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Food safety regulations and the perception of risk are different among countries. This
can lead to persistent trade frictions and even reduce food trade. These differences may
also lead to increased dialogue between countries, with improved food safety systems
the result. Although little disruption to trade has occurred for food safety reasons (con-
sidering the total volume of food trade), trade issues or crises related to food safety are
wide ranging. These issues and crises challenge policymakers and industries to both pro-
tect domestic food supplies and nurture international markets. Meanwhile, consumers in
developed countries are demanding safer food. Risk reduction measures and quality cer-
tification programs can not only pre-empt food safety crises, but can better position
exporters in emerging overseas markets. However, coherency between trade and food
safety goals requires public intervention and investment and/or private costs.
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This report presents ERS research on the interaction between food safety and inter-
national trade. Food safety challenges are mounting and crises like “mad cow
disease” are becoming more pronounced. Growth in world food trade means that
U.S. consumers are more dependent on the food safety measures used in other coun-
tries and that there are greater opportunities for U.S. food exports. 
This research was performed by examining the conceptual relationships between
food safety and international trade and by examining the meat and poultry, produce,
food/animal feed crop, and seafood sectors for trends in trade, food safety regulation,
and the resolution of incidents and disputes related to both. 
Food safety regulations and standards evolve differently around the world as coun-
tries respond to food safety crises and prepare for perceived exposure to emerging
food safety risks. Regulations and standards worldwide are shaped by: (1) countries’
experiences with food safety, (2) inherent food safety risk levels in each country’s
food supply (e.g., livestock host factors), (3) countries’and industries’ability and
willingness to allocate resources to control these risks, and (4) differences in
consumers’food safety perceptions and, hence, preferences for targeting risk reduc-
tion efforts. For example, countries’perceptions about Salmonella risks in poultry
vary tremendously, as do their commitments and methods of control. As a result,
countries’trade restrictions for Salmonella vary by type, extent, and duration.
These differences in regulations and standards among countries can lead to inter-
national trade conflicts or disputes and can ultimately affect global patterns of
food demand and reduce trade. In particular, food safety-related disputes among
trading partners may arise from:
● New or more stringent standards and rapidly changing food safety regulations,
● The difficulty of separating the roles of food safety and non-science issues (e.g.,
consumer preferences) in regulatory decisionmaking,
● Difficulties in determining whether an equivalent safety outcome has been
achieved when process standards are used,
● Strong differences in consumer risk perceptions and preferences,
● Newly identified or unfamiliar hazards, and
● Increased trade volumes from new or less proven sources.
Therefore, the causes of food safety-related trade disputes are varied, complex, and
tenacious. For example, the 1989 European Union ban on animal growth hormones
originated from concerns there about the effects of hormones used in beef produc-
tion on human health. The scientific basis of the ban was later successfully chal-
lenged by the U.S. and Canada, but the European Union (EU) has still not lifted its
ban. This is the only food safety dispute that has advanced to a World Trade
Organization dispute panel.
Although differences in standards and regulations may lead to conflicts and
disputes, they may also spur fruitful dialogue between countries, causing some
countries to alter and improve their food safety systems. For example, regulatory
agencies worldwide are increasingly adopting the Hazard Analysis and Critical
Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● iiiControl Point (HACCP) system as a foundation for new regulations to control
microbial pathogens in food.
There has been relatively little disruption to food trade for safety reasons when
considering the magnitude of global food and agricultural trade ($436 billion in
2001), notable changes over the past decade in food consumption, production, and
trade (for example, the increased consumption of food away from home, greater live-
stock concentration, and increased volume of food trade); the vast number and
variety of food categories and products traded; the roughly 200 countries partici-
pating in food trade; and challenges to food safety that include pathogens, pesticide
and drug residues, food additives, environmental toxins, persistent organic pollutants,
unconventional agents such as those associated with “mad cow disease,” and
zoonotic diseases. However, the globalization of the food supply could introduce
new food safety risks, revive previously controlled risks, and spread contaminated
food wider. For the United States, there is no evidence as to whether food safety
risks are increasing, remaining stable, or decreasing with trade. 
Trade frictions related to food safety can be persistent, and any coherency between
trade and food safety goals will likely require private costs and/or public interven-
tion and investment. Global food trade will continue to increase due to improve-
ments in transportation, infrastructure, and marketing networks, and to global
increases in per capita income levels and populations. Consumers in developed
countries are demanding certain attributes in food, like safety. Therefore,
improving food safety and expanding international trade are compatible—even
mutually reinforcing—goals. Governments and the private sector must react
quickly to new food safety crises in order to minimize human illness and financial
losses. But governments also invest in food safety to protect human health and
expand food markets indefinitely. The private sector will be similarly pre-emptive
where market incentives are strong. 
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I
ncreased international food trade means that coun-
tries share the responsibility for food safety, which
pertains all along the food supply chain from pro-
ducers to consumers. With increased international food
trade, this supply chain transcends international bor-
ders. Consumers benefit from worldwide trade through
lower prices, year-round supplies, and a greater quality
and variety of food. However, globalization of the food
supply could introduce new food safety risks, revive
previously controlled risks, and spread contaminated
food wider. For food producers, food safety issues can
raise production costs, influence reputation, and close
off international markets. 
Trade in international markets may introduce new
costs for addressing and managing food safety haz-
ards. Most internationally traded food poses no human
health risks, with food safety incidents rare consider-
ing the total volume of trade. Trade disputes over food
safety, however, can be persistent, and may require
public intervention/investment and private costs to
overcome. This report highlights how food safety dis-
putes and challenges arise and are resolved.
Although food safety standards are frequently viewed
as technical barriers to trade, improvements in food
safety and expanded international trade are likely com-
patible and even mutually reinforcing. Domestic and
international firms share and respond to the same
incentives to provide safer food. Reputation and sales
can be enhanced for those exporting firms and indus-
tries making noticeably safer products, whereas firms
implicated in a food safety crisis may suffer a wide
range of business losses. From our research here, we
believe that, over time, food safety should continue to
improve worldwide with the spread of private and pub-
lic food safety control efforts, increased scientific
understanding about food safety, and improved dia-
logue between countries. 
Food safety risks are defined here as they pertain to
human health, covering well-established and perceived
impacts from agents and sources including: (1) micro-
bial pathogens (i.e., illness-causing bacteria, viruses,
parasites, fungi, and their toxins); (2) residues from pes-
ticides, food additives, livestock drugs, and growth hor-
mones; (3) environmental toxins such as heavy metals
(e.g., lead and mercury); (4) persistent organic pollu-
tants (e.g., dioxin); (5) unconventional agents such as
prions associated with bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy (BSE) or “mad cow disease” in cattle; (6) zoonotic
diseases that can be transmitted through food from ani-
mals to humans (e.g., tuberculosis); and (7) foods pro-
duced or processed with practices perceived to involve
risks, such as irradiation. Scientists generally agree that
food safety risks are low relative to many human health
risks such as cancer and heart disease. Among food
safety hazards, human health risks are highest from
foodborne pathogens such as Campylobacter and
Salmonella, each of which causes well over a million
illnesses annually in the United States (Mead et al.,
1999). These are also common pathogens worldwide.
Food safety and trade issues related to it are becoming
more pronounced. There has been an increased scientific
awareness of the public health risks from unsafe food,
including both acute and long-term health consequences
(Lindsay, 1997). Many foodborne pathogens and dis-
eases, such as new pathogenic strains of E. coli,a r e
emerging as technological improvements enable their
detection (Käferstein et al., 1997). Also troubling is
accumulating evidence that some pathogens are becom-
ing resistant to certain antibiotics (GAO, 1999; Tauxe,
1997). Public health authorities are growing more
engaged with food safety as improvements in informa-
tion and reporting systems accompany greater concern
about food safety in general (Käferstein et al., 1997). 
The traditional foodborne outbreak scenario is chang-
ing (Tauxe, 1997). In the past, outbreaks were mostly
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1Economist with the Food and Rural Economics Division,
Economic Research Service, and Professor, Department of
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois. acute and highly local and resulted from a high level
of contamination. Now, we see relatively more out-
breaks from low level contamination of widely distrib-
uted commercial food products affecting many
counties, States, and nations. This development has
been attributed to changes in food production and dis-
tribution and to the growth of international trade.
The U.S. food system is changing at all levels—con-
sumption, production, and trade. These changes alter the
nature and incidence of food safety risks. In the past
few decades, consumption of poultry, fish, fruits, and
vegetables has increased (Regmi, 2001), as has con-
sumption of prepared foods and foods consumed away
from home (Lin et al., 1999). Meanwhile, the demand
for better food safety has tended to increase with grow-
ing consumer affluence and awareness of food safety
issues (Hooker and Caswell, 1999). Food production
has changed notably, leading to a different set of food
safety risks for the food industry to manage. For exam-
ple, U.S. aquaculture production increased by over 50
percent between 1990 and 2000 (NMFS, 2002) and the
aquaculture share of total world production has also
increased (FAO, 2000). Farm-raised fish pose a different
set of food safety challenges than does wild-caught
seafood. Farm-raised fish are subject to contamination
from residues by production inputs (e.g., vaccines, feed
additives, and antibiotics), whereas wild-caught seafood
are more likely subject to contamination from, say, his-
tamine (FDA, 2001). 
Shifts in food consumption have led to some of these
changes in food production, while other changes are
driven by advances in technology and by comparative
advantages of nations. Shifts in food consumption
coincide with increased trade and changes in the com-
position of world agricultural trade (Regmi, 2001). Not
only are trade volumes increasing—especially of fresh,
minimally processed, or high-value foods—but coun-
tries like the United States are looking to imports for a
wider variety of safe food year-round. 
There is no scientific evidence that food imported into
the United States, as a whole, poses greater food safety
risks than domestically produced food (Zepp et al.,
1998). Concern remains, however, for products such as
seafood because more countries are exporting to the
United States and some of these countries have poor
internal control systems and/or are in tropical areas
where toxin and bacteria hazards are intrinsically higher
(Ahmed, 1991). In general, importing countries have
limited ability to enforce their standards outside their
borders and may view exporters’standards as inade-
quate or unreliable (Lichtenberg, 2003). Establishing the
equivalence of another country’s regulatory system is
difficult (see chapter 3). Although risks from imported
food sources are similar to the kind and extent of risks
from domestic sources, the United States has less food
safety oversight over countries from which we import,
which are increasingly from developing countries. 
In general, less developed countries are adapting to
higher standards of food safety oversight as they enter
new markets, and technical assistance helps with this.
Often, higher standards apply only to production for
export markets (see chapter 5). Both public and private
sectors are helping to safeguard imported food. For
example, private importers may set safety standards for
imports over and above those set by the U.S. Govern-
ment. However, reducing a residue tolerance, for exam-
ple, does not necessarily provide additional protection
from disease or injury. Governments in exporting coun-
tries may work with their industries to ensure food safety
as well.
Although over a dozen Federal agencies share jurisdic-
tion over food safety (e.g., education, enforcement,
inspection, monitoring, outbreak management, research,
and surveillance), four have major regulatory roles: the
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Department of Commerce’s
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (IOM,
1998).2 These four agencies actively monitor imports
and, in some cases, survey the safety of production
abroad. In general, FDA oversees almost all import
inspections, which include testing for pesticide residues
or sanitary violations. Meat and poultry products fall
under FSIS jurisdiction, and this agency carries out
audits of foreign plants to ensure that sanitation meets
U.S. standards. FSIS also re-inspects imports of these
products using statistical sampling techniques to verify
that exporting countries’inspection systems are working.
FSIS and FDA share responsibility for egg product
imports (IOM, 1998). For seafood, NMFS conducts a
grading program and a voluntary inspection of fishing
vessels, seafood products, and processing plants; FDA
has regulatory responsibility for seafood safety, includ-
ing imports (IOM, 1998). FSIS requires that exporting
2 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA
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EPA, see www.epa.gov, and for NMFS, see www.nmfs.noaa.govcountries have food safety systems equivalent to those in
the U.S., while FDA lacks such authority, relying mostly
on port-of-entry sampling to determine if imports meet
U.S. standards (GAO, 1998).
With heightened awareness of food safety concerns and
the rapidly changing food system, food safety standards
are becoming more stringent and responsive to new haz-
ards (see chapter 3). Countries that trade internationally
may have different desired levels of food safety and food
safety regimes, as well as different costs of complying
with regulations. These differences may lead to trade
conflicts or reductions in trade (see chapter 2). These
differences may, on the other hand, lead to increased dia-
logue between countries and cause some to change or
even improve their food safety systems.
Who Manages and Ensures 
Food Safety?
Food safety, both domestically and internationally, is
managed and ensured by both private and public sector
efforts (Caswell and Henson, 1997). 
Private Sector
The private sector, both here and abroad, has strong
incentives to prevent food safety crises and to mitigate
their impact if they arise. Firms implicated in a crisis
may suffer from reputation lost, stock prices reduced,
plants closed for cleanup or permanently shut down,
food poisoning lawsuits filed, premiums raised for
product liability insurance, and demand for product
reduced enough to threaten entire markets or industries
(Buzby et al., 2001). For example, the Guatemalan
raspberry industry shrank from 85 producers to 3 once
caught in the spotlight of repeated Cyclospora out-
breaks from contaminated raspberries (see chapter 5). 
Many sectors have great potential for growth in world
markets and so have added incentives to produce safer
food (e.g., see chapter 4 on the growth of the red meat
sector). As safety and quality attributes are increas-
ingly demanded by consumers, the private sector
responds.3 For example, the seafood sector exhibits
increased market segmentation, with wealthier coun-
tries favoring higher valued, safer products while less
wealthy countries favor lower valued products with
fewer food safety assurances (Wessells, 2002). In gen-
eral, the private sector pioneers food safety advances.
Firms such as Nestle, in fact, have developed food
safety assurance standards beyond mandated ones
(USDEC, 2001).4 Importers often target their food
safety efforts to sell to large supermarket chains with
particular food standards (e.g., regarding produce). 
For branded products, private-sector diligence may
help firms improve their international competitiveness
when their products are perceived to be noticeably
safer. Private approaches fostering food safety include
self regulation, vertical integration, third-party certifi-
cation, and common approaches to risk identification,
assessment, and management such as Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems and vol-
untary guidelines or Good Agricultural Practices
(GAPs). Vertical integration is growing in the United
States and is characterized by a single firm controlling
the flow of a commodity across two or more stages of
production (Martinez and Reed, 1996). It can better
guarantee the safety and quality of a firm’s inputs and
enhance the ability to trace product ingredients or
processes back through the food production and mar-
keting chain. Traceback capability is critical in the
event of a food safety problem; it can help identify the
source of the contamination. Tracing such incidents
forward can eliminate other firms or products as
potential sources of contamination (see chapter 5).5
Third-party certification provides assurances to con-
sumers that the information supplied by firms is cor-
rect (Golan et al., 2000) (e.g., the International
Organization for Standardization has its ISO 9000
series or “EN 29000” in Europe). HACCP essentially
identifies, monitors, and controls hazards at critical
points in food production and processing. Many pro-
ducer groups have instituted quality assurance pro-
grams, and firms often use a mix of approaches.
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4 Of course, the amount of market share that firms can capture
from increased food safety efforts will depend on how well con-
sumers can distinguish the safer product, how willing they are to
pay for the safer product, and how well firms communicate that
their products are safer to consumers.
5 Note traceback is different than traceabilty. Traceability is estab-
lished when information about a particular attribute of a food prod-
uct is systematically recorded from creation through marketing
(Golan et al., 2002). 
3 Although the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations considers food safety to be one attribute of food quality,
the U.S. Food Industry considers food safety and quality as sepa-
rate attributes. Therefore, we follow the latter usage in this report.Public Sector 
Although the private sector has strong incentives to
produce safe food, market signals to producers are
imperfect. Consumers often cannot discern the safety
of their food before buying it, and so their preference
for safer food may not be reflected in the price they
are willing to pay. Also, market transactions do not
include all of the social costs of food safety (e.g., med-
ical costs, lost work time) (Buzby and Roberts, 1997).
Additionally, high transaction and information costs,
combined with the structure of the legal system, limit
the effectiveness of litigation for compensating ill con-
sumers and providing firms with signals to produce
safer food (Buzby et al., 2001). Therefore, in addition
to private sector approaches, government regulation is
necessary to ensure food safety.
New approaches to food safety regulation emerged in
industrialized countries during the 1990s following
advances in science, changes in markets, and increased
awareness of food safety risks. There are seven main
trends for food safety regulation in industrialized
nations (see chapter 3). Regulatory agencies are
increasingly:
● Organized into one agency that can focus on food
safety,
● Using risk analysis to design regulation,
● Stressing a farm-to-table approach in addressing
food safety hazards,
● Adopting the HACCP system as a basis for new
regulation of microbial pathogens in food,
● Adopting more stringent standards for many food
safety hazards,
● Adding new and more extensive regulation to 
handle newly identified hazards, and
● Improving market performance in food safety
through provision of information.
These trends cut across commodities (see chapters 4,
5, 6, and 7). However, each food sector may also face
unique issues, such as BSE in cattle and bovine prod-
ucts, histamine poisoning in seafood, and mycotoxin
(toxic byproduct of mold infestations) risks in grains. 
Different food safety standards and regulations natu-
rally evolve around the world, even when countries
have similar levels of economic development. For
example, standards may differ because countries dis-
agree about science—countries may have different
scientific standards or they may interpret the same
science differently. Food safety contamination can
vary greatly among countries because of differences
in available technology (e.g., refrigeration), plant and
livestock host factors (e.g., herds exhibit varying
infection rates, endemic diseases), food production
practices (e.g., use of veterinary drugs), cultural dif-
ferences (e.g., routine consumption of raw seafood),
and geographic or climatic differences (e.g., colder
climates may kill some pathogens) (Buzby and
Roberts, 1999). These differences among countries
may affect the relative risks or imports of food from
different countries. 
When the U.S. sets standards that affect imports or
negotiates access to other markets with different stan-
dards, it does so under the rules set out by the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, which was established
under the World Trade Organization in 1995. The SPS
Agreement was a result of the 1986-93 Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This
Agreement addresses food safety regulations and pro-
vides a framework for determining the legitimacy of
regulations that restrict trade and for resolving poten-
tial trade conflicts. Under the SPS Agreement, WTO
members recognize several principles, including:
● Transparency: Member nations are required to
publish their regulations and provide a mechanism
for answering questions from trading partners.
● Equivalence: Member nations must accept that
SPS measures of another country are equivalent if
they result in the same level of health protection.
● Science-based measures: SPS measures must be
based upon risk assessments and must be chosen
so as to minimize distortions to trade.6
● Harmonization: Member nations recognize the
desirability of common SPS measures. Three
international organizations are recognized as
sources of internationally agreed-upon standards:
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for
human health measures, the International Office of
Epizootics (OIE) for animal and human health
measures, and the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC) for plant health measures.
4 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA
6 Risk assessments identify the sources and incidence of risks, and
identify possible control strategies.The SPS Agreement also establishes dispute resolution
mechanisms. Because of improved transparency and
the international SPS framework established for food
safety, many disputes are diffused or resolved before
reaching a formal dispute process. Several chapters in
this report refer to the SPS Agreement, because it has
played a role in the negotiation of trade disputes or
potential disputes over food safety standards. For
example, the emergence of BSE has created many dif-
ficulties for trade of live cattle and bovine products,
and international organizations have helped prompt
new standards to control BSE in the beef supply. 
One area of controversy is the difference in food safety
standards that exists among countries (e.g., mycotoxin
risk assessments and standards, see chapter 6). Codex
has facilitated the discussion of internationally accept-
able standards, and the SPS Agreement has eased nego-
tiations among countries concerned about new standards
proposed by the European Union (EU) and by others.
Food safety issues examined in this report for other
commodities, such as produce, seafood, and poultry,
have been addressed either through private efforts to
meet standards or through bilateral negotiations over
acceptable standards and systems of oversight. 
In essence, the private and public sectors have
responded to consumer demand for quality and safety
by developing and implementing common approaches
for quality and safety control, management, and assur-
ance (Regmi, 2001), often working in partnership. The
extent of public versus private responsibility varies
among commodities and food products. Public and pri-
vate approaches are often intertwined with each other
and with multilateral coordination mechanisms (e.g.,
Codex and HACCP). For example, the public sector
mandates HACCP for some foods, while the private
sector voluntarily implements it for other foods. In
another example, the fruit and vegetable sector is using
third-party certification to reduce microbial and other
hazards, and this certification is based on GAPs pro-
vided by FDA. 
How Do Food Safety Disputes
in Trade Arise? 
The dynamic nature of food trade, the emergence of
new hazards, and remaining differences in regulatory
approaches and capacity can still spur disputes over
differing food safety standards. In particular, food
safety disputes in trade may arise from the following
(see chapter 3):
● The appearance of new hazards and/or increased
trade volumes from new sources can lead to food
safety incidents or disputes in trade (see chapters
4, 5, and 8 for examples);
● Rising standards and rapidly changing food safety
regulations in industrialized countries can create
challenges for developing countries (see chapters
5, 6, and 7 for examples);
● If new or more stringent standards are process
standards, then it is more difficult to determine
whether an equivalent safety outcome has been
achieved (see chapters 4 and 7 for examples); 
● Strong differences remain with respect to con-
sumer risk preferences, consumer perceptions, and
the role of non-science issues in regulatory deci-
sionmaking (see chapters 3 and 4).
The causes of food safety and international trade dis-
putes are complex and likely to persist for some time. 
Recently, several new food safety hazards have dis-
rupted trade. BSE, for one, emerged in the mid-1990s
and instigated new regulations, some of which have
proven contentious among trading partners (chapters 3
and 4). And the Belgian dioxin crisis temporarily sus-
pended the trade of wide range of products (e.g., pork,
cheese, and poultry) in many countries (chapter 8). 
What Food Safety-Related
Trade Disputes and Challenges
Arise in U.S. Commodity
Sectors? 
Health risks from internationally traded agricultural
products outweigh risks from domestically produced
products in at least one important respect—trade can
spread pathogens, pests, and diseases into countries tra-
ditionally free of these hazards. In essence, animal,
plant, and human health concerns with domestic agricul-
tural products tend to stem from endemic pathogens,
pests, and diseases, and the responses to these hazards
are often established and ongoing. Hazards introduced
through international trade may pose a whole new set of
problems unfamiliar to the importing country. These
problems may threaten trade and the economic health of
the importing and exporting country. BSE, for example,
Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 5has affected a number of U.S. domestic industries even
though there has never been a BSE case identified in the
United States (chapter 4).
Food safety challenges are different across commodity
and food types because of the nature of the products.
First, it matters whether the product is highly per-
ishable. The potential for faster decomposition means
a shorter shelf life, greater food handling challenges,
and fewer leftovers to test in the event of an outbreak.
Raw foods tend to pose higher risks than cooked or
processed foods and may be more likely to pose risks
of cross contamination.7 Animal products such as
meat, poultry, seafood, dairy products, and eggs are
the foods most likely to cause outbreaks of human ill-
ness in the United States (CAST, 1994, p. 32).8 In
recent years, the variety of foods associated with food-
borne illness (e.g., salami, lettuce, bean sprouts, and
raspberries) has increased (Tauxe, 1997), perhaps with
improvements in detection and traceback. In particular,
foodborne outbreak investigations are tracing a greater
proportion of outbreaks to fresh produce (Tauxe,
1997). Less perishable foods such as grains tend to
pose fewer acute food safety challenges (e.g., myco-
toxins) (chapter 6). 
Second, the nature of the human health risks associ-
ated with food matters. Do risks lead to illnesses that
are acute or chronic, of low or high severity, and/or
low or high incidence? The nature of risks determines
how the risk is regulated and controlled, and its associ-
ated costs. For example, most food safety hazards
from seafood, meat, and poultry are from the immedi-
ate health risks of ingesting foods contaminated with
pathogens and their toxins, so regulation and testing
tends to focus on reducing these kinds of contamina-
tion. On the other hand, human health risks from con-
taminated grain products generally stem from
increased cancer risk due to long-term exposure to
mycotoxins, so surveillance and prevention measures
are aimed at these hazards. Food safety concerns from
produce involve both the immediate health risks from
pathogens and the chronic risks from long-term expo-
sure to pesticide residues, and so testing is for both
types of hazards.
Third, whether the food safety issue is linked with
productivity in the commodity sector also matters.
Meat and poultry are singular commodities in that their
human and animal health issues are often linked. Some
pathogens such as Salmonella and E. coli O157:H7
exist naturally in the gastrointestinal tracts of animals
and birds (Wells et al., 1998). Some pathogens can
impair the health of the animal, and contaminate meat
and poultry during slaughter if the gastrointestinal tract
is punctured or if the hides, feathers, and hoofs are con-
taminated when animals enter the slaughterhouse (IFT,
2002; Feinman, 1979). Animals fed mycotoxin-contam-
inated grain can become ill, which can lower animal
productivity (weight gain, milk or egg production)
(CAST, 2003). Animal byproducts must be destroyed if
mycotoxin residue levels exceed standards (CAST,
2003). Mycotoxin levels are higher when crops are
under stress or stored in improper conditions, so well
managed crops would suffer less contamination and
reduce waste. This improves the incentives for food
safety diligence (CAST, 2003).
Fourth, differences in challenges across commodity
sectors also depend on the extent of vertical coordi-
nation and joint cooperation among stakeholders in
the sector. Well-developed mechanisms for coordina-
tion enhance the ability of a commodity sector to share
costs and incentives arising from food safety improve-
ments. Such mechanisms can also facilitate traceback
and recalls if outbreaks occur. For example, grower
organizations in produce have spearheaded traceback
systems to protect the reputation of their particular
crops (chapter 5). Without a rapid and effective system
for traceback, sectors may face serious financial con-
sequences if their products are erroneously implicated
with a food safety crisis. For example, the California
Strawberry Commission estimated that growers in the
central coast of California lost $16 million in revenue
during June 1996 when their products were falsely
implicated with the Cyclospora outbreak later attrib-
uted to Guatemalan raspberries (Mishen, 1996). 
Although food safety issues, challenges, and
approaches differ among sectors, food safety incidents
can compromise markets, market share, and business
or product reputation across the board. All commodity
sectors are concerned with protecting their product’s
reputation for safety in both domestic and international
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7 Although processing and refrigeration can kill or slow growth of
some hazards in perishable foods, they do not result in zero risk.
Some pathogens such as Listeria can grow and even multiply
under refrigerated conditions, and some toxins and mycotoxins can
remain harmful after cooking or processing. 
8 The extent of product co-mingling may also be important. For
example, the nature of ground beef is such that one hamburger
may contain meat from many cows and any existing contamination
can be spread throughout a batch of hamburger, making thorough
cooking even more important (chapter 4).markets (see chapters 4 and 5). Furthermore, producers
in all commodity sectors prefer to have regulations and
standards applied in the same way to imports and
domestic production, so that they can compete on an
equal basis to provide safe food (see chapter 4 for an
example of differential application of standards). 
Trade Frictions Over Food
Safety Persistent but
Surmountable
Food safety concerns and new food safety regulations in
industrialized nations have led to trade frictions. Though
all countries value food safety, the best means of ensur-
ing it and the extent of control necessary is debatable—
and is debated. For example, the United States and the
EU have disagreed over both risk standards and meth-
ods of risk management (e.g., the role of scientific and
economic analysis; level of product standards; risk
equivalence of different process standards) (chapter 3).
Such trade frictions can be persistent. For example,
mycotoxin contamination is recognized as a risk that is
difficult or impossible to control, and under the precau-
tionary principle, some countries may set new standards
on certain mycotoxins despite unclear scientific evi-
dence about health risks (chapter 6). 
Ultimately, facilitating trade without compromising con-
sumer protection is an inherently challenging task (chap-
ter 6). Any coherency between trade goals and food
safety goals will likely incur private costs and/or public
intervention and investment. International institutions are
working toward harmonizing trade and food safety goals
and the private sector is also contributing, particularly
where market incentives are strong. When a food safety
crisis arises, both governments and the private sector
react quickly to minimize human illnesses and financial
losses. With the Cyclospora outbreak attributed to
Guatemalan raspberries in 1996, FDA, Health Canada,
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Guatemalan
officials joined forces, while the Guatemalan Berry
Commission developed a system to characterize farms
according to food safety risks (chapter 5).
There has been remarkably little disruption to trade for
food safety reasons, despite large increases in the vol-
ume, value, and variety of food trade. Global food and
agricultural trade has increased from $138 billion in
1975 to $436 billion in 2001. For the United States at
least, there is no evidence that food safety risks are
correlated with trade volume. 
Food safety can enhance trade as more prosperous con-
sumers worldwide demand certain attributes, like safety.
Both market share and value could grow for producers
who can manage and certify quality and safety. Trade
provides consumers with a year-round supply of a wider
variety of food. If a food safety crisis does occur, inter-
national markets and crisis-free exporters offer a source
of flexibility in satisfying demand.
Because the government and private sector have limited
resources to devote to food safety, it is important to tar-
get them effectively. More research is needed to sup-
port priority setting. FDA product sampling is already
targeted to products with higher risks to human health.
But how to monitor and set standards for foods pro-
duced in different ways under different regulatory 
systems? Research might explore what kind of stan-
dards (e.g., process or product) provide for easier 
monitoring and assurance of food safety in trade and
explore the relative cost of these standards. 
Food sectors quickly respond and adjust food safety
practices after food safety incidents (e.g., the private
sector response to Cyclospora outbreaks). Meanwhile,
consumers tend to adapt and regain trust in the food
supply when new private/public oversight efforts are
announced (or simply with the passage of time). 
The complexity of food safety issues in trade means
that disputes and difficulties will continue to arise.
Nevertheless, the many similarities in regulatory
approaches among industrialized nations may enable
greater agreement about higher standards. As industri-
alized countries with major markets adopt new regula-
tions, there is incentive for other countries to follow
suit (Vogel, 1995). Furthermore, government can help
the private sector allay food safety concerns, by pro-
viding guidelines for good agricultural practices (see
chapter 5). Private certification of compliance with
these guidelines can facilitate trade, even when stan-
dards and requirements differ among countries. 
Food trade will continue to expand with growth in
demand, increased market access, and reductions in
technical barriers. Food safety enhancement is essen-
tial to consumer welfare and product reputation. Both
U.S. consumers and producers have an interest in see-
ing improved food safety and expanded food trade.
This report highlights the issues that must be managed
if this is to happen.
Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 7References
Ahmed, F.E., Editor, Institute of Medicine. “Seafood
Safety,” National Academy Press: Washington, DC,
1991. www.nap.edu/books/0309043875/
html/index.html, accessed Aug. 9, 2003.
Buzby, Jean C., Paul D. Frenzen, and Barbara Rasco.
“Product Liability and Microbial Foodborne Illness,”
U.S. Dept. Agr., Econ. Res. Serv., AER-799, April
2001. www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer799/
Buzby, Jean, and Donna Roberts. “Food Safety and
International Trade in the Twenty-first Century,”
CHOICES, Fourth Quarter (1999):23-27.
Buzby, Jean C., and Tanya Roberts. “Economic Costs
and Trade Impacts of Foodborne Illness,” World
Health Statistics Quarterly, 50, ½ (1997):57-66.
Caswell, J.A., and S.J. Henson. “Interaction of Private
and Public Food Quality Control Systems in Global
Markets,” proceedings of Globalisation of the Food
Industry: Policy Implications, R.J. Loader, S.J.
Henson, and W.B. Traill (eds.), 1997, pp. 217-234.
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology
(CAST). “Mycotoxins: Risks in Plant, Animal, and
Human Systems,” Task Force Report 139, Ames,
IA. 2003.
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology
(CAST). “Foodborne Pathogens: Risks and
Consequences,” R. 122, Ames, IA, Sept. 1994.




Feinman, S.E. “The Transmission of Antibiotic-
Resistant Bacteria to People and Animals,” CRC
Handbook Series in Zoonoses: Antibiotics,
Sulfonamides, and Public Health. pp. 151-71. CRC
Press, Boca Raton, FL. 1979.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United
Nations. “The State of World Fisheries and
Aquaculture,” 2000. www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/
X8002E/X8002E00.htm, accessed July 21, 2003.
Golan, Elise, Barry Krissoff, and Fred Kuchler.
“Traceability for Food Marketing and Food Safety:
What’s the Next Step?” Agricultural Outlook. U.S.
Dept. Agr., Economic Research Service, Jan.-Feb.
2002, pp. 21-25.
Golan, E., F. Kuchler, and L. Mitchell. “ Economics of
Food Labeling,” U.S. Dept. Agr., Economic
Research Service, AER-793, Dec. 2000.
Hooker, N.H. and Caswell, J.A. “ A Framework for
Evaluating Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade Related to
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulation.” Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 50, 2 (May 1999).
Institute of Food Technologists (IFT). IFT Expert
Report on Emerging Microbiological Food Safety
Issues: Implications for Control in the 21st Century,
Feb. 2002, accessed Aug. 7, 2003 www.ift.org/
govtrelations/microfs
Institutes of Medicine (IOM). Ensuring Safe Food:
From Production to Consumption. National
Research Council, National Academy Press:
Washington, DC, 1998.
Käferstein, F. K.,Y. Motarjemi, and D.W. Bettcher.
“Foodborne Disease Control: A Transnational
Challenge,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 3,4(Oct.-
Dec. 1997), www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol3no4/
kaferste.htm
Lichtenberg, Erik. “Impact of Food Safety on World
Trade Issues,” chapter 35 in Food Safety Handbook,
R.H. Schmidt and G.E. Rodrick (eds.). John Wiley
& Sons, Inc.: Hoboken, NJ, 2003.
Lin, B.-H., J. Guthrie, and E. Frazão. “Nutrient
Contribution of Food Away from Home,” chapter 12
in America’s Eating Habits: Changes and
Consequences, U.S. Dept. Agr., Econ. Res. Serv.,
AIB-750, Apr. 1999, www.ers.usda.gov/publica-
tions/aib750.
Lindsay, J.A. “Chronic Sequelae of Foodborne
Disease,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 3,4(Oct.-
Dec. 1997), www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol3no4/
lindsay.htm.
Martinez, S., and A. Reed. From Farmers to
Consumers: Vertical Coordination in the Food
Industry, U.S. Dept. Agr., Economic Research
Service, AIB-720, June 1996.
8 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDAMead, P. S., L. Slutsker, V. Dietz, L. F. McCaig, J. S.
Bresee, C. Shapiro, P. M. Griffin, and Robert V.
Tauxe. “Food-Related Illness and Death in the
United States,” Emerging Infectious Diseases.
5,5(Sept.-Oct. 1999):607-625.
Mishen, P. “Strawberry Update: $16 Million Loss due
to Cyclospora,” National Food and Agricultural
Policy Project, Arizona State University, Tempe,
AZ, 1996.
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), U.S. Dept.
Comm. “Imports and Exports of Fishery Products:
Annual Summary, 2001,” Dept. of Commerce,
2002.
Regmi, A. (ed.).“Changing Structure of Global Food
Consumption and Trade,” USDA, ERS, WRS-01-1,
May 2001.
Tauxe, R. V. “Emerging Foodborne Diseases: An
Evolving Public Health Challenge,” Emerging
Infectious Diseases. 3,4(Oct.-Dec. 1997):425-434.
U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC) “Buying the
Very Best,” Export Profile, 11,3(Oct. 2001).
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “Fish and
Fisheries Products Hazards and Controls Guide,”
2001, pp.16-37. www.cfsan.fda.gov/~acrobat/
haccp4c.pdf 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). Food Safety:
Federal Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Imported
Foods are Inconsistent and Unreliable. Resources,
Community, and Economic Division, Report 98-
103, Washington, DC, 1998.
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). The
Agricultural Use of Antibiotics and Its Implications
for Human Health. GAO/RCED-99-74. April 1999.
Vogel, David. Trading Up: Consumer and
Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy.
Harvard University Press, 1995.
Wells, S., P.J. Fedorka-Cray, T. Besser, P. McDonough,
and B. Smith. “E. coli O157 and Salmonella—
Status on U.S., Dairy Operations,” U.S. Dept. Agr.,
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv., National
Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS),
Dairy ‘96, May 1998.
Wessells, C.R. University of Rhode Island. Personal
communication, July 23, 2002.
Zepp, G., F. Kuchler, and G. Lucier. “Food Safety and
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables: Is There a Difference
Between Imported and Domestically Produced
Products?” Vegetables and Specialties, U.S. Dept.
Agr., Econ. Res. Serv., VGS-274 (April 1998):
23-28.
Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 9Summary
T
he market has incentives to provide some degree
of food safety, as firms depend on their reputa-
tions for repeat sales. However, the market gener-
ally does not provide the socially desirable amount of
food safety for two reasons. First, consumers cannot
determine how safe food is before buying it. Even when
consumers purchase foods, they often cannot tell
whether a particular food was responsible for making
them ill or whether consuming it might have long-term
health consequences. Food safety measures can increase
costs for firms, and this lack of information reduces the
incentives for a firm to provide safe food. Consumers
will not necessarily be able to assign the appropriate
credit or blame to firms that provide safe and unsafe
food respectively. Indeed, when consumers learn of a
food safety incident and the unsafe food cannot be attrib-
uted to a particular firm, consumers might simply stop
consuming that type of food altogether. 
Second, when consumers eat unsafe food and become
ill, costs extend beyond consumers themselves to
healthcare workers, employers, and family members.
Consumers don’t usually take these costs to others into
account when they consume food. Thus, society would
like consumers to devote even more resources to mak-
ing certain that their food is safe in order to avoid
these extra costs.
Government regulation is an attempt to increase the
amount of food safety provided by the market, as the
market alone will usually not provide the socially desir-
able level of food safety. Regulations can specify partic-
ular processes that a firm must use to produce food, or
they can simply specify a level of safety for the final
food product. The latter are generally considered more
efficient, as they allow the firm to select the least expen-
sive method of arriving at the desired product.
Regulations often raise costs for firms, but consumers
are often willing to pay more for safer food. However,
firms might have a difficult time communicating
improved safety to consumers.
When countries trade internationally, the same issues
arise, with a few additional concerns. Regulations might
differ across countries, as countries have different types
of regulations, different levels of tolerance for food
safety risks, different costs of producing safer food, and
different levels of accidental contamination. If a regula-
tion imposed by the government of one country is more
stringent, its firms will have higher costs and may be
unable to sell their goods as cheaply as foreign firms
not subject to the regulations. Consumers will pay more
for safer food, but the firm’s ability to communicate its
food safety level—and the consumers’inability to take
social costs into account—can leave the domestic firms
at a disadvantage. These regulatory differences can cre-
ate conflicts across countries.
When countries disagree over food safety regulations for
imports, several outcomes can occur. The domestic
country can ban less regulated foreign foods. If the for-
eign producers really cannot provide the safer food as
cheaply as domestic firms, this could benefit consumers.
However, if foreign firms could provide food that is
cheap and safe, consumers lose from a ban. If the for-
eign firms decide that the value of the domestic coun-
try’s market is high enough, the foreign firms can adopt
the domestic country’s costlier food safety regulations. If
these regulations spread throughout the foreign country’s
industry, this can improve food safety for the foreign
country’s own consumers. Finally, the countries can
negotiate their way to a compromise solution, if both
feel that the costs they must incur are worth the benefit
of maintaining the trading relationship.
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Chapter 2
Economic Theory and Conceptual
Relationships Between Food Safety 
and International Trade
Lorraine Mitchell1
1 The author is an economist with the Market and Trade
Economics Division of the Economic Research Service.Introduction
This chapter discusses the basic economic theory
behind food safety regulation, and its predicted effects
on trade. Food safety issues are becoming increasingly
important in the arena of international food trade. As
countries begin to lower agricultural tariffs and
become increasingly integrated into world markets,
they purchase more food from abroad. As consumers
grow wealthier, they also focus more on the attributes
of their food, its safety, nutrition, and environmental
friendliness. Increased income can mean an increased
willingness to pay for such characteristics. 
Consumers demand food safety, and food producers are
willing to provide it. However, consumers often lack
information about products that they buy, and might
not consider social costs, like lost workdays resulting
from a foodborne illness, in their purchasing decisions.
This incomplete information, coupled with the costli-
ness of some food safety provisions, can mean that the
government needs to regulate food safety.
Indeed, most nations have laws that regulate the safe
production of food within their borders, but no country
has jurisdiction over production outside of its borders.
A country can regulate the products entering its bor-
ders, but enforcing these standards is difficult and
costly, as it requires sampling and testing many ship-
ments. Consumers therefore consume not only food
from abroad, but also the services of other countries’
food safety regimes. The desired level and form of
food safety regulation may vary among countries, and
exporting firms might have difficulty complying with
multiple safety regimes. Differences in food safety
regulations can lead to trade conflicts, but can also
lead to increased dialogue on food safety standards.
Some conflicts over food safety lead to reductions in
trade, while other conflicts are settled amicably.
Sometimes, conflicts can even lead to improvements in
food safety, as firms comply with the stricter safety
regimes of their trading partners.
Demand for Food Safety
Food Safety is Valued by Consumers
Consumers value a safe food supply. Since food is a
necessity, consumers value knowing that their food is
free of toxins, foreign material, and pathogens. Food
safety concerns have increased as wealth has risen.
Now that many consumers in the industrialized world
have adequate quantities of food, they (or their govern-
ments) can spend resources to ensure that their food is
safer. For example, Hayes et al. (1995) found that U.S.
consumers were willing to pay a premium of 15 to 30
percent per meal to reduce their risk of becoming ill
from their meal, while a number of studies cited by
Baker (1999) found that consumers are willing to pay
a premium for reduced pesticide residues in produce.
Another study found that the premium consumers
were willing to pay for food with low pesticide
residues increased with income (Huang et al., 2000,
1999). In a number of experiments and surveys, con-
sumers have indicated that they would be willing to
pay more for food with lower risks of disease; how-
ever, these experiments might not reflect how con-
sumers will actually behave in a market setting, as
consumers’ attitudes on surveys sometimes differ from
their documented behavior at the cash register
(Caswell, 1998). Food safety scares, like the Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow dis-
ease”) problem in the European Union (EU), or the E.
coli outbreak in the Western U.S., have raised aware-
ness about food safety issues. Additionally, food trav-
els long distances from producer to consumer, and
many foods are perishable. Modern food processing
facilities, refrigerated transport, and research on tem-
peratures, pathogens, and toxins have all improved
food safety. As consumers know that such technolo-
gies are available, they will likely hold producers to a
high standard.
Consumer Demand Reflects Only
Some Benefits of Food Safety
Consumers can lack adequate information about their
food purchases, preventing them from demanding the
level of food safety they would choose if they had
complete information.2 Additionally, even if con-
sumers have adequate information, their individual
purchases may not reflect the desire of the wider soci-
ety for food safety.
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2 When an economic agent does not know which of several possible
outcomes (safe food, unsafe food) will result from a transaction,
economists say the market is characterized by imperfect information.
When one party to a transaction does not know as much about the
good being exchanged as the other does (for example, a consumer
does not directly observe how meat is handled), economists say the
market is characterized by asymmetric information. Food Safety Is Not Always Observable
Consumers cannot always readily observe the safety
level of their food. A consumer usually cannot know
whether food is contaminated until after purchasing it
(Segerson, 1999; Caswell, 1998). Even if the con-
sumer becomes ill from eating food, linking the illness
to a particular food out of many consumed is often dif-
ficult (Segerson, 1999; Buzby et al., 2001; Caswell
and Mojduszka, 1996). Indeed, if the food is contami-
nated with toxins, like carcinogens, the consumer
might be not be able to observe any adverse effects for
many years, if ever, and might not be able to attribute
any adverse health consequences to a particular food
(Antle, 1996).3 Thus, firms have less incentive to pro-
vide food safety than they would if food safety were
directly observable by the consumer prior to purchase.
Consumers Don’t Consider Food Safety Effects
on Society as a Whole
Consumers may not demand as much food safety as
would be socially desirable, neglecting to take all the
social costs of their purchases into consideration
(Segerson, 1999, Golan et al., 2001). Inadequate food
safety can result in illness, which imposes private costs
on the consumer, but which also creates social costs in
the form of additional resources allocated to medical
care and lost workdays. For instance, outbreaks of E.
coli O157:H7 in fast food restaurants during the early
1990s created clusters of illness in several Western
States, with over 700 people affected. Several victims
died, and many patients experienced pain and suffering.
Some spent costly stays in intensive care units or visited
emergency rooms, and some might experience lifelong
health problems, with long-term implications for health-
care resources (Buzby, 2002; Foulke, 1994). In such
cases, the patients’relatives had to put aside other activi-
ties in order to care for them. In addition, public health
resources had to be mobilized to trace the source of 
the outbreak. 
Thus, health care resources, employers, and other sec-
tors of the economy share the costs of inadequate food
safety with the original consumer of the unsafe food.
This reduces both producers’ incentives to produce
safe food and consumers’ incentives to consume safe
food, because neither group bears the full costs of their
actions. Even if producers matched the food safety
they provide with the amount that consumers demand,
a more socially beneficial outcome would occur if pro-
ducers’ provision of food safety met the demand of
consumers plus the demand of health care resources,
employers, public health departments, and other
affected sectors of the economy. 
Implications of Food Safety 
Demand for Firms
Since consumers demand some degree of food safety,
firms have an incentive to supply safer food (Holleran et
al., 1999). Reputations for providing safe food are valu-
able assets that firms have an incentive to protect. A firm
can develop an edge over its competitors if it produces
food using a technique known to enhance food safety
(Reardon and Farina, 2001). Likewise, a firm can suffer
increased costs or a loss of sales and equity, sometimes
permanently, if someone becomes ill from eating one of
its products (Buzby et al., 2001; Dolan and Humphrey,
2000; Henson and Northen, 1998; Segerson, 1999;
Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001). Odwalla, a “natural”
juice company, lost millions in sales and suffered a stock
price decline of 68 percent when customers contracted
E. coli from drinking its apple juice (Buzby et al., 2001;
San Jose Business Journal, 1997). In another instance,
Perrier, a leading mineral water company, lost 50 percent
of its U.S. market share when one of its shipments was
contaminated with benzene (Kunreuther and Slovic,
2001). Richards and Patterson (1999) find that negative
publicity about the safety of a food product has a very
persistent effect on prices. 
Food Safety Can Be Costly to Supply
Implementing food safety standards can increase costs
for firms. If food processors need, for example, to
increase the cooking temperatures for their foods, they
will need to pay more for energy, and will need to
cook each unit of product longer, perhaps raising labor
costs. If firms are required to use sterile packaging,
they might have to add more steps or inputs to their
assembly line. If certain pesticides are banned, farmers
might have to use less effective ones, thus losing a
larger percentage of their crop to pest damage. 
However, some standards might not raise costs much at
all. For example, some of the more toxic pesticides can
be replaced with less toxic ones for similar prices.
Jensen et al. (1998) found that improving food safety in
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3 When a good has a characteristic (e.g., overall effects on longrun
health) that is not directly observable even after the buyer has pur-
chased and consumed it, economists refer to that characteristic as a
credence attribute.the meat industry raised costs for producers and that
costs varied with the particular safety option chosen.
Antle (1999) cites a number of studies that quantify the
costs of complying with various food safety regulations.
Ollinger and Mueller (2003) find that implementing
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points)
systems in meat-processing plants added just under one
cent per pound to the cost of meat processing. 
Firms have incentives to protect their reputations, and
so might implement state-of-the-art food safety prac-
tices without any prodding from the government.
Additionally, as consumers might be willing to pay
more for food that they perceive as safer, firms have
another incentive to implement food safety regimes.
The higher prices consumers are willing to pay could
compensate firms for the costs of food safety provi-
sion. A firm will adopt more stringent food safety
practices if the cost is smaller than the resulting bene-
fit to the firm in the form of reduced risk of losses,
reduced liability, and higher consumer willingness to
pay for the safer food. 
Increasingly, food producers in wealthy countries engage
in long-term contracting with their suppliers, and care-
fully vet those suppliers for food safety compliance.
Some firms use international and third-party standards
and certifiers in order to reduce the costs of verifying
that suppliers are using safe production methods and to
reduce the costs to suppliers (Henson and Northen,
1998). Segerson (1999) frames the problem slightly dif-
ferently, noting that a firm will voluntarily improve food
safety standards if the benefits to the firm, plus the
decrease in damages a firm would have to pay to injured
consumers from selling the safer food, outweigh the
costs that the firm will have to pay to implement new
safeguards. If the cost is greater than these benefits to the
firm, firms might not adopt more stringent practices
unless the government mandates them.
Imperfect Information Changes
Incentives and Costs
Food safety levels are difficult to observe, and this can
change the incentives for firms. If the firm perceives
that consumers underestimate the chances of a food
safety incident, then firms will produce more of the
unsafe food than consumers would desire to purchase
if they knew the risks (Segerson, 1999). Producers
have less of an incentive to provide information about
their products if they believe that consumers perceive
the products to be less harmful than they actually are
(Zarkin and Anderson, 1992). 
A special case of this inability to identify the source of
illnesses occurs when a food safety problem is identified
with a particular bulk product or products from a partic-
ular country. If a product produced by a particular firm
makes some people ill, but that particular firm’s goods
are hard to identify in the marketplace, consumers may
eschew all products in that category (chapter 5). This, in
turn, can reduce other firms’desire to provide safe
goods. Even if the other firms spend a great deal to pro-
vide safe food, consumers still might not buy their prod-
ucts if they cannot tell the difference between the safe
products and the unsafe one produced by the firm with
the lower standards. The firms spending money on food
safety will not be compensated for their extra expenses
by increased consumer demand or willingness to pay for
their safer products (Akerlof, 1970; Antle 1996). 
In chapter 5, Calvin notes several cases in which a par-
ticular type of fruit supplied by a particular supplier
caused illness. In these cases, demand fell for that fruit
across all suppliers, not just the one implicated in the
food safety crisis. For instance, when imported strawber-
ries caused an outbreak of salmonellosis in 1997, U.S.
strawberry producers suffered a decrease in sales, despite
the fact that their product was uncontaminated; the same
happened to U.S. cantaloupe producers. In such cases,
firms can take safety precautions and still suffer reduced
demand; likewise, firms that do not take safety precau-
tions impose costs not just on themselves, but on other
firms as well. A firm might therefore think that safety
precautions are not worth the costs, whereas they would
be worth the costs if firms were responsible for the costs
they impose on their fellow firms by damaging the rep-
utation of the industry (Segerson, 1999). 
Because consumers perceive a product generally, rather
than a specific firm’s product, as safe or unsafe, firms
might find it in their best interest to implement safety
standards for the industry as a whole (chapter 5).
Industry standards are probably easier to achieve among
a small number of firms. Coordination costs are kept to
a minimum. Additionally, if some firm does not comply
with the standards and sells unsafe food, the source of
the food safety crisis is easier to pinpoint. With many
firms, just negotiating a set of standards might be prob-
lematic, and enforcing the regulations might be more
difficult if the source of unsafe food cannot be traced to
a particular firm out of the many in the industry.
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source of a food safety problem, several companies
might have handled the product. A package of cheese
might have been produced by one firm, shipped by
another, and sold to the consumer by yet a third firm. If
the cheese contained an unsafe number of pathogens, it
might be difficult to determine whether the contamina-
tion resulted because the cheese was packaged improp-
erly, or because the shipper or the retailer stored it
improperly. This difficulty in assigning responsibility
could again reduce the incentive to provide safe food. 
Additionally, if the cheese is associated with the brand
name of one of those firms, the other two are more insu-
lated from the negative effects on their reputations,
because the market will not effectively route demand
away from their firms to other, safer firms. In such a
case, the firm whose reputation is on the line would be
willing to pay to have the other two firms provide ade-
quate safety standards. Indeed, Henson and Northen
(1998) note that this is the method preferred by UK
retailers, who sell many items under their own name
brands and therefore have a great deal to lose in liability
and reputation if a food safety incident occurs. However,
the unobservability of food safety makes it difficult for
the firm that cares about its reputation to be certain of
the work of the other two without carefully observing
the whole production process. Therefore, they note,
many retailers are asking suppliers for third-party certifi-
cation of their production facilities, which reduces the
monitoring costs for retailers.
Indeed, even in cases where firms might wish to provide
food safety to their consumers, it is frequently difficult
for them to do so, since they themselves find it hard to
detect unsafe food. There are many types of food safety
hazards, and contamination can occur at many different
stages. Pathogens can also multiply over time, causing
the danger to increase (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1996). 
A Gap Exists between Socially
Desirable and Market Outcomes
While economic theory suggests that firms should have
an incentive to ensure that their products are safe from
pathogens, toxins, and other hazards, these incentives
are not always as strong as they need to be. The market
outcome—that is, the intersection of supply and
demand—can fail to achieve the efficient or socially
desirable amount of food safety in two ways. The first
source of market failure stems from the lack of con-
sumer information. The market supplies the level of
safety that consumers can currently observe, not the
level of food safety that consumers would want if they
could observe all of the safety attributes of their food. In
such cases, the market might produce too much of the
unsafe food, and too little of the safe food. 
The market’s failure to provide the efficient level of food
safety information can have substantial consequences. If
consumers become concerned about the safety of the
food supply, or particular food items, they will reduce
their consumption of such items, thereby shrinking the
food sector, or parts of it, below the amount of food that
consumers would prefer to consume if they had adequate
information about the safety of their purchases, and
could tell the difference between safe and unsafe food
(Akerlof, 1970). Also, if consumers are unable to evalu-
ate the true risks of food consumption, they can experi-
ence more illness and incur more costs than benefits
from consuming some foods. Henneberry et al. (1999)
found that the amount of negative information that con-
sumers received about pesticides on produce reduced the
demand for some varieties of produce and increased the
demand for others. Thus, consumers’concerns changed
the composition of their diet, altering the pattern of pro-
duction and consumption from what it would be if con-
sumers had more information. 
The gap between society’s ideal level of food safety
and that which consumers demand for themselves con-
stitutes a second source of market failure. Ideally, soci-
ety would like food safety to be provided to the point
that reflects consumer demand for food safety, plus the
demand of public health providers and employers for
food safety. However, producers only have incentives
to take consumer demand for a particular product into
account, not the demand of the rest of society, as con-
sumers’ willingness to pay determines the price that
the producer receives. 
Countries as a whole incur substantial costs when food
safety incidents occur. One USDA study indicates that
five types of foodborne illness collectively cost the
U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 (Roberts, 2001). Another
USDA study, using simulations, indicates that imple-
menting the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Points (HACCP) program to reduce foodborne illness
in meat and poultry resulted in economywide gains of
$9 billion, not including the benefits of reduced work
days lost (Golan et al., 2000). Another study estimated
that the benefits of implementing HACCP policies
would be $7-$42 billion (Crutchfield et al., 1997).
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pain and suffering and public health agencies’ expen-
ditures on foodborne disease.
Potential Ways to 
Close the Gap
Litigation
Consumers, and sometimes other members of society,
can attempt to recover some of the costs of unsafe food
from food producers by seeking redress through the
court system. In countries with a functioning tort system,
a party who is injured by consuming unsafe food can sue
the firm that produced the food for damages (Antle,
1996). Such suits should provide incentives for firms to
provide safer food rather than risk the court costs, dam-
age costs, and negative publicity of a lawsuit, but the
incentives are limited by the difficulty of proving conclu-
sively that a producer’s food caused the illness.4 Buzby
et al. (2001) found that one-third of jury trials in food
poisoning cases resulted in verdicts in favor of the con-
sumer. Most cases were settled before they reached trial. 
Education and Information Provision
Governments can use food safety education as an
alternative to regulation. Requiring firms to disclose
information about the foods they produce and educat-
ing the public about food safety could allow con-
sumers to make better choices about the foods that
they consume (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). Van
Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1996) note that publicly pro-
vided information on food safety could result in
changes in consumers’ purchasing behavior and food
preparation practices that would reduce the number of
food safety incidents. Labeling and education would
address the consumer’s lack of information, which is
one of the market failures that leads to food safety
problems (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). However,
education would not address the second form of mar-
ket failure—that consumers demand less food safety
than society would like (Golan et al., 2001). 
Government Regulation
When markets and legal institutions fail to provide the
socially optimal level of some good, like food safety,
economic theory suggests that governments can bridge
the gap. Governments can take a number of policy initia-
tives to induce producers to provide higher levels of food
safety. Governments could, in theory, tax unsafe food,
raising the firm’s costs of providing unsafe food and
therefore creating an incentive to provide safer food.
However, this assumes that a society can measure the
amount of unsafe food that is sold, which would be diffi-
cult. Most governments, therefore, turn to regulation, set-
ting minimum safety standards that food producing firms
have to meet before they can sell their products.
Regulations are generally classified as product stan-
dards and process standards. Product standards spec-
ify characteristics that a product must attain before it
is considered safe to sell. For example, most industri-
alized countries have maximum residue levels (MRLs)
for pesticides. If a food has pesticide residues above
this amount, a vendor cannot legally sell that food. In
Great Britain, the government, under the doctrine of
due diligence, assigns the responsibility for verifying
food safety to food retailers, rather than setting spe-
cific procedures for processing foods. 
Process standards specify techniques that must be used
to process or package foods, with the belief that certain
production techniques make food more likely to be safe.
For instance, some governments require that processed
meat products be raised to a certain temperature to kill
bacteria before packaging. Ideally, such process restric-
tions are based on research, like studies of the percent-
age of bacteria killed at each temperature. In practice,
such studies are not always available, although knowl-
edge in this area is increasing rapidly.
Governments might have motives beyond food safety
for certain regulations. Some food safety regulations
also achieve some other purpose, like protecting the
environment, animal welfare, or worker welfare. For
instance, DDT was banned in the 1970s not only
because the residue on foods was considered dangerous
for consumers, but because the pesticide also bioaccu-
mulated. Small animals ate sprayed plant life, fish that
lived in streams absorbed runoff from farms, and larger
animals that ate these small animals and fish accumu-
lated huge quantities of the toxin in their tissues. In par-
ticular, eagles and other birds of prey were threatened
by DDT, and since the ban, their populations have
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4 Buzby et al. (2001) note that plaintiffs were hindered by long
incubation periods for foodborne illness, a lack of food evidence,
inadequate laboratory test results, and the fact that it is difficult to
pinpoint which of many foods consumed caused the illness.recovered a great deal (Muir, 2001). In this case, a
process standard (banning a particular production
process) was used; simply setting a residue standard for
food might not have met the environmental goal.
The Effect of Government Regulation
on Supply 
Are certain standards more costly than others? Economic
theory indicates that product standards are often cheaper
to implement than process standards, as product stan-
dards give firms more flexibility to choose the least
costly production methods that meet the standards
(Unnevehr and Jensen, 1996; MacDonald and
Crutchfield, 1996). For instance, if a firm is told that its
products cannot exceed a certain maximum level of pes-
ticide residue, then it can choose the most cost-effective
method for attaining that standard, which could include
reducing the amount of pesticide applied, reducing the
number of applications, switching pesticides, or altering
the last date of application before harvest. If the govern-
ment told the producer which of those methods to use,
the government might not select the lowest cost method
(Segerson, 1999). Indeed, one production method might
be the low-cost method for one firm, while another
method might be cheaper for another firm (Antle, 1996). 
However, this general principle is not true in all cases.
If one herbicide is banned because it is deemed too
toxic, then producers might be able to switch to a sim-
ilarly priced alternative. Additionally, standards for
final products must be verified in some way, either by
inspection or testing of samples, both of which can be
costly, particularly in the case of pathogen contamina-
tion (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1996; MacDonald and
Crutchfield, 1996). Hence, the relative expense of
process and product standards has to be evaluated case
by case. 
In response to the relative expense of these types of stan-
dards, many countries are adopting HACCP require-
ments, which require firms to identify points in the
production process where food safety is likely to be
compromised, and to put in place procedures that pre-
vent such compromise. HACCP requirements feature
characteristics of both product and process standards.
Firms must adhere to the procedures in their HACCP
plans, but are allowed to define those procedures. Firms
must also meet standards for pathogens in their products,
and testing is required. Such plans have proven to be
cost-effective (Henson and Caswell, 1999). These plans
allow the firm to choose the most cost-effective methods
of prevention, and prevention can be less expensive than
testing or remediating a product (Unnevehr and Jensen,
1996). Both the U.S. and the EU require producers of
certain food products to implement HACCP plans.
Whatever type of regulation the government chooses,
most regulations will increase production costs for at
least some firms. In isolation, these cost increases gener-
ally shift back the supply curve of a firm, which results
in a new market equilibrium where firms produce fewer
goods at a higher price. One could also say that less safe
food was overproduced before the regulations were put
in place, since the production costs that firms paid did
not reflect the true cost to society of the less safe food,
which should include the costs of illness, lost workdays,
and other costs to society. Sometimes, industry opposes
individual government regulations, which can increase
costs and reduce production. 
With regulation, however, consumers would be more
willing to buy the food products, since they are now get-
ting a safer good for their money (Unnevehr, 2000). This
represents a shift out of the demand curve, with con-
sumers now willing to buy more of the safer food and to
pay a higher price. Indeed, fresh milk sales in the U.S.
are probably much higher than they would be if con-
sumers did not have the security of knowing that milk is
pasteurized. However, the individual consumer is not
able to capture all of the benefits of having the safer
food; some of these benefits go to society. Therefore, in
some cases, consumers might not be willing to pay as
much as it costs for the product to meet the most socially
beneficial safety standard. In such cases, the net effect
would be a decrease in sales with a higher price,
although this higher price better represents the true cost
of supplying the food product with the higher level of
food safety (fig. 2.1).
Additionally, firms have difficulty in passing on the
information about food safety improvements to con-
sumers. Some firms advertise when they undertake an
improvement in food safety, even when such an
improvement is a response to stronger regulations.
After the E. coli O157:H7 incidents in the 1990s,
some fast food chains sent out press releases announc-
ing that they would be increasing the mandated cook-
ing temperatures for their beef. Many juice companies
now advertise the fact that they pasteurize their prod-
ucts. Firms are only required to label juices if they are
unpasteurized, but firms label their pasteurized juices
to reassure the consumer. 
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evidence that they are complying with a particular set of
safety standards. In other cases, particularly if the public
is not aware of a food safety problem prior to the imple-
mentation of a regulation, or is unaware of the magni-
tude of the incremental increase in safety, then the
regulation might not result in an increase in demand for
the new, safer product. 
Food safety standards affect not only the industry in
which they are implemented, but also other related
industries. If prices of a particular food rises, consumers
might consume less of that food and increase their
demand for another food, which will alter that second
food’s equilibrium price (MacDonald and Crutchfield,
1996). Suppliers to that industry might also find them-
selves subject to more stringent standards (Henson and
Northen, 1998). Thus, the regulations might affect not
only the market equilibrium in the regulated industry,
but markets in other industries as well.
Food safety standards can also have implications for
industry structure. If regulations require a large initial
expenditure on equipment, such regulations might give a
cost advantage to large firms that can afford this expen-
diture, and their scale means that the additional cost per
unit is amortized over a large number of units
(MacDonald et al., 1996). Firms might also integrate
vertically (with retailers becoming processors and/or
processors starting to run farms) in order to better con-
trol food attributes. Results here are mixed. Henson and
Northen (1998) report that retailers tend to prefer asking
processors for outside certification, as opposed to run-
ning processing firms themselves. Kilmer et al. (2001),
however, report that vertical integration among straw-
berry producers is associated with lower pesticide
residues, but the same is not true for tomato producers.
In order to decide whether or not to enact a particular
food safety regulation, governments must weigh the
costs to the firms and the consumers who now pay
higher prices against the benefits to consumers, employ-
ers, and public health resources of improved food safety.
Henson and Caswell (1999) point out that many govern-
ments have found this assessment difficult to achieve,
given the wide array of standards to evaluate and the
myriad of grounds on which those regulations are based.
Trade Implications
We have seen how concerns about food safety affect
the domestic food production sector. Concerns about
information, incentives for firms to provide food
safety, and deviations of market outcomes from
desired outcomes all affect the price, quantity, and
qualitative attributes of food supplied. Firms may incur
extra costs. Government regulation may prove neces-
sary. How do those factors change when we introduce
international trade into the picture?
Food safety concerns have some of the same implica-
tions for international trade as for domestic trade, but
with the added complication that consumer prefer-
ences and government regulations may differ from
country to country, creating the potential for rivalry
and conflict. The 190 or so countries of the world all
have established different regimes for food safety, and
thousands of different foods are regulated. Differences
in trade regulations can put either domestic or foreign
firms at a competitive disadvantage in selling their
products. Trade conflicts frequently result when coun-
tries enact different types of regulations, have different
desired levels of food safety, or have different costs in
complying with regulations. Countries can resolve
these conflicts in a number of ways, including ceasing
to trade, adopting each other’s regulations, or recog-
nizing each other’s regulations. 
Demand for Food Safety
Consumers throughout the world desire a safe food
supply. However, the extent of that desire might differ
from country to country. Consumers are also generally
willing to pay more for safer food, but the amounts
they are willing to pay might differ. Consumers in very
poor countries might have to balance expenditures on
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Market impact of a food safety regulation
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Qother health threats against that of food safety. Wealthy
countries therefore sometimes have more stringent
standards for pesticides and microorganisms than
developing countries do.
Consumers might have different desired levels of risk.
One country might want to push risk as close to zero as
possible, while another might regard some slightly
higher level of risk as acceptable, because driving the
risk to zero would be extremely costly. Economists have
found that the desire to tolerate risk varies significantly
across individuals. Men tend to be less “risk averse” than
women (Jianakopolos and Bernasek, 1998). Wealth tends
to increase risk aversion up to a certain level, after which
risk aversion declines with wealth, while the opposite is
true for age (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001). One’s percep-
tion of risk also depends on one’s ability to mitigate the
risk or to cope with an adverse outcome (Smith et al.,
2001). To the extent that such factors differ across coun-
tries, willingness to tolerate risk differs. Some studies of
asset markets have found different levels of risk aversion
in different countries (Hamori, 1998). Further, countries
might have similar valuations of risk, but might disagree
on what to do when the risks are unknown. 
Consumers might also have difficulty making evalua-
tions at very low levels of risk, which might lead to
very different standards in different countries. 
Implications for Firms
Firms still have incentives to provide safe food to con-
sumers, even if those consumers are in a different
country. Indeed, Holleran et al. (1999) note that there
are incentives for foreign firms to provide safe food to
capture international market share, just as there are
incentives for firms to provide safe food to maintain
domestic market share. If that incentive to provide safe
food is large enough, firms might establish their own
standards. This can be true as firms begin operating in
an international arena as well. Firms can sell food
abroad in one of two ways. They can open processing
plants in other countries (often called foreign direct
investment), or they can ship their food abroad (inter-
national trade). Raw and bulk food is often shipped.
Some processed food is shipped, but a great deal is
manufactured under license or by a subsidiary in the
country to which the firm wishes to sell. 
Foreign direct investment. As food processing firms
open plants in many different countries, their private
standards might be modeled after their production
facilities in wealthy countries (Reardon and Barrett,
2000). Nestle, for instance, sets stringent standards for
suppliers to its plants that operate in a number of
developing countries (USDEC, 2001). 
These internal standards stem from the fact that firms
desire reputations for food safety (Reardon, 2001). It is
sometimes costly to communicate food safety attributes
to the consumer, so firms might rely on their interna-
tional reputations to do so (Reardon et al., 1999).
However, since most of the food processing firms began
in nations with stringent safety standards, the firms
might simply be adopting stringent standards for their
worldwide operations to reduce transaction costs by hav-
ing standardized procedures. Whatever the reasons, the
firms from wealthy countries that open branches in other
countries usually do so to produce for the host country’s
market, so the production at those facilities generally is
not traded. The host country also has the legal right to
impose food safety standards on these foreign-owned
processing plants operating in their country.
Trade. Improving food safety standards can increase
costs for firms. In addition to more expensive methods
of production associated with food safety standards,
trade also comes with some extra costs. Verifying that
foreign countries have actually adopted the domestic
food safety standards can be quite costly. Sending
inspectors abroad is expensive, limiting the number of
inspections an importing country can perform. If
domestic governments inspect foreign firms, they can
bear the costs, or they can bill foreign firms. If govern-
ments require foreign firms to obtain third-party certi-
fication, the costs will be borne by the foreign firms,
but could be passed on to domestic consumers. 
Foreign firms undertaking trade also undertake several
risks as well. If compliance with the regulations requires
a lot of fixed investment costs in the form of new equip-
ment, foreign firms risk the investment without certainty
of obtaining certification. In addition, even if they under-
take certification, they might experience random transi-
tory events, like disease outbreaks, that prevent them
from complying with their trading partners’food safety
regulations for short periods of time. 
The same problems that lead to a need for regulation
domestically can lead to a need for government regula-
tion in the international trade environment. Consumers
do not consume as much safe food as society would
like them to. Consumers also lack information about
the safety level of the foods they eat, and the inability
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food can reduce the incentive for firms to provide safe
food. Consumers might assume that if one firm’s prod-
uct is unsafe, all brands of that good are unsafe. 
In the international arena, there are two complications
to add. A firm’s products might be labeled unsafe if
some other firm has produced unsafe versions of that
product, even if that other firm is in another country.
California berry producers suffered a reduction in
demand when consumers became ill from eating berries
grown in Guatemala (chapter 5). Consumers could not
differentiate the safe berries from the unsafe ones.
Additionally, firms located in particular countries can
find that their country’s reputation matters in determin-
ing whether they can sell their goods abroad. Several
studies indicate that consumers form opinions about the
general quality of goods coming from a particular coun-
try (Chisik, 2002). When consumers receive inadequate
information about the products they purchase, they can
make errors that reduce their welfare, eschewing prod-
ucts they might really want to buy and embracing prod-
ucts that might be unsafe. Firms therefore lose some of
their incentive to provide safe food, since they can
spend money on food safety and still lose sales as the
result of an outbreak. Conversely, they can spend little
on food safety, and might not lose as many sales as they
would if consumers knew their food was less safe. If a
country’s goods are perceived as poor in quality, there is
less incentive for firms in that country to improve qual-
ity if they don’t believe they can convince consumers to
pay them the high quality premia (Chisik, 2002; Basu
and Chau, 1998).
Government Regulation in the 
International Arena
These information shortcomings generally lead gov-
ernments to regulate food safety. However, in the case
of international trade, each country enacts its own
unique set of food safety regulations. A country’s abil-
ity to regulate firms outside its borders is limited to
import restrictions. These differences in food safety
regulations across countries can create conflict.
If governments impose regulations on domestic firms,
and such regulations raise costs for producers, then pro-
ducers might suffer a loss of sales. This problem can be
compounded in the context of international trade. If
domestic producers must adhere to regulations that raise
costs of production, but foreign firms do not have to
meet the same requirements, then the foreign firms can
offer their products at lower prices, undercutting the
domestic firms and capturing a larger market share.
Although consumers are willing to pay more for a safer
good, if they cannot distinguish between the more heav-
ily regulated, and presumably safer, domestic good and
the less regulated imported good, they will not be will-
ing to pay what the safer good is worth to them.
The amount of market share that foreign firms capture
will depend on how willing consumers are to pay for
the safer product, how well they can distinguish the
safer product, and how well firms communicate to
their customers that their products are safer. Figure 2.2
illustrates the case where the foreign supplier is not
bound by the new stringent food safety regulations, but
domestic producers are, so that the new domestic sup-
ply curve reflects higher costs.5 The demand curve
remains unchanged, reflecting the assumption that
consumers are only willing to pay more for a safer
good if they can identify it. The result is a loss in mar-
ket share for the domestic firm, and an increase in the
cheaper imports. In such cases, consumer groups inter-
ested in food safety and domestic producers some-
times form political coalitions to pressure the
government to impose the same standards on foreign
firms as domestic firms (Vogel, 1995). 
Indeed, governments already have a motivation to
impose such standards, namely a safe food supply,
whether foods are domestically produced or imported.
Since governments do not have the power to regulate
production in other countries, they usually set standards
for imports that require foreign producers to meet the
same product standards that domestic firms must meet or
to prove that they use the same production techniques
required of domestic producers. Foreign firms then have
to pay the higher costs of complying with the standards,
and might have to raise their prices, making their prices
more similar to those of domestic firms.
Some governments have even set standards for particu-
lar foreign products higher than those for like domestic
products. The foreign firms then must pay the higher
costs of complying with the more stringent standards,
and might have to charge a higher price than domestic
firms. The foreign firms might even be kept out of the
market altogether. Chile, for instance, has banned the
import of fresh poultry. However, domestic firms are
allowed to sell fresh poultry (see chapter 4). This prac-
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is a price-taker on the world market.tice protects domestic producers from foreign competi-
tion. Such practices are generally forbidden by World
Trade Organization regulations, but enforcement of
those regulations can be difficult. 
Trade Conflicts
Many different trade conflicts over food safety regula-
tions occur every year. It is difficult to determine how
many trade conflicts occur every year or how costly
those conflicts are. However, in 1999, almost $400 bil-
lion worth of agricultural trade took place worldwide.
Clearly, world food trade is not paralyzed by conflicts
over food safety regulation. Some trade, however, could
be inhibited by conflicts over regulations. Recent studies
suggest that excessive technical barriers to trade, which
include food safety regulations, might be responsible for
measurable losses for agricultural exports from the U.S.
(Henson and Caswell, 1999; Roberts and DeRemer,
1997). Other countries also experience losses. 
Trade conflicts follow four common patterns. The first
two stem from differences in preferences for food
safety, and the second two stem from differences in the
cost of providing food safety.
(1) One country might use a process standard, while
another uses a product standard, or each country
might have different process standards. While both
product and process standards may result in a similar
good or the use of similar production techniques, the
fact that the requirements are different might result in
one country’s exclusion of another country’s products,
or even mutual product exclusion.
Alternatively, one country might require the use of one
process, while another country requires the use of a dif-
ferent process. The U.S. and EU, for instance, have dif-
ferent mandated standards for their meat producers. The
U.S. requires producers to adhere to HACCP plans, and
the government inspects the final product (FSIS, 1998).
The EU also uses HACCP plans, but has very specific
practices that it requires its meat producers to use,
including checking pig hearts for a specific type of dis-
ease and mandating that meat casings be purchased
from EU-approved firms (Caswell and Hooker, 1996;
FSIS, 2002). While these two approaches can result in
meat of similar hygiene levels, the production methods
differ. In the early 1990s, this caused a great deal of
trade disruption, as the EU revoked the export certifica-
tion of many U.S. meatpacking plants (USTR, 1996).
The EU also bans the use of hormones for growth pro-
moton in livestock production, while the U.S. allows the
use of some (see chapter 4).
(2) Countries might have different levels of safety 
standards. Countries have different levels of tolerance
for risk, and they might have different levels of willing-
ness to pay for a reduction in their risk of consuming
unsafe food. Thus, one country might have a pesticide
residue or bacteria level standard that differs from those
of its trading partners. For example, the EU has recently
adopted a very stringent standard for aflatoxin on
peanuts that could substantially reduce African peanut
exports to the EU (Otsuki et al., 2001). Indeed, coun-
tries vary widely in the actual levels of aflatoxin
allowed on foods (see chapter 6). Also, countries might
differ in their perceptions of the level of risk, particu-
larly when risks are unknown, which can also lead to
differences in regulations. 
(3) Complying with a safety standard might be more
difficult for foreign firms than for domestic. Several
types of regulations can be more difficult for foreign
firms to comply with than for domestic firms. For
example, the importing country may have a regulation
that requires inspection or certification by a domestic
agency. In such cases, it can be very difficult and
costly for a foreign firm to determine what the regula-
tions are, comply with them, and then obtain inspec-
tors from the domestic agency. 
Additionally, a foreign firm might have particular local
conditions that make complying with safety standards
very expensive or even impossible. An exporting country
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Figure 2.2
Foreign trade with a new food safety 













Imports (new)might use pesticides that aren’t used in the importing
country, and are therefore not approved there. The pres-
ence of BSE in Europe, for example, and the difficulty
of testing for BSE, makes it difficult for a livestock pro-
ducer in the EU to convince foreign markets of the
safety of his or her product. 
The costs and logistics of complying with food safety
regulations might be prohibitive for firms in some
countries. In developing countries, specialized equip-
ment, industrial engineers, and local government
inspection might all be substantially more scarce and
therefore more expensive to obtain. Therefore, poorer
countries might have greater difficulty complying with
food safety regulations imposed by their trading part-
ners (Unnevehr, 2000).
(4) A new safety problem might arise, or accidental
contamination might take place. Countries might agree
in principle on food safety regulations, but one country
might suddenly have difficulty in complying with
those regulations. In 1998, when dioxin accidentally
contaminated a large quantity of animal feed in
Belgium, thereby contaminating animal products, the
U.S. banned imports of animal products from Belgium
temporarily (see chapter 8). In such cases, countries
might agree on acceptable levels of food safety, but it
has suddenly become prohibitively expensive or
impossible for one country to meet the desired stan-
dard. Interruptions of trade are often temporary, as the
exporting country works to correct the sudden change
in food safety. Conflicts can arise if the importing
country and the exporting country disagree on the con-
ditions that must be met for products to return to
acceptable levels of food safety.
Consequences of Trade Conflicts
Countries can resolve their trade conflicts in a number
of ways. The particular resolution chosen is often
driven by the relative sizes of the costs of the regula-
tions and the benefits of the trade flows. Three possi-
ble patterns of solving problems of differing standards
include trade bans, adopting regulations of trading
partners, or bilateral negotiation.
(1) Cessation of trade / trade bans. Some countries,
unable to resolve their differences over food safety
regulations, have simply ceased trading the product in
question. This occurs if producers in the foreign coun-
try decide that the higher prices they can charge for
the safer goods in the highly regulated market of their
trading partner are not enough to meet the costs of
complying with those regulations, and if the demand-
ing country is willing to forgo cheaper imports in favor
of the greater perceived food safety it receives from
the highly regulated domestic good. 
Trade might also cease for legal reasons if the domestic
country imposes a trade ban. These bans might occur if,
for instance, the gap between domestic and foreign regu-
lations is simply too large to allow producers to satisfy
both sets. For example, the EU refuses to accept U.S.
chicken exports, treated with chlorine. The EU does not
allow decontamination of poultry with chlorine while
U.S. producers find it very difficult to meet stringent
U.S. pathogen standards without the use of chlorine. A
U.S. producer would find it difficult to comply with both
sets of regulations. A country might also enact a legal
trade ban when it feels that its trading partner cannot
provide safe products at any reasonable price. For
instance, the U.S. and many other countries have banned
beef imports from Europe due to the presence of BSE. 
When trade ceases, if the domestic country is not a
major buyer of the good, then the foreign producers 
will sell their goods elsewhere. If, however, the domes-
tic country is a major buyer, the demand for the foreign
country’s goods falls, reducing the price. In contrast,
in the domestic country, reduced trade results in a
reduction in the supply (domestically produced goods 
+ imported goods) of the good, increasing the price.
However, now consumers are presumably getting a safer
good, as reflected by the new demand curve shown in
figures 2.1, 2.3a, and 2.3b. If the foreign firm is really
incapable of providing food of the desired safety level at
an affordable price, then if the food safety gain is large
enough compared with trade gains, trade should not
take place. Additionally, if verification abroad or the
risks of random safety crises prove to be too expensive
for either the domestic or foreign party to willingly
absorb, then trade might cease, because the domestic
country is the lowest-cost producer of food safety and
food safety information for that particular good. 
In figure 2.3a, the domestic firm experiences the
higher costs of providing the safe food. The increase in
costs is even larger for the foreign firms, a fact that is
reflected in the higher world price. The new higher
world price, above the new domestic price, reflects the
fact that other countries cannot supply the safer good
at a price the domestic consumer is willing to pay. If
the food safety gain is large enough, the domestic
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imports, to equilibrium point B, with no imports.
In the case of a strictly legal trade ban—i.e., the foreign
supplier could provide satisfactory goods, but does not
because the two countries simply have regulations that
differ—consumers are missing the opportunity to pur-
chase the imported goods. When the domestic govern-
ment implements the new food safety regulations, again,
both domestic and foreign firms experience an increase
in production costs. In this case, however, while the safer
imported goods (sold at the new world price) are more
expensive than imported goods that do not implement
safety regulations (sold at the old world price), the
imports are still less expensive than the domestic goods.
The new world price is below the domestic price. Before
the new food safety regulations, the domestic market
imported goods from the foreign country because such
goods had characteristics the consumers wanted at a
price they were willing to pay. If costs increase by simi-
lar amounts, for both foreign and domestic consumers,
and if extra costs for foreign producers are not high, then
trade may still be beneficial. If the transactions do not
take place because of a trade ban, both domestic buyers
and foreign sellers usually lose. In figure 2.3b, this
would be akin to consumers paying the higher domestic
price rather than the new world price available with
trade. Domestic consumers and producers move from
equilibrium point A-A’to equilibrium B, at a higher
price and lower quantity consumed (but a higher quan-
tity domestically produced). Consumers would be better
off with trade in the new, safer good at equilibrium C-C’,
with more consumed (but less domestically produced) at
the new world price than at point B. 
Ceasing trade or trade bans can be quite costly, although
the total cost depends on a number of factors. If trade
ceases because the foreign country is unable to supply a
good of the desired safety level, then the citizens of the
home country have decided that the costs are worth the
benefits. The foreign exporters lose revenue, but can fre-
quently sell the goods elsewhere for a lower price. If,
however, the trade conflict represents a dispute over dif-
ferences in regulations, rather than the inability to pro-
vide a safe product, then domestic consumers lose as
well as foreign producers. 
Private domestic firms can lobby for restrictions that
keep foreign products out of the domestic market. If
the costs of this lobbying are less than the market
share that the domestic firm gains by keeping the
whole domestic market, a firm has some incentive to
do this. This kind of lobbying can therefore be costly
to the domestic country, but only if the lobbying
results in keeping out goods that would satisfy con-
sumers’ needs for safe food at a lower cost. 
In many cases, however, legal trade bans or cessation of
trade might well be transitory, particularly if the food
safety problem is temporary. In such cases, the costs of
trade exceed the benefits in the short run, but if the for-
eign country is able to mitigate the food safety problem,
trade once again becomes beneficial, and lifting the ban
results in greater benefits than costs. For instance, after
the Belgian dioxin crisis, trade between Belgium and its
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(old)partners resumed (see chapter 8). The U.S. detains some
seafood imports if testing indicates that they are tainted
(see chapter 7). While costly for the individual importer
and exporter, such episodes do not necessarily result in
long-term losses to consumers and producers. 
(2) Foreign firms comply with domestic regulations or
adopt domestic standards. Some countries will simply
comply with or adopt the standards of their trading
partners. This can occur when a country cannot negoti-
ate a reduction in standards, when a country can meet
the standards set by its trading partner, albeit at greater
expense, and/or when the higher standards give some
kind of marketing advantage. In this way, firms in the
foreign country find that keeping their share in the
importing country’s market, perhaps with a premium,
is worth the costs of complying with the regulations.
Such costs include not only the increased costs of
complying with the regulations, but also the informa-
tion costs of finding out what the regulations are,
which can be high if the regulations are complex and
very different from the foreign firms’ own domestic
safety regime. Verification costs and the risk of ran-
dom food safety crises must be added to the costs of
compliance and weighed against the gains of receiving
high prices for safe food in the domestic market. In
figure 2.3b, the market moves from the equilibrium A-
A’ to C-C’, where the increase in world prices reflects
the increased costs of the food safety standards.
Consumers here receive the benefit of having both for-
eign and domestic suppliers of the new, safer food,
which allows them to pay a lower price than they
would at equilibrium B, which represents sales of the
new safer food but without any foreign suppliers. 
Any two countries, of any income levels, who have
divergent regulations can and have used this strategy.
However, Baldwin (2002) suggests that the dynamics of
adopting similar regulations can depend on the parties to
a trade dispute. When industrialized nations, each with
their own standards, experience a conflict, it is difficult
to get one to adopt the other’s standards, so protracted
negotiations can follow, and eventually they may recog-
nize the equivalency of each other’s laws. Baldwin fur-
ther notes when one country is a developing country and
one is an industrialized country, their laws might be too
divergent to allow mutual recognition. Thus, the devel-
oping country will sometimes conform to the industrial-
ized nation’s standard. 
Countries can agree to comply with the standards of
their trading partners only for the purposes of export-
ing, or they can agree to adopt their trading partners’
standards. The latter process is called harmonization
(Hooker, 1999). Harmonization can also refer to two
countries adopting a third standard, discussed below.
One of the more positive spillovers of having to meet
stringent foreign standards for exports is improvement
in the safety and quality of domestic production
(Donovan et al., 2001; Vogel, 1995). For instance, if a
firm operating in a developing country has to purchase
state-of-the-art equipment in order to produce for
export to wealthier countries with higher safety stan-
dards, then the food produced for the domestic market
could also become safer. If the new equipment repre-
sents a one-time expenditure, the price will probably
not rise substantially, and the safer food might be
affordable. However, the safer food might be more
expensive if the costs of running the machinery are
substantially higher. In such cases, the firm might sell
cheaper food domestically, using the less expensive,
less safe production process (Donovan et al., 2001). 
(3) Bilateral negotiation. Compromises can occur when
countries each perceive that losing trade will be more
costly than altering its standards or regulations.
Negotiations take place between governments, since
individual firms usually (although not always) have lim-
ited influence on another country’s regulations. If a
compromise is desired, countries have a number of
options from which to choose. Either or both parties can
attempt to recognize the other’s regulations, hammer out
a compromise, or adopt or accept international stan-
dards or standards set by a third party (see chapter 3;
Henson and Caswell, 1999; Sykes, 1999; Dolan and
Humphrey, 2000; Holleran et al., 1999; and Hooker,
1999). Two countries agreeing to adopt a third standard
is one form of harmonization. Recognizing each other’s
standards is often referred to as “mutual recognition,”
while gradually moving standards closer together is
referred to as “coordination” (Hooker, 1999). These
three types of policy action all require at least one coun-
try to alter its standards in some way, incurring costs in
order to keep the benefits of trading internationally for
food. In one prominent case, the U.S. and the EU have
arrived at an agreement that has allowed them to resolve
some of their problems with conflicting standards for
the safety of meat products. U.S. firms wishing to
export to the EU may obtain certification from the
USDA, thereby avoiding the costly overseas inspection
problem. The USDA, in turn, certifies that the firms are
using EU-approved production processes in addition to
meeting U.S. domestic standards. 
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the Codex Alimentarius. Some countries have adopted
some of the Codex standards. International standards
would ideally seem to reduce the costs of negotiations
over a bilateral standard. Indeed, Casella (2001) theo-
rizes that when a number of countries with divergent
standards begin to trade, they can benefit from adopt-
ing common standards, since it reduces the costs of
conforming to more than one set of standards. Yet, she
also points out that countries are better off with two
sets of standards rather than one, so that they can
appeal more exactly to the tastes of different sets of
consumers. With two sets, each set of standards can be
chosen to appeal to the tastes of a different set of con-
sumers, while one set of standards might be rather far
from the tastes of each set of consumers. Additionally,
agreement on any third standard may itself be difficult
and costly. Baldwin (2002) notes that trying to negoti-
ate a solution in which the two parties agree on a third
standard that both will adopt is rarely successful.
Rather, some suggest that mutual recognition of each
other’s standards is preferable, citing the fact that the EU
member states found it much easier to recognize each
other’s standards than to agree on new ones that all
would adopt (Baldwin, 2002; Vogel, 1995). However, if
two countries are experiencing trade conflicts because
they find their trading partners’standards do not satisfy
their desire for reduced risk, mutual recognition is not
necessarily an easy solution either. Indeed, economists
have begun to recognize that individual consumers often
require more compensation to give up a good once they
have it, than they were willing to pay for the good in the
first place (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). Thus, if a
country perceives that it is giving up a level of food
safety that it has achieved, then they may be unwilling to
compromise, even if the less expensive food they can
purchase from abroad would appear to compensate them
amply for a small reduction in food safety.
Bilateral negotiation will occur when a highly regulated
country does not wish to lose a lower cost supplier, or
fears that its trading partner might retaliate against a
stringent standard with stringent standards or tariffs of
its own. The domestic country must perceive these ben-
efits from trade to be greater than any reductions in
food safety they might incur with a less stringent stan-
dard, increased costs of verification under the new stan-
dard, or increased costs resulting from their own
producers’having to alter their production practices. In
order to be willing to compromise, the foreign supplier
usually must perceive that keeping their share of the
home country’s market is worth some potential
increase in the cost of producing for the domestic
country under the new regulations. Economic theory
suggests that there are numerous possible solutions
when two economic actors attempt to negotiate a con-
tract. If the home country is an important buyer of the
foreign country’s products, then it is more likely to be
able to exert influence and push for a supply of product
closer to its own standard. If the foreign country is an
important supplier of the good in question, then the for-
eign country will be able to exert influence in the nego-
tiations, since it is likely that the costs of obtaining
alternative supplies will be high for the home country. 
Conclusions
As advances in science and increases in wealth put
greater focus on food attributes, both firms and govern-
ments find themselves increasingly responding to con-
sumer demands for food safety. Firms have incentives to
provide safe food, but in some cases, the market and
legal incentives are insufficient to give consumers the
level of protection that a society as a whole would like.
In such cases, governments enact food safety regula-
tions, and at some point, the regulations of trading part-
ners are bound to conflict, as countries choose different
types of regulations and different levels of stringency
from the wide array of options available. 
When conflicts occur, countries may stop trading in
some items, one or both countries may alter their stan-
dards, or they may maintain both standards. The
option countries choose should depend on the cost of
implementing the strict standards compared with the
price that consumers are willing to pay for safe food,
and also on country differences in the costs of comply-
ing with the new standards. If firms find it too difficult
and costly to satisfy the demand of consumers in the
markets of their trading partners, they might forgo
trade or try to lobby for a change in their trading part-
ners’ regulations or a compromise solution. If, how-
ever, firms can charge an adequate premium in the
market with more stringent standards, they might
adopt the standards of their trading partners, which
can, under certain conditions, eventually improve food
safety in the domestic market.
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T
his chapter examines current trends in food regu-
lation, to see how they may influence interna-
tional trade and to ascertain if, when, and how
multilateral mechanisms can resolve trade conflicts. New
approaches to food safety regulation that emerged in
industrialized countries during the 1990s include:
● The growing use of risk analysis,
● Establishing public health as the primary goal of
food safety regulation,
● Emphasizing a farm-to-table approach in address-
ing food safety hazards,
● Adopting the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP) system as a basis for new regula-
tion of microbial pathogens in food,
● Increasing the stringency of standards for many
food safety hazards,
● Adding new and more extensive regulation to han-
dle newly identified hazards, and
● Improving market performance in food safety
through provision of information.
These regulatory trends have several implications for
how food safety standards affect international trade in
food products. Some new regulatory developments are
likely to mitigate potential barriers to trade. For exam-
ple, new kinds of regulation or public intervention that
focus on voluntary provision of information (e.g., cer-
tification for certain kinds of production practices) can
facilitate trade, even when standards and requirements
differ among countries. Other trends, though, may
impede trade. For example, if new or more stringent
standards are in the form of process standards, (e.g.,
under HACCP systems), it can be difficult to deter-
mine if imported products are as safe as those pro-
duced domestically. Whether certain kinds of process
requirements are necessary to achieve an equivalent
risk outcome can be subject to dispute.
The 1995 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), negoti-
ated by World Trade Organization (WTO) members,
recognizes the need for countries to adopt SPS regula-
tions while establishing a framework to reduce their
trade distorting aspects. Under these rules, WTO mem-
bers reported 187 complaints related to food safety
regulations from 1995 to 2001, which provides some
evidence of the extent to which new food safety regu-
lations have created barriers to trade. 
Three of the principles under the SPS Agreement—
science-based risk assessment, equivalence, and harmo-
nization—directly address some aspects of food safety
regulation that create the potential for trade disputes.
Progress toward realization of these principles is
reviewed here to see how well the SPS Agreement and
supporting institutions have addressed emerging issues
arising from regulatory trends. The agreement’s require-
ments for the use of scientific risk assessment, for exam-
ple, have led to the resolution of a number of disputes.
Less progress can be reported in reducing transaction
costs to trade through equivalence or harmonization.
Multilateral institutions continue to work on
projects—such as identifying the types of technical
assistance that best help developing countries meet food
safety requirements in key export markets—to achieve
welfare-enhancing trade. 
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Resolving Trade Disputes Arising from
Trends in Food Safety Regulation
The Role of the Multilateral 
Governance Framework
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of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.Introduction
New developments in food safety regulation, including
new and more stringent standards for many hazards,
occurred in many countries during the past decade.
Both existing and emerging measures to protect human
health can affect trade in agricultural products by
increasing the costs of imports or prohibiting them
entirely. The imposition of new performance standards
(such as maximum residue levels for pesticides) or
process standards (such as the required use of filters
for irrigation water) may alter the cost of foreign sup-
plies relative to domestic production. Requirements for
certifying compliance with importers’ standards may
effectively prohibit imports from countries that lack
adequate regulatory infrastructure, even if individual
foreign firms can meet importers’ standards. Such
costs from reduced trade must be balanced against the
public health benefits of safer food, and the market
benefits of increased consumer confidence. It is the
balance of such costs and benefits among countries
that makes these measures so controversial in interna-
tional trade. 
During the last round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions, exporters voiced concerns that sanitary and phy-
tosanitary (SPS) measures to protect animal, plant, or
human health were sometimes used to shield domestic
industry from foreign competition, and that such pro-
tectionist pressures would increase as other trade barri-
ers such as tariffs fell. The 1995 Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement) was therefore negotiated by the
WTO to provide a set of multilateral rules that would
recognize the legitimate need for countries to adopt
SPS regulations while establishing a framework to
reduce their trade distorting aspects. To implement this
agreement, the WTO relies in part on three multilateral
standards organizations, and also draws on the expert-
ise of other international scientific organizations.
Together, these institutions, along with their principles,
rules, standards, and enforcement mechanisms, com-
prise the multilateral governance framework for food
safety regulation (Josling et al., forthcoming). 
The impact of SPS measures on trade and welfare is
largely unknown, primarily because we lack system-
atic information on the incidence of these measures
themselves and because of underdeveloped methods of
economic assessment (Beghin and Bureau, 2001;
Maskus and Wilson, 2001; Roberts et al., 1999).
However, there is substantial evidence that disagree-
ments over SPS measures are becoming more impor-
tant over time due to several trends. Reduction in tra-
ditional trade barriers, growth in trade of fresh and
minimally processed foods, growth in trade of live-
stock products, and increased consumer awareness and
demand for safety have all contributed to increased
disagreements over SPS measures and allegations that
they pose barriers to trade (Unnevehr, 2000; Henson
and Loader, 1999; Dyck and Nelson, 2000; Buzby and
Roberts, 1999). 
Resolving trade conflicts over food safety regulation is
viewed as possibly one of the biggest challenges fac-
ing the international trade system. It is widely recog-
nized that a perceived failure to accommodate
legitimate differences in food regulations could
increase opposition to trade liberalization in general.
Effective governance of the interface between food
safety regulation and trade relies on the efforts of mul-
tilateral institutions and national regulatory authorities. 
Current Trends in the
Regulatory Environment
Several changes in the global food system—increased
scientific understanding of foodborne hazards,
increased international trade in food products, and
changes in how consumers obtain and prepare
food—have brought renewed attention to food safety
regulation in many countries. The science of public
health is now better able to identify new foodborne
pathogens and other hazards, estimate the incidence
and severity of foodborne illness, and trace hazards to
their sources. Increased public awareness of microbial
pathogens has raised public concern about this type of
foodborne hazard. In industrialized countries, con-
sumers carry out less food preparation, consume more
fresh and minimally processed foods, and consume
more meat and seafood products. A greater share of
consumption is now imported in many countries,
including many fresh products. These changes in con-
sumption patterns alter the sources and incidence of
risk and reduce consumer control over food safety, at
the very time that increasingly affluent consumers are
demanding a higher level of safety. 
Some well-publicized crises have brought these
changes to the attention of the public. In 1993, an out-
break of Escherichia coli O157:H7, a new and more
virulent strain of E. coli, was linked to consumption of
undercooked hamburger contaminated with the bac-
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deaths in several Western States. This pathogen drew
further U.S. media attention later in the 1990s when
outbreaks were associated with unpasteurized fruit
juice and bagged salad lettuce. In 1996, bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy (BSE), or “mad cow” disease in
cattle, was linked epidemiologically to the emergence
of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in
humans who had consumed meat contaminated with
the BSE causative agent. Consumers in the UK and
elsewhere in Europe where BSE has been found in cat-
tle were especially affected. And in 1999, supplies of
several animal-derived foodstuffs produced in Belgium
were contaminated with dioxins associated with ani-
mal feed prepared from tainted fats and oils. The
resulting food recalls and disruptions in trade crippled
the Belgian economy. These outbreaks or incidents
have often resulted in new food safety regulation.
New approaches to food safety regulation emerged in
industrialized countries during the 1990s following
these changes in science, markets, and consumer
awareness. The following discussion presents seven
main trends in regulation worldwide:
(1) The growing use of risk analysis,
(2) Establishing public health as the primary 
goal of food safety regulation,
(3) Emphasizing a farm-to-table approach in 
addressing food safety hazards,
(4) Adopting the Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) system to regulate 
microbial pathogens in food,
(5) Increasing the stringency of standards for 
many food safety hazards,
(6) Adding new and more extensive regulation
to handle newly identified hazards, and,
(7) Improving market performance in food 
safety through provision of information.
The new approach to food safety regulation is based
upon risk analysis, which includes risk assessment,
risk communication, and risk management. Risk
assessment is to be science-based, and includes identi-
fication of the sources and incidence of the risk, as
well as identification of possible control strategies.
The results of risk assessment must then be communi-
cated, inviting public participation in the risk manage-
ment process. Risk management entails choosing the
appropriate level of protection and selecting suitable
interventions or control options. 
This approach to food safety regulation was recom-
mended in reports by the National Research Council
of the National Academy of Science (NRC, 1985;
NRC, 1987) for U.S. food safety regulation, and is
generally embraced by U.S. agencies. For example,
FDA and USDA have recently carried out risk assess-
ments for S. enteritidis in shell eggs, E. coli O157:H7
in hamburger, BSE in beef cattle, antibiotic-resistant
Campylobacter in poultry, Vibrio vulnificus in shell-
fish, and Listeria monocytogenes in ready-to-eat meat
products. These risk assessments have generally been
undertaken to see whether new regulation is warranted.
The 2002 European Food Law embraces this approach
as well, as do all of the European food safety agencies
in member states of the European Union. The Joint
Institute for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at the
University of Maryland lists several publicly available
food safety risk assessments carried out by govern-
ment agencies in other countries, including Canada,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
(JIFSAN, 2002). 
The primary goal of food safety regulation is public
health. In the past, some food safety agencies have had
multiple mandates relating to other issues such as food
quality, industry promotion, or animal health. To more
clearly focus food safety regulation on public health and
consumer protection, several countries have reorganized
their food safety regulatory agencies in order to refocus
and to integrate previously scattered functions:
● Australia and New Zealand established the
Australia and New Zealand Food Authority or
ANZFA in 1991 to create uniform food regulation
in both countries; in July 2002, the Food
Standards Australia-New Zealand agency was
established and charged with setting standards for
primary products;
● Canada established the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency in 1997 to unify inspection activities pre-
viously spread across several agencies;
● France established the Agence Francaise de
Securite Sanitaire des Aliments (AFSSA) in 1999
to provide systemwide authority for risk assess-
ment and intervention;
● The United Kingdom Food Standards Agency was
created by an act of Parliament in 1999, and is set
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public health and consumer interests;
● Ireland created the Food Safety Authority in 1998; 
● The European Union (EU) created a new Food
Safety Authority in early 2002, following earlier
reorganization of EU directorates in 1997 to address
consumer protection in response to food safety con-
cerns following the BSE crisis (Vos, 2000). 
In the United States, FDA has always had public
health protection as its sole mandate. However, 12
Federal agencies have some responsibility for food
safety, and many have other public goals in addition to
public health. To better focus food safety activities in
the U.S., greater coordination among the various regu-
latory agencies has been established at the Federal
level (President’s Council on Food Safety, 2001). 
Regulatory agencies increasingly recognize that a
farm-to-table approach is often desirable for address-
ing food safety hazards. Many foodborne hazards can
enter food at many points during the production
process. Once present in food, some hazards can mul-
tiply or cross-contaminate other foods during trans-
portation, processing, and preparation. Thus, control of
foodborne hazards may involve interventions at many
points in the food production and distribution system.
Interventions at one level may influence control
options at subsequent points in the supply chain from
producer to consumer. Finally, there may be tradeoffs
among controls at different levels in terms of the risk
reduction achieved and the costs incurred. Thus, for
many hazards, the ideal risk assessment examines the
entire food production and distribution system. 
The farm-to-table approach is clearly articulated in the
new EU Food Law as a principle for future food safety
regulation. However, the EU policy also recognizes
that different kinds of regulatory measures may be
needed at the farm level, due to the difficulties of con-
trolling hazards in a farm environment. In the United
States, the farm-to-table approach was used in devel-
oping new regulatory approaches to S. enteritidis in
eggs (see box). 
Countries are increasingly adopting the Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system
as a basis for new regulation, often of microbial
pathogens in food. HACCP requires identification of
critical control points and development of procedures
for monitoring controls and addressing any failures in
control. Often, firms or industries are given some flex-
ibility in determining control points and critical limits,
so that implementation of HACCP is adaptable to
many different contexts. The imposition of regulations
mandating HACCP systems reflects a growing recog-
nition that it is important to prevent and control haz-
ards before they reach the consumer.
In 1996, the USDA’s Pathogen Reduction/HACCP
Regulation mandated the use of HACCP in meat and
poultry slaughter and processing plants in order to
reduce microbial pathogens (USDA, 1996). The FDA
mandated HACCP for seafood plants in 1995 (FDA,
1995), and for fruit juice in 2001 (FDA, 2001). Canada
also requires HACCP for fish, seafood, meat, and
poultry plants. In the European Union, HACCP was
mandated in 1993 for the entire food system, though it
has been implemented in different ways within mem-
ber countries. 
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The risk assessment of Salmonella enteritidis (SE)
carried out by the FDA and the USDA's Food Safety
and Inspection Service and Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service examined the interdependence
among control options at different stages of process-
ing and handling. It provided the basis for an action
plan (President's Council on Food Safety, 1999). The
risk assessment model indicated that multiple inter-
ventions would achieve more reductions in SE ill-
ness than would a single point of intervention.
The action plan identifies a set of activities at each
stage of the production chain. Producers and
packer/processors can choose between two strategies
designed to give equivalent performance in terms of
reduction in SE at the egg production and
packer/processor stages. The first strategy focuses on
farm-level testing and egg diversion; the second strat-
egy directs more resources to the packer/processor
level and includes a lethal treatment, or “kill step”
(and HACCP plan) at this stage. Both strategies
include regulatory presence on the farm (e.g., control
of chicks from SE flocks) and at the packer/processor
(e.g., washing, mandated prerequisite programs of san-
itary controls). In addition to these interventions, the
action plan sets refrigeration standards for the distribu-
tion and retail stages to ensure that reductions in SE
are preserved at later stages in the food supply chain.
Box 3.1—Farm to Table Risk Assessment 
for Salmonella enteritidis in EggsOver and above the general principles in the new regu-
latory approach, there is also a trend toward more
stringent standards for many food safety hazards.
HACCP regulations frequently consolidate existing
codes of hygienic practice or sanitation standards with
new requirements. For example, the 1996 Pathogen
Reduction/HACCP Regulation for U.S. meat and poul-
try plants also required written sanitation procedures
and pathogen tests to verify that HACCP is reducing
hazards. These standards are in addition to previous
sanitation requirements for plants. In the EU, earlier
HACCP directives have been replaced by a new direc-
tive in 2000 that extends requirements for recordkeep-
ing and corrective action. 
Standards for other kinds of hazards have changed.
The U.S. Food Quality Protection Act, passed in 1995,
mandates that no harm result to infants and children
from aggregate exposure to all pesticide residues. This
has brought about a reassessment of all currently regis-
tered pesticides, beginning with the widely used class
of chemicals called organophosphates. In the EU, new,
unified standards were proposed for aflatoxins on
crops in 1998. In unifying standards across member
states, the new standards reduced allowable levels of
residues in most countries. Comments on this change
from EU trading partners led to some revisions in the
unified standard that was implemented in 2001 (and
modified in 2002). 
In addition to more stringent food safety standards,
newly identified hazards have brought about new and
more extensive regulation. For example, BSE poses both
animal and human health risks. Its mode of transmission
among cattle or between animals and people is not fully
understood. New regulations in the United Kingdom
and elsewhere—regarding animal age at slaughter, mon-
itoring of animal herds, testing of animal brains at
slaughter, exclusion of specified risk materials (brain,
spinal cord, eyes, tonsils, etc.) from meat products and
meat cuts, and exclusion of mammal products from cat-
tle feed—are designed to reduce the risk of transmis-
sion. These regulations are extensive, covering every
step of the food production and distribution system from
animal feed to meat butchering. They also have had an
impact on a wide range of byproducts, including gelatin
used in pharmaceuticals. 
Another example of newly identified hazards is the
growing awareness of potential transmission of antibi-
otic resistance from food animals to humans. This has
led to new regulations regarding the nontherapeutic use
of antibiotics in food animals, most notably in the EU,
where such uses are banned entirely. In the U.S., such
uses are under review, and the FDA has issued new
guidelines for assessing the risk of resistance to antibi-
otics used in feeds.
Other new approaches to food safety regulation
attempt to improve market performance through provi-
sion of food safety information. These approaches
include the use of voluntary guidelines or standards,
provision of third-party certification, provision of
information through labeling, establishing legal liabil-
ity for food safety, and establishing voluntary or
mandatory systems for traceability (table 3.1). Such
interventions may improve performance by providing
information or incentives that encourage consumers to
choose safe food and reward producers for its provi-
sion. The public role in these new approaches, and the
degree to which they are mandatory or voluntary,
varies among countries. 
Unresolved Public 
Policy Issues 
These new trends in food safety regulation have come
about mostly over the past decade. As these trends are
still evolving in many countries, three public policy
issues remain unresolved. First, the role of scientific
and economic analysis in risk management varies
widely among countries. In the United States, regula-
tions must be science-based. Economic analysis is
mandated for major regulations with an estimated eco-
nomic impact over $100 million and for all food safety
regulation within USDA (Executive Office of the
President, 1993). Economic analysis played a role in
the design of the Pathogen Reduction/HACCP
Regulation, as analysis of the fixed cost implications
led to staggered implementation dates for plants of dif-
ferent sizes. In the European Union, risk management
decisions may include “other legitimate factors” that
extend beyond scientific and economic analysis
(Henson, 2001). Such factors include consumer con-
cerns, the environment, animal welfare, and other
political or economic factors, such as the impact on
small farms. In Australia and New Zealand, cost-
benefit analysis with risk assessment is extensively
used. For example, in the 1998 redesign of food safety
regulation, the regulatory approach that was chosen
balanced expected benefits to consumers and industry
against the costs of regulation to industry and govern-
ment. Such analysis in Australia, Canada, and New
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kets and the impact of new regulations on trade as an
important economic dimension.
Second, controversy surrounds the role of standards. In
the United States, a recent court decision declared that
USDA could not shut down a meat grinding plant for
failing to pass a performance standard based on
Salmonella incidence. The USDA is currently review-
ing the role of microbiological performance standards,
and it is not yet clear what role these may play in addi-
tion to sanitation process standards. In the EU, the
mandate for HACCP in all parts of the food produc-
tion and distribution system is not always practical for
small retail establishments, so in many cases regula-
tion instead relies on codes of hygienic practice
(Jansen, 2001). These more prescriptive process stan-
dards do not really follow the HACCP model of pre-
vention and control. 
The role of process and performance standards in regu-
lating different kinds of hazards is changing. Inputs that
are added during the production process are often sub-
ject to performance standards, such as tolerances for
pesticide residues. However, some inputs are subject to
process standards such as withdrawal times for antibi-
otics in animals or required recordkeeping for use of
growth hormones. It is more difficult to set performance
standards for microbial hazards, as they can enter the
food supply at many points during production and dis-
tribution, and can grow or cross-contaminate other
foods. Regulation of microbial hazards has often meant
setting process standards, such as standard sanitation
procedures or codes of hygienic practice. Microbial haz-
ards may be more frequently subject to performance
standards in the future, as the need to verify HACCP
systems is recognized and new tests are developed that
provide more timely and specific results. 
A third unresolved issue is regulatory agency capacity
and authority. In many cases, existing regulations
require review or removal in order to implement new
kinds of regulation. This kind of review took place in
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom to
reduce regulatory burden and to ensure consistency in
how regulations are applied. Another issue is whether
existing regulatory authority extends throughout the
food system. When it does not, then certain kinds of
intervention may not be possible. The EU Food Law
establishes regulatory authority for the entire food pro-
duction/distribution system, but such authority does
not exist to the same extent in the United States.
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service does not
have authority to regulate at the farm level. In some
cases, FDA or the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health
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Table 3.1—Information-based approaches to food safety interventions
Approach Example Public sector role Food safety benefit
Guidelines UK voluntary guidelines for farms to 
reduce Salmonella in pigs
U.S. voluntary Good Agricultural 
Practices to reduce microbial hazards 
in fresh fruits and vegetables 
Third-party USDA  Quality  Through  Verification 
certification program certifies that fresh produce is 
produced under HACCP
Netherlands IKB programs for livestock 
producers
Labeling U.S. required safe handling labels on 
fresh meat and poultry products
EU novel food regulation requires labeling 
of novel foods
Liability UK 1990 Food Safety Act Establishes responsibility  Improves safety by providing 
for food safety  incentives for producers to follow 
practices that minimize hazards
Traceability EU Food Law establishes as principle for  Establish information and  Facilitates tracing problems in case 
food safety policy marketing channel requirements of outbreak; can provide incentives 
for producers to improve safety
Japan requires traceability in beef sector
Public sector can develop
guidelines or certification that
is science-based, directed
toward public health, and
credible to consumers
Identify where information
critical to facilitate consumer
choice; respond to consumer
demand for information
Reduces market failure where infor-
mation previously lacking; alters
hazard incidence in some cases
Reduces hazards, but only where
guidelines or certification adopted;
and reduce transaction cost in 
markets for safety.Inspection Service may regulate food safety at the
farm level, but this is not the focus of either agency.
What Are the Implications for
International Food Trade?
Regulatory trends, associated unresolved public policy
issues, and the growth in world food trade have several
implications for how food safety standards affect interna-
tional trade in food products. First, the simultaneous
move toward improved safety among industrialized
countries creates the potential for convergence around
higher standards. That is, as developed countries with
major markets adopt new regulations, there is incentive
for other countries to follow suit (Vogel, 1995). New
regulations are undertaken in some countries in response
to other countries’actions. This rationale has been
explicitly mentioned in regulatory impact analysis in
Australia and Canada, for example. USDA’s survey of
35 countries that export meat and poultry to the United
States also attests to the demonstration effect of stringent
food safety standards in importing countries (World Food
Chemical News, 2000). More than a third of the 29
respondents to the survey indicated that they had
adopted HACCP in all (not just exporting) establish-
ments, while nearly half had adopted HACCP for at least
some of their nonexporting establishments. Such conver-
gence likely reduces the potential for trade disputes.
New kinds of regulation or public intervention that
focus on provision of voluntary information, such as
certification for certain kinds of production practices,
can facilitate trade, even when standards and require-
ments differ among countries. The FDA developed
guidelines for minimizing microbial hazards, so-called
Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) (FDA, 1998).
While not mandatory for market access, these guide-
lines provide a basis for exporters to privately certify
food safety to produce wholesalers in the U.S. (see
chapter 5). In another example, a USDA certification
program for meat producers enables U.S. firms to
export to the EU if they voluntarily apply to USDA for
certification that they meet EU requirements (which
are different from U.S. regulations). A USDA certifi-
cate then accompanies export shipments. 
Although some new regulatory developments might
mitigate potential barriers to trade, the appearance of
new hazards, or increased trade volumes from new
sources, can lead to food safety incidents or disputes
in trade. A disease outbreak or newly identified hazard
often leads to disruptions in trade and may strain rela-
tions with trading partners. In the Belgium dioxin cri-
sis, the Belgian government was criticized for not
providing timely information to other countries that
imported implicated products. The BSE discoveries in
the United Kingdom disrupted trade between that
country and other members of the EU. In the United
States, the first food-related outbreak from Cyclospora
in the United States led to an import ban on
Guatemalan raspberries (see chapter 5). 
The imposition of new, higher standards—as well as
remaining differences among countries in how stan-
dards are developed and applied—can also lead to
trade disputes. In particular, rising standards and the
rapid change in food safety regulation in the industri-
alized countries creates challenges for developing
countries, many of which have seen rapid growth in
food exports since the 1990s (Unnevehr, 2000; Henson
and Loader, 1999). For example, the proposed new
standards for aflatoxin in the EU had a disproportion-
ate impact on exports from developing countries
(Otsuki et al., 2001). These countries may lack infra-
structure to ensure basic sanitation in processing and
transport, as well as public oversight to certify certain
kinds of safety. The issue of equivalence in safety out-
comes has been identified by developing countries as
important in implementation of the SPS Agreement.
New or more stringent process standards entail greater
difficulties in determining whether an equivalent safety
outcome has been achieved. While HACCP may be
widely accepted as an approach to food safety, specific
HACCP regulations for specific food sectors may result
in different outcomes. As required HACCP systems
may or may not be linked to specific performance stan-
dards, it can be difficult to determine if imported prod-
ucts are as safe as those produced domestically
(Hathaway, 1995). Other kinds of process controls, such
as recordkeeping or traceability requirements,2 can
impose objectionable costs on trading partners. Whether
such requirements are necessary to achieve an equiva-
lent risk outcomes can be a matter of dispute. For exam-
ple, the United States is concerned that new EU
regulations regarding control of feeds to prevent BSE
could impose unreasonable costs on the U.S. feed
industry, given that the EU’s own risk assessment indi-
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2 Traceability requirements are recordkeeping systems used to help
keep foods with different attributes separate from others (Golan et
al., 2002)cates that the probability of BSE appearing in the
United States is negligible (Schwartz, 2001). 
Strong differences remain with respect to consumer
risk preferences, consumer perceptions, and the role of
nonscience issues in regulatory decisionmaking. Both
consumer risk preferences and consumer perceptions
are at issue in the longstanding disagreement between
the U.S. and the EU over use of growth hormones in
beef (see chapter 4). Nonscience issues such as the
preservation of small farms are a consideration in EU
decisions about inputs like growth hormones or r-BST
(recombinant bovine somatotropin, a synthetically pro-
duced version of a naturally occurring hormone
intended to increase milk production). Differences in
perception and willingness to assume unknown risks
are evident in more recent disagreements over the
acceptability of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) and labeling of foods produced through mod-
ern biotechnology. Furthermore, nonscience issues
such as ethical concerns about genetic modification are
at play in the dispute over modern biotechnology.
Food safety issues may be difficult to separate from
other contentious issues in cases like these. 
In summary, changes in regulatory approach may lead
to some convergence in food safety standards, but the
dynamic nature of food trade, the onset of new hazards,
and differences in regulatory approach and capacity still
instigate disputes and disruptions to trade.
Disruptions to Trade From Food
Safety Regulation:  Evidence
From the WTO
The SPS Agreement was established under the WTO in
1995, as a result of the 1986-93 Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This Agreement pro-
vides a framework for determining the legitimacy of SPS
measures that restrict trade and for resolving potential
trade conflicts. Its requirement for regulatory trans-
parency, key to enabling judgment about the purpose or
design of a measure, is achieved by “notifications” (to
the WTO) of proposed changes in regulations that could
affect trade. Trading partners are then entitled to com-
ment on the proposed changes. If differences cannot be
resolved in bilateral discussions, countries can raise the
matter in the WTO SPS Committee. These complaints
provide some evidence of the extent to which new food
safety regulations have created barriers to trade. 
Complaints Raised in the WTO’s 
SPS Committee
WTO members submitted more than 2,400 SPS notifi-
cations to the WTO between 1995 and 2001. Each
notification indicates, among other things, what the
proposed measure is, which product or products it is
applied to, if it is based on an international standard,
and when it is expected to come into force. These noti-
fications provide an opportunity for trading partners to
raise questions or objections to proposed measures in
the SPS Committee before they are adopted as regula-
tions. WTO members have taken advantage of this
notification process, registering 187 complaints (or
counter notifications) in the SPS Committee between
1995 and 2001 (table 3.2).3 More than half (108) were
related to human health measures (i.e., food and feed
regulations). Developed countries were most often the
source (68 percent) as well as the target (67 percent)
of counter notifications that identified food and feed
regulations as unjustified trade impediments. Both
developed and developing countries cited the measures
of developed countries in the majority of counter noti-
fications related to human health. The complaints by
developed countries (42) outnumbered those by devel-
oping countries (30) in this category, suggesting that
access to the same scientific information and technolo-
gies still leaves ample scope for disagreement over
food safety measures. 
An examination of the counter notifications by com-
modity and hazard provides some insight into the
sources of current tensions over regulations in interna-
tional agricultural markets. Most notable are the number
of counter notifications related to the regulation of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs),
which include BSE. TSE measures alone accounted for
nearly half of the counter notifications related to food
safety regulations since 1995, indicating the significant
disruption to international trade caused by the BSE out-
break (table 3.3). This impact is related to the fact that
cattle, the source of BSE, provide so many food and
industrial products, including meat and milk for human
consumption, gelatin for pharmaceutical purposes,
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3 Other WTO committees have formally adopted the term “counter
notifications” to reference complaints recorded in the minutes or
reports of committee meetings. The SPS Committee has not done so.
Complaints are variously recorded under “information from mem-
bers,” “specific trade concerns,” and “other business” in the commit-
tee minutes. The term counter notification is used here to help
distinguish the complaints raised in the SPS Committee from the
complaints that proceed to formal dispute settlement in the WTO. semen for breeding, and other byproducts used in cos-
metics, commercial animal feed, and elsewhere. The EU
and Switzerland together registered more than half of
these complaints, which were often directed at the ini-
tial emergency measures adopted by countries in 1996.
The EU itself later became the target of 10 complaints
following implementation of its new, extensive BSE
regulations. Examples include Chile and Peru’s com-
plaints against the EU’s ban on the use of fish meal in
ruminant feed, and Australia’s complaint against EU
restrictions on selected cosmetics.
The discovery of elevated levels of dioxin in Belgian
animal feedstuffs also led to immediate restrictions on
exports of a wide array of European animal products
in 1999 (see chapter 8). The EU subsequently raised
objections to the emergency dioxin measures of nine
of its trading partners who, in the view of EU officials,
maintained restrictions on animal products when these
actions were no longer justified. 
The fact that more counter notifications (82) were
related to the regulation of animal products than any
other product category is not surprising in view of the
significant impact of the BSE and dioxin events.4 The
number of counter notifications (14) related to pathogen
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Table 3.2—Complaints (counter notifications) in the SPS Committee against trade partners, 1995 - 20011
Complaints by developed countries Complaints by developing countries
Human Plant and Human Plant and Total
Respondents: health animal health  Other2 Subtotal health animal health Other Subtotal
Developed 
country 42 15 1 58 30 23 1 54 112
Developing 
country 31 18 1 50 5 16 1 22 72
Multiple 
countries -- 1 -- 1 -- 2 -- 2 3
Total 
complaints 73 34 2 109 35 41 2 78 187
1 Entries exclude “repeat interventions” made by WTO members who registered complaints against the same measure more than once.
2 Includes complaints about administrative issues and horizontal regulations that address multiple health objectives.
Source: WTO Summaries of the Meetings of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/R series, 1995-01 and authors'
calculations.
Table 3.3—Distribution of complaints (counter notifications) related to human health measures in the SPS
Committee, 1995 - 20011
Complaints against measures regulating:
Commodity TSEs2 Food Foodborne Toxins  and Veterinary Pesticide Other3 Total
additives pathogens heavy metals residues residues
Multiple animal products 44 -- -- 8 -- -- -- 52
Meat and meat products 4 -- 8 2 2 -- -- 16
Multiple agricultural products -- 1 -- 13 -- -- 2 16
Dairy/Eggs -- -- 6 1 -- -- 2 9
Processed products -- -- -- 5 -- 1 3 9
Feedstuffs 2 -- -- 1 2 -- -- 5
Horticultural products -- -- -- -- -- 1 -- 1
Cereals -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0
Total 50 1 14 30 4 2 7 108
1 Entries exclude “repeat interventions” made by WTO Members who registered complaints against the same measure more than once.
2 transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) include bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
3 Complaints related to measures that regulated multiple hazards or genetically modified products, or had unknown objectives.
Source: WTO Summaries of the Meetings of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/R series, 1995-01 and authors'
calculations.
4 This total reflects counter notifications related to restrictions in
the following categories: multiple animal products (52), meat and
meat products (16), dairy and eggs (9), and feedstuffs (5).control measures for meat, dairy, and eggs was also a
factor in the number of complaints against measures reg-
ulating animal products. The regulation of other products
drew far fewer complaints. Together, the number of
counter notifications related to regulations applied to
“multiple agricultural products” (16), processed products
(9), horticultural products (1), and cereals (0) accounted
for fewer than one-fourth of the total counter notifica-
tions related to human health measures.
The WTO Secretariat has aggregated the 108 separate
food safety-related counter notifications into 40 issues
or “special trade concerns.” The Secretariat reports res-





The framework that governs the interface of trade and
food safety regulation includes the SPS Agreement and
the multilateral organizations that are charged by the
WTO to further implementation of the agreement. The
SPS Agreement rests on two premises: that basing
domestic standards on international norms will reduce
conflicts and lower transaction costs, and that requiring
scientific justification for standards that deviate from
these international norms makes it more difficult for
countries to shelter domestic industries behind unneces-
sarily restrictive SPS regulations. The role of interna-
tional standards and the work of scientific organizations
are therefore critical to the WTO’s objectives of averting
trade disputes and increasing welfare-enhancing trade. 
Provisions of the SPS Agreement
Prior to 1995, rules for SPS measures in the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had
allowed measures that were “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life and health” but stipulated
that measures should not constitute disguised restric-
tions or create unnecessary trade barriers. The WTO
SPS Agreement reiterates earlier commitments under
the GATT, but also requires regulators to: (1) base
measures on a scientific risk assessment (science-
based risk management); (2) recognize that different
measures can achieve equivalent safety outcomes
(equivalence); and (3) allow imports from distinct
regions in an exporting country when presented with
evidence of the absence or low incidence of pests or
diseases (regionalization).5 Adoption of international
standards (harmonization) is encouraged, but not
required (see box).
In addition to setting out the rights and obligations of
WTO members, the SPS Agreement also establishes
enforcement mechanisms. These mechanisms include
the notification procedures and the establishment of an
SPS Committee to discuss these issues on a continuing
basis. WTO dispute resolution mechanisms for resolv-
ing conflicts between countries in a timely manner are
also available. These mechanisms include formal con-
sultations between the parties to a dispute, followed by
adjudication by a WTO panel and the WTO Appellate
Body if required.
Institutions in the Multilateral 
Governance Framework
Other intergovernmental organizations besides the
WTO itself contribute to the implementation of the
SPS Agreement by creating international standards or
advancing scientific understanding of foodborne risks
and their mitigation. The SPS Agreement identifies
three organizations to promote harmonization through
adoption of international standards: the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for human health
measures; the International Office of Epizootics (OIE)
for animal and human health measures; and the
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for
plant health measures. Firms and governments have
relied on the standards of these organizations—some-
times referred to as the “three sisters”—to facilitate the
international exchange of agricultural goods for sev-
eral decades, but their role has become more promi-
nent since the SPS Agreement. The agreement does
not require countries to adopt international standards,
but those that do so are presumed to be in compliance
with their WTO obligations. 
While the SPS Agreement itself does not reference any
other institutions, the SPS Committee also draws on the
expertise of official observer organizations. The World
Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), which are well posi-
tioned to convene expert scientific panels on issues of
emerging importance and to distribute their findings, are
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5 Regionalization is more germane to the regulation of plant and
animal health than food safety. among the most influential observer organizations. Their
work on BSE, biotechnology, and other issues has been
key to the resolution of some conflicts, particularly those
arising over emergency measures adopted by countries
in response to newly identified hazards.
Implementation of the SPS Agreement
Three of the principles under the SPS Agreement—
science-based risk management, equivalence, and har-
monization—directly address some aspects of food
safety regulation that create the potential for trade 
disputes. 
Science-Based Risk Management
The obligation to base regulations on scientific risk
assessment clearly reduces the latitude for disingenu-
ous use of SPS regulatory interventions. In each of the
three SPS disputes6 to reach the WTO Appellate Body
since 1995, the regulations at issue were judged to vio-
late this requirement. 
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The SPS Agreement requires:
● Science-based risk management (Articles 2 and 5):
SPS measures must be based upon scientific princi-
ples and sufficient scientific evidence; more partic-
ularly, measures must be based on a risk assess-
ment. Measures should be chosen so as to mini-
mize distortions to trade and must be no more trade
restrictive than necessary to achieve a country's
“appropriate level of protection.” Members are to
avoid variation in the levels of health protection
provided by its measures if this variation creates a
disguised restriction on trade. Countries may adopt
a provisional measure to avoid risk, but must seek
information and carry out a risk assessment to jus-
tify permanent use of a trade-restricting measure.
● Equivalence (Article 4): A WTO member must
accept that the SPS measures of another coun-
try are equivalent to its own if it is objectively
demonstrated that the exporter's measures
achieve the importer's appropriate level of pro-
tection, even if the measures themselves differ.
● Regionalization (Article 6): A country is
required to allow imports from regions that are
free or nearly free of pests or diseases.1
These obligations are balanced by a recognition of:
● National sovereignty (Article 3): A country may
choose a measure that differs from the interna-
tional standard to achieve its appropriate level of
protection as long as it complies with the other
rules of the Agreement. This recognizes that indi-
vidual nations may be unwilling to subscribe to
uniform measures for all hazards. 
The Agreement endorses:
● Harmonization (Article 3): Members are urged
(but not required) to adopt international stan-
dards. A country that does adopt the standards
of the three designated international organiza-
tions is presumed to be in compliance with its
WTO obligations. 
The Agreement also establishes enforcement 
mechanisms, including:
● Notification: A WTO member is required to pub-
lish its regulations and provide a mechanism for
answering questions from trading partners.
● WTO SPS Committee: The WTO Committee
meets three to four times a year to develop guide-
lines and discuss contentious SPS measures on a
continuing basis.
● Dispute settlement: Mechanisms include formal
consultations between the parties to a dispute,
followed by adjudication by a WTO panel if
required. Decisions by trade dispute panels may
be appealed to the WTO Appellate Body.
Box 3.2—Principal Provisions of the WTO's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures
1 This provision is more germane to the regulation of plant or
animal hazards.
6 The three cases were EU—Hormones (brought by the U.S. and
Canada);  Australia—Salmon (brought by Canada); and Japan—
Varietal Testing (brought by the U.S.).However, the impact of the risk management require-
ments extends far beyond formal dispute settlement.
The clear obligation to base measures on science has
led to the resolution of many issues before they
advance to dispute settlement. In particular, food
safety measures that discriminate among sources of
supply attract close scrutiny, and sometimes are seen
to lack scientific rationale. For example, an exemption
to a ban on sauces containing benzoic acid that
Australia had granted to New Zealand during their
transition to a common food standards system was
replaced with a tolerance level for all imports follow-
ing a Philippine complaint in the SPS Committee.
Similarly, Spain modified its regulatory regime for
cadmium and copper residues in squid that held
imports to higher standards than EU products in
response to a U.S. complaint.
Disagreements over less overtly discriminatory meas-
ures have been resolved by means of updated risk
assessments. For example, Australia rescinded its 1994
ban on three kinds of raw milk cheeses from
Switzerland following completion of its 1999 risk
assessment that indicated that Swiss processing proto-
cols attained at least the same level of pathogen
destruction as pasteurization in hard cheeses (though
not for semi-hard or soft cheeses). Further study simi-
larly led Korea to amend its new Food Code to exempt
poultry meat destined for further processing and cook-
ing from its zero tolerance standard for Listeria,
thereby allowing imports of Thai frozen chicken to
resume (WTO, 2002a). 
While the obligation to base measures on risk assess-
ments can often avert trade disputes, it cannot do so in
all cases. Relevant risk assessments may not be available
to inform regulatory responses to new hazards.
Emergency measures have only accounted for 17 percent
of the total SPS measures notified to the WTO, but
because such measures are generally very trade restric-
tive, they often give rise to complaints if importers fail to
modify policies as new evidence emerges. For example,
many countries suspended imports of European dairy
products immediately following the March 1996
announcement of a possible link between BSE and its
human variant, vCJD. Most countries rescinded these
bans when the OIE and the WHO reaffirmed that exist-
ing scientific data did not indicate that these products are
BSE vectors. However, the EU had to repeatedly petition
Argentine regulators before they modified restrictions on
dairy products—including Belgian chocolate, German
milk powder, and Swedish cacao oil butter—in 2001. 
Risk assessments also do not avert disagreements over
measures that reflect extremely conservative approaches
to mitigating scientifically verified risks. For example,
11 countries (supported by 11 others) objected to the
EU’s proposed regulation to lower tolerances for afla-
toxin, a naturally occurring carcinogenic class of 
chemicals, in a wide range of foodstuffs in March 
1998 (WTO, 1998a). The new tolerances were to be
enforced by new sampling procedures that exporters
also regarded as onerous. The World Bank estimated
that the new regime for cereals, dried and preserved
fruits, and edible nuts would result in an annual export
loss of $650 million for nine African countries while
achieving 1.4 fewer deaths per billion inhabitants than
Codex standards (Otsuki et al., 2001).
The SPS Agreement protects a country’s right to
choose its “appropriate level of protection,” stating
only that when choosing these levels, members should
(not “shall” which indicates a legal obligation) “take
into account the objective of minimizing negative trade
effects.” The U.S. Statement of Administrative Action
to Congress states that this provision, along with other
language in the Agreement, “explicitly affirms the
rights of each government to choose its levels of pro-
tection including a ‘zero risk’ level if it so chooses”
(President of the United States, 1994). The national
sovereignty principle reflected in the risk management
provisions of the Agreement thus provides leeway for
a country to adopt measures that achieve incremental
risk reductions regardless of the cost (for its trading
partners or its domestic consumers). These provisions
were necessary to secure the support of developed
countries during the negotiations, but by allowing poli-
cies that vary significantly from the norm they widen
the scope for trade disputes, even among developed
countries themselves. 
The requirement to use the least trade restrictive
means to achieve the appropriate level of protection
did contribute to the resolution of many of the com-
plaints related to the EU’s proposed aflatoxin regime.
The EU eventually decided to adopt the international
standard for aflatoxin in groundnuts (15 parts per bil-
lion (ppb)) in lieu of the 10 ppb level it had originally
proposed, agreeing with exporters that further process-
ing (for confectionary products) or sorting (for direct
human consumption) would lower residues to 10 ppb
in final products. The EU also adopted a less costly,
but equally rigorous sampling procedure to enforce its
new standards (WTO, 1998b). However, not all com-
plaints were resolved: developing countries, particu-
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tions to some of the aflatoxin tolerances that were not
revised (WTO, 2002a).
Other considerations besides scientific evidence and
risk aversion sometimes factor into risk management
decisions, leading to divergent policies that restrict
trade. For example, recent developments in the regula-
tion of food irradiation illustrate how other factors can
lead to dissimilar policy choices despite a strong inter-
national consensus about the risks and benefits of this
technology. The FAO, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and the WHO concluded in 1980
(and in several followup studies) that the irradiation of
any food up to a specified dose is safe and does not
alter the nutritional content of food. In fact, the WHO
encourages the use of irradiation in order to reduce the
incidence of foodborne diseases caused by microor-
ganisms (European Communities, 2001). The United
States has long approved the use of irradiation for
spices, and has more recently approved its use for a
number of other food products, including meats and
meat products, fruits and vegetables, and juices.
However, other developed countries have been more
reluctant to allow the use of this technology. European,
Canadian, and Australian regulators currently allow
dried herbs, spices, and other minor products to be
irradiated, but have encountered resistance to permit-
ting irradiation of other products from consumer and
domestic industry representatives.
In fact, EU authorities have been considering irradia-
tion regulations for more than 10 years. Despite the
repeated recommendations of the EU’s Scientific
Committee on Food to allow the irradiation of prod-
ucts such as fish, fresh meats, poultry, produce, and
raw milk cheeses, consumer concerns about the safety
of this technology and related questions about the
“technological need” for this form of pathogen control
persist (European Communities, 2001). Current EU
Commission proposals for a list of products that may
be irradiated have drawn criticism from the United
States in the SPS Committee as the list includes only a
few products such as frogs’ legs, peeled shrimp, herbs,
spices, and seasonings (WTO, 1998c). 
While countries’ increasing reliance on scientific risk
analysis to inform food safety policies has led to a
convergence of standards, a number of gaps remain.
This is true even among trading partners who are at
the forefront of this trend, as the WTO counter notifi-
cations indicate. For some of these complaints, the
SPS Agreement’s requirements to base measures on
scientific risk assessments and to use the least trade
restrictive means for achieving public health goals
have led to the quick resolution of trade conflicts, par-
ticularly those involving transparently discriminatory
measures. The Agreement’s science requirements have
also prodded authorities to revisit regulations whose
longevity could be attributed to simple inertia rather
than overt protectionism. The SPS Agreement provides
no further elaboration of risk management principles,
other than the recommendation to minimize trade
effects when choosing levels of risk reduction. The
countries that negotiated the SPS Agreement judged
that it was inappropriate for the WTO to be more pre-
scriptive about risk management, seeing Codex as the
better forum for the development of best regulatory
practices related to food safety.
Some guidance has been provided by Codex7 but, as
yet, there is still disagreement over the role of precau-
tion and “other legitimate factors” in Codex debates as
well as in regulatory policy (as in the aflatoxin and
irradiation cases) (Codex Alimentarius Commission,
2001). Eventual agreement on risk management princi-
ples in Codex may further narrow the scope for trade
disagreements, but these principles are unlikely to
eliminate disputes over the question of the best course
of action to take, given the scientific evidence. Science
is descriptive, not prescriptive; a risk management
decision will therefore always require a choice among
different policy options, each with different costs and
benefits. Options that severely limit market access to
achieve extremely incremental health benefits are
likely to be contentious, even if based on science. 
Equivalence
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement requires members to
accept other countries’ measures as equivalent to their
own if an exporter can demonstrate that its measures
achieve the importer’s desired level of SPS protection.
This provision recognizes that regulatory flexibility
allows countries to allocate scarce resources efficiently
rather than identically. The Agreement also promotes
trade based on equivalence of SPS measures by requir-
ing members to enter into consultations for bilateral
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7 Two of the most important Codex documents providing risk man-
agement guidance are the “Statements of Principle on the Role of
Science in the Codex Decision-making Process and the Extent to
which Other Factors are Taken into Account” (or “General
Principles”) and the “Working Principles for Risk Analysis.”and multilateral equivalence agreements upon request
by the exporter. 
Equivalence determinations usually involve process stan-
dards, since countries are better able to compare per-
formance standards, which stipulate observable and/or
testable attributes of end products. An enormous num-
ber—and arguably a growing proportion—of SPS meas-
ures are process standards. The equivalence obligation
therefore has the potential to yield significant benefits in
international markets for products such as cheeses,
meats, fresh produce, and seafood for which process
standards are key to managing microbial risks.
Although the SPS Committee has urged members to
submit information on their bilateral equivalence
arrangements, few have done so (WTO, 2001b).
Consequently there is no systematic accounting of
achievements to date.8 However, the use of equiva-
lence is still rare in international food trade
(Gascoine, 1999.) The United States and the EU did
sign a framework agreement for recognizing equiva-
lence of some SPS measures for selected animal
products in July 1999, after 6 years of occasionally
high-profile negotiations over matters as minute as
the colors of wall paint in food-processing facilities.
This framework agreement applies to $1 billion in
EU exports of dairy products, fish, and meat to the
United States, and $1 billion in U.S. exports of fish,
hides, and pet food to Western Europe. The export-
ing country must still comply with the importing
country’s measures that are not included in the
framework agreement, including those regulating
food and feed additives and animal drug residues.
Both the EU and the United States also recognize the
equivalence of some measures for selected meat and
dairy products from Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand. However, numerous regulatory differences
remain in contention even between countries gener-
ally recognized as having rigorous regulatory stan-
dards that are rigorously enforced. 
Often, differences hinge not only on the equivalence of
different process standards themselves, but also on how
conformance with different standards is ascertained.
There is inevitably more discretion in enforcement of
process standards than for performance standards,
which is why institutional capability and integrity fig-
ures so importantly in equivalence determinations. In
many instances, equivalence is controversial because
judgment about such matters, unsurprisingly, differs
between exporters and importers. In other instances,
there is disagreement between governments and domes-
tic consumer groups.
Different views on the appropriate roles for the private
and public sector in conformity assessment have like-
wise given rise to trade disputes among developed coun-
tries. For example, the United States rejected Australia’s
1997 “Project 2” proposal to replace government offi-
cials with company-paid inspectors in meat export
plants. Some Australian officials thought that this 
rejection lacked a legitimate rationale, but did not bring
the matter to the WTO (World Food Chemical News,
1997b). U.S. regulators subsequently approved
Australian exports under a revamped program that
increased the role of government oversight, but rede-
ployed government resources from traditional inspection
duties to verification of control strategies, in line with
changes being considered under USDA’s HACCP-based
inspection models project (USDA, 1999). 
Differences over government and industry roles in cer-
tification have also held up EU recognition of the
equivalence of the U.S. production and inspection sys-
tems for food-grade gelatin. U.S. exports to the EU
have been suspended since June 2000, when the
European Commission’s new BSE-related regulations
came into force. The European Commission has indi-
cated that all U.S. gelatin safety measures, with the
exception of two issues pertaining to the source of raw
material and certain end-product specifications, are
equivalent to corresponding EU measures. However,
the EU is currently unwilling to import U.S. gelatin
until there is more FDA oversight of industry self-cer-
tification of compliance with the two “non-equivalent”
measures (WTO, 2002a). 
Given the problems that developed countries have had
with equivalence, developing countries have ques-
tioned whether this provision of the SPS Agreement
will actually provide many export opportunities for
them (WTO, 1998d). Some equivalence arrangements
between developing and developed countries do exist,
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8 More systematic assessment of the impact of equivalence in
global food trade will be possible in the future as the result of the
Committee’s recent actions to increase the transparency of equiva-
lence arrangements. The Committee revised its recommended pro-
cedures to provide for the notification of equivalence of SPS
measures in 2001 and finalized the notification format in June
2002. In its Decision on the Implementation of Article 4, the
Committee noted that equivalence could be accepted for a specific
measure or measures related to a certain product or categories of
products, or on a systemswide basis (WTO, 2001c).especially for seafood products.9 However, developing
countries—echoing the claims of developed coun-
tries—have argued that developed countries often
require “compliance” rather than equivalence of meas-
ures. Even developing countries that have had substan-
tial success as agricultural exporters—such as Brazil,
Mexico, and Thailand—have gone on record to note
the difficulties in gaining recognition of equivalence
(WTO, 1999; WTO, 2001a). Globally, the limited
access to developed country markets for poultry meat
illustrates both the potential and challenge of equiva-
lence. Of the 144 countries that are WTO members,
only 15 are eligible to export fresh, chilled, or frozen
poultry meat to the EU, 4 may export to the United
States, 1 can ship to Canada, and none are allowed to
export to Australia.10
Developing countries aired their concerns related to
equivalence and other SPS Agreement commitments in
“implementation negotiations” undertaken by the
WTO General Council in May 2000 after the 1999
Seattle Ministerial Conference failed to launch a new
round of trade negotiations (WTO, 2001d). In
response, the SPS Committee began to consider how it
could advance implementation of the Agreement’s
equivalence provisions. To date, the Committee has
identified options for expediting equivalence determi-
nations, urged the international standards organizations
to produce equivalence guidelines, and developed pro-
cedures to increase the transparency of such arrange-
ments through notification (WTO, 2001c). The
standards organizations quickly supported the WTO’s
initiative: both Codex and the OIE have completed
draft guidelines for judging equivalence.11
Together, these efforts may further the objective of
regulatory flexibility, but significant constraints
remain. First, the administrative burden of equivalence
determinations is often significant, involving evalua-
tion of infrastructure, overall program design and
implementation, and specific technical requirements.
The United States has stated that its experience indi-
cates the potential for equivalence may be limited
because the actual trade benefits often do not justify
this administrative burden (WTO, 2000).12 Second,
recognizing the equivalence of an alternative regula-
tory regime may require national regulators to offer
the same alternative to domestic producers, requiring
new or revised domestic regulations. Finally, measures
may be specified in legislation, leaving little scope for
regulators to consider other options. For example, the
U.S. Egg Products Inspection Act of 1970 requires
continuous inspection of processed eggs by govern-
ment inspectors, a standard that is currently met by
only one other country (i.e., Canada). 
Harmonization
The SPS Agreement’s endorsement of harmonization
stems from repeated complaints by exporters that com-
plying with divergent SPS measures substantially
increases the transaction costs of trade. Firms that ship
products to several different markets stand to gain
more from harmonization than from equivalence if
harmonization results in lower production and certifi-
cation costs per unit.
Harmonization can also benefit consumers, especially
if the origins of regulatory heterogeneity are the result
of chance events, information differences, or interest
group capture. Harmonization is more likely to be
inappropriate if incomes, tastes, and risks are the pri-
mary sources of variation in national regulations.
Differences in risk perceptions, available market
information, the incidence of risks in production, and
traditional methods of food processing and prepara-
tion all lead to differences in food safety outcomes
among countries. Thus, the benefits of a food safety
standard may exceed its costs in one country, but not
necessarily elsewhere.
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9 The EU, for example, has stated that 62 countries have been rec-
ognized as implementing an equivalent system of inspection and
certification for fishery products; another 41 await equivalence
evaluations, but can currently export fishery products to individual
member States on the basis of bilateral agreements (WTO, 2002b).
10 In addition to the four countries that are permitted to export
fresh, frozen, and chilled poultry to the United States (Canada,
Great Britain, France, and Israel), some plants in northern Mexico
may also re-export U.S.-origin poultry meat to the United States
after minimal processing. 
11 Codex adopted “Guidelines for the Judgement of Equivalence
Agreement Regarding Food Imports and Export Inspection and
Certification Systems” (GL-34) in 1999, but has yet to adopt its
“Guidelines for the Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary
Measures Associated with Food Inspection and Certification
Systems.” The OIE’s “Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary
Measures relating to International Trade in Animals and Animal
Products” is also still under consideration by members.
12 The United States has also cautioned that equivalence does not
imply mutual recognition: under the equivalence provisions of the
SPS Agreement, market access is contingent on a scientific deter-
mination that an exporter’s alternative measure achieves the level
of SPS protection required by the importer, not on reciprocity.However, the impact of harmonization on trade
appears to have been constrained as much by the lack
of international standards as by normative considera-
tions since the SPS Agreement came into force. The
majority of 1995-99 notifications from WTO members
stated that no international standard existed for the
notified measure. Underinvestment in the development
of international standards has led not only to too few
international standards, but also to too many outmoded
standards, which may account, in part, for the low
adoption rate for those standards that do exist. Over
the first 4 years of the SPS Agreement, partial or full
acceptance of international standards as a percentage
of total notified measures was highest for the lower-
middle income countries (38 percent), followed by
high-income (22 percent), lower income (20 percent)
and upper-middle income countries (17 percent)
(Roberts et al., 1999). 
Still, international standards did settle some trade dis-
putes. The OIE’s continually updated assessments of
potential vectors of BSE have been especially impor-
tant in the wake of a crisis that has affected so many
traded products. Countries cited OIE recommendations
as the basis for resolution or partial resolution of 3 of
the 13 “specific trade concerns” related to BSE meas-
ures. In these cases, Chile, India, and Slovakia (as well
as Argentina) lifted bans on imports of dairy products
or animal genetics as the result of the OIE’s repeated
assessments that these products would not transmit the
disease (WTO, 2001a). The BSE outbreak has been a
dramatic, but not isolated, example of a new hazard
spawning new and extensive regulation. Information
dissemination via international standards will be
important not only to health authorities, but also to the
trade system in these instances.
The nature of international standards is also important
in assessing their impact on trade and trade disputes.
Over the past decade, international standards organiza-
tions have allocated more of their resources to the
development of metastandards—which identify com-
mon approaches to risk identification, assessment, and
management—rather than international standards per
se. Exporters’ anticipated gains from international
metastandards may be smaller than from international
standards, as adherence to the same general guidelines
still leaves scope for countries to develop different reg-
ulatory regimes for foodborne risks. For example,
countries that follow Codex’s 1997 General Principles
of Food Hygiene guidelines, which provide a template
for HACCP programs, still have substantive differ-
ences in their requirements for meat imports, as the
EU’s 1997 ban on U.S. poultry meat illustrates. Thus,
the international standards organizations have con-
tributed more to the trading system in recent years by
setting out scientific approaches to regulation than by




Recent trends in food safety regulation create the
potential for both more and less dispute in interna-
tional food trade. Disputes may be eased by the simi-
larity in regulatory trends and approaches among
industrialized countries, such as the growing use of
risk analysis and the adoption of HACCP require-
ments. Disputes may arise from the increased strin-
gency of food safety standards; sudden actions taken
in response to a food safety crisis; the difficulty of
determining equivalence of risk outcomes from new
process standards; differences in risk management
approaches; and differences in the capabilities of coun-
tries at different levels of development. 
The principles and mechanisms established in the SPS
Agreement appear to be well-targeted to the potential
sources of disputes, averting, diffusing, and resolving a
number of food safety-related disputes since 1995. The
SPS Agreement’s requirements for transparency of
regulatory regimes have promoted symmetry of infor-
mation among WTO members. The establishment of
the SPS Committee has provided a forum for airing
grievances and made it easier to identify and track
contentious regulations. These mechanisms have facili-
tated the resolution of disputes between countries at
every level of development. 
The large number of complaints by developed countries
against the measures of other developed countries sug-
gests that some gaps remain in convergence around SPS
regulatory principles. The requirements to base meas-
ures on science and adopt minimally trade distorting
measures still leaves scope for substantial disagreement
among countries at the same level of development.
Differences in the use of precaution are one source of
variation in food safety policies. Under the SPS
Agreement, countries have been able to adopt meas-
ures that are substantially more conservative than the
norm, as the EU’s new aflatoxin regime illustrates.
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sionally adopting measures to mitigate risks that are
not fully understood. Most countries did so when the
BSE crisis emerged in 1996, initially banning all
bovine products from all 15 members of the EU.
However, the right to exercise caution is balanced in
the Agreement by the obligation to seek additional
information to justify the permanent use of a measure,
an obligation that benefited European exporters as
more evidence emerged about the country/product
sources of BSE risk. The balance struck by the SPS
Agreement in the BSE case and in other instances
seems to have accommodated legitimate variation in
policies attributable to risk aversion or uncertainty,
while disallowing trade restrictions that are based on
protectionism or inertia. 
The SPS Agreement has been less successful in reducing
transaction costs to trade resulting from diverse regula-
tions. Determining equivalence in risk outcomes has
proven challenging. At a minimum, it may raise moni-
toring costs to determine that complex process standards
are followed in the exporting country. Further difficulties
arise when production practices and the incidence of
risks vary widely across countries, making it difficult to
determine if a process standard will lead to an equivalent
risk outcome. Institutional barriers are also a factor, as
when policy instruments are specified in legislation.
Thus, food safety standards, especially process stan-
dards, are likely to be contentious in international trade.
The international standards organizations have improved
the functioning of food markets, but more by improving
the quality of regulation (which benefits consumers) than
by reducing the transaction costs of exporting to differ-
ent markets (which benefits exporters). 
Multilateral institutions continue to work on an array
of projects to improve the current governance of food
safety and trade. For example, the Codex Commission
aims to increase the relevance of its standards in inter-
national trade by adopting a “fast track” approval pro-
cedure for some standards, creating more working
groups to address new issues, and increasing the num-
ber of its meetings to speed the adoption process.
These institutional innovations are likely to lead to
more immediate and concrete results than the continu-
ing debate over the development of risk management
principles. Other initiatives, such as the identification
of the types of technical assistance that best help
developing countries meet food safety requirements in
key export markets, could also yield important bene-
fits. But responsibility for increasing welfare-enhanc-
ing trade ultimately rests with national authorities who
determine whether the spirit as well as the letter of
their international obligations are fulfilled. 
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A
s our food system changes at all levels (con-
sumption, production, and trade), these changes
alter the nature and incidence of food safety
risks. Greater consumer affluence and awareness of food
safety issues tends to lead to a greater demand for safety.
The three case studies in this chapter represent food
safety issues that affect international trade of high-value
meat and poultry products. The first case study is of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad-cow
disease,” which began in the United Kingdom (UK) and
has caused regulatory changes affecting both imports
and market access worldwide. This case study shows
that while live cattle and beef exports from the United
Kingdom were decimated by three BSE crises (1988,
1996, and 2000), and have not recovered, total European
Union (EU) exports of these products have been far less
affected to date. For a brief period of time after each of
the three BSE crises, EU domestic consumption of beef
declined sharply. While EU domestic consumption of
beef has gradually increased back to its long-term trend,
prices have not recovered, suggesting some shift in
demand. During the 1996 crisis, BSE became a human
health issue when a connection between BSE and a new
human variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) was
announced in the UK. BSE has affected the rendering
industry and, because bovine byproducts and rendered
products are used as intermediate inputs in so many
products, effects have spread to the cosmetic, feed, med-
ical, pharmaceutical, and other sectors. 
The second case study, chosen to represent microbial
food safety risks, focuses on Salmonella and covers
the issue of zero or near-zero tolerance for Salmonella
in poultry imposed by some countries. The Salmonella
case study shows that many countries have trade
restrictions for Salmonella in poultry and these restric-
tions vary by type (specific products or processing),
extent (inspections of slaughter facilities, production
practices), and duration, making compliance challeng-
ing for exporters. The technical ability to monitor and
detect Salmonella and other pathogens is increasing
and has led to major concerns about the difficulties in
meeting the increasingly stringent or near-zero toler-
ance standards for Salmonella imposed by some coun-
tries. Also at issue is the inconsistency between
standards for domestic and imported poultry.
Some foodborne pathogens, including Salmonella,
have the potential to develop resistance to drugs used
in livestock production so that the association of live-
stock drug use with drug-resistant foodborne
pathogens and drug residues have potential implica-
tions for international trade. The third case study
examines that issue, again using Salmonella as an
example. There is accumulating evidence that some
pathogens are becoming resistant to antibiotics. Some
countries (for example, in the EU) prohibit the low-
level (subtherapeutic) use of certain antimicrobial
drugs as growth promotants in livestock production or
have proposed such prohibitions based on their percep-
tion that there is enough evidence linking livestock
drug use and human antibiotic effectiveness in treating
foodborne illnesses, including salmonellosis.
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Chapter 4
International Trade of Meat/Poultry
Products and Food Safety Issues
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This chapter focuses on food safety concerns surround-
ing meat and poultry products and their associated
impacts on international trade. These high-value prod-
ucts are widely traded internationally. The impacts from
food safety concerns on meat and poultry trade are par-
ticularly important to the United States because of the
high value and volume of U.S. exports of these products
(table 4.1). U.S. exports of cattle, sheep, hogs, poultry,
and many of their products account for roughly 10 per-
cent of the value of cash receipts for those livestock
species at the farm level. In terms of volume, about 20
percent of U.S. poultry production and 8.5 percent of
U.S. beef production was exported in 2001. Although
the United States is not a major importer of poultry,
imports of meats and live animals are important, partic-
ularly imports of young live animals.
In the short run, meat and poultry trade varies due to
year-to-year fluctuations in supply and demand. Supply
may be affected by factors such as exchange rates and
animal disease incidents that cause temporary trade
restrictions. Demand factors that affect meat and poultry
trade include changes in tastes and preferences, popula-
tion growth, responses to food safety issues, and growth
in income. Imports and exports for a particular sector
may increase simultaneously due to differences in the
supply and demand for different types of products pro-
duced within that sector. For example, U.S. consumers
tend to prefer white poultry meat, and consequently the
United States tends to export dark poultry meat. In gen-
eral, poultry markets are subject to a mix of trade and
national regulations combined with traditional and non-
tariff barriers (Orden et al., 2002). Historically, non-
tariff trade barriers have also been important in markets
for other meats.
Meat and poultry trade has increased over time, and
continued increases are projected over the next few
decades, both in the United States and worldwide.
World exports of poultry have increased dramatically
and now account for about 10 percent of world con-
sumption (Orden et al., 2002). Of all U.S. animal and
crop exports, red meat exports increased the most over
the last two decades. The 5-year average volume of
U.S. red meat exports rose over 300 percent between
1981-85 and 1996-2000. 
In its 1999 report on Animal Agriculture and Global
Food Supply, the Council for Agricultural Science and
Technology projected growth in international trade for
livestock and livestock products, especially meat prod-
ucts (CAST, 1999). Predicting a 63-percent increase in
global demand for meat through 2020, the CAST report
attributed 88 percent of the projected increase to devel-
oping countries, with China accounting for half of that
increase. Two specific reasons were cited for this pro-
jected increase in global demand for meat. First,
increased urbanization due to increasing populations
and rising incomes have increased per capita demand
for meat, milk, and eggs. Second, increased global
demand for meat reflects the increased demand for
high-quality protein to improve children’s growth, cog-
nitive development, and health in countries where con-
sumption of animal products is traditionally low.
Meanwhile, per capita consumption of red meat has
Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 49
Table 4.1—U.S. livestock product exports and
imports
Fiscal year
2001 2002 2001 2002
—1,000 units— —$ million—
Exports
Animals, live — — 727 696
Meats and preps., 
excl. poultry1 (mt) 2,442 2,590 5,193 5,113
Dairy products — — 1,121 1,031
Poultry meats (mt) 2,810 2,586 2,084 1,879
Fats, oils, and 
greases (mt) 1,049 1,339 320 454
Hides and skins, 
incl. furskins — — 1,933 1,776
Cattle hides, whole  — — 1,437 1,121
Imports
Animals, live — — 2,198 2,022
Meats and preps., 
excl. poultry1 (mt) 1,600 1,656 4,091 4,187
Beef and veal (mt) 1,056 1,067 2,645 2,749
Pork (mt) 399 439 1,039 992
Dairy products — — 1,728 1,841
Poultry and products — — 258 317
Fats, oils, and 
greases (mt) 106 99 62 63
Hides and skins, 
incl. furskins — — 162 136
Wool, 
unmanufactured (mt) 21 12 53 31
1 Includes beef, pork, variety meat, and processing.
Source: Agricultural Outlook Statistical Tables, February 2003,
accessed March 27, 2003:
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/Agoutlook/AOTables/AOTables.htmdeclined in the United States (Haley, 2001) and in some
other developed countries, although U.S. per capita con-
sumption of poultry has increased (Regmi, 2001).
This growth in meat and poultry exports has been
accompanied by several food safety disputes. From the
perspective of the United States, perhaps the best-known
market access problem arising out of a food safety issue
is the 1989 beef hormone ban that adversely affected
Canadian and U.S. exports of beef to the European
Union (see box 4.1, “The Hormone Case…”). Other
examples of food safety concerns negatively affecting
U.S. exports of meat and poultry products include suspi-
cion of E. coli on beef products exported to Japan and of
Salmonella on poultry products exported to Russia. An
example of how a food safety concern not endemic to
the United States can still negatively affect U.S. produc-
tion and trade is Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in cattle and its potential link to variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). BSE is the focus of
the first case study here, the second covers Salmonella in
poultry products, and the third discusses drug resistance.
These food safety issues have caused changes in policies
and trade flows worldwide. 
Food Safety for Meat 
and Poultry
Ensuring food safety for internationally traded meat
and poultry is particularly challenging because these
products are perishable and can be contaminated by a
variety of food safety hazards. Meat and poultry, along
with other raw foods of animal origin (i.e., raw eggs,
unpasteurized milk, and raw shellfish), are the foods
most likely to cause foodborne illness outbreaks
(CAST, 1994, p. 32). 
Meat and poultry can be contaminated during produc-
tion processes in many ways. In addition to physical
contaminants like bones, hair, and other items, meat
and poultry can also be contaminated with hormones,
drugs, and other compounds that can leave residues in
food, or by pathogens that can pass from animals or
the environment to humans through contaminated raw
food products or processing steps (table 4.2). Of
bovine products, ground beef poses higher risks from
E. coli O157:H7 than whole cuts of meat. The nature
of ground beef is such that one hamburger may con-
tain meat from many cows so any existing contamina-
tion can be spread throughout a batch of hamburger,
making thorough cooking even more important. 
Pathogens such as E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella are
commonly found in the gastrointestinal tract of ani-
mals and birds (Wells et al., 1998). Contamination of
meat and poultry can occur during slaughter if the gas-
trointestinal tract is punctured or if there is contamina-
tion on the hides, feathers, and hoofs when animals
enter the slaughterhouse (IFT, 2003; Feinman, 1979).
During processing, poultry are eviscerated, then gener-
ally chilled in a cold water bath, and sprayed with a
cleansing solution. The cold water bath is somewhat
controversial because it can spread pathogens to previ-
ously uncontaminated carcasses. Beef animals are also
eviscerated, and the carcasses are sprayed with a
cleansing solution, but then they are air chilled rather
than dipped in water. 
In general, improvements in food safety, such as safe
canning procedures, pasteurization of milk, and disin-
fection of water supplies have successfully contributed
to the control of many foodborne diseases. Similarly,
to improve meat and poultry safety, existing technolo-
gies, such as irradiation, and new technologies, such as
steam pasteurization, continue to be developed,
refined, and adopted.
Links Between Animal and 
Human Health 
More than 200 known pathogens are transmitted
through food and pose human health risks (Mead et
al., 1999). Many of the more important foodborne dis-
eases are caused by pathogens such as Salmonella,
Campylobacter, Clostridium, and Listeria, some of
which are zoonoses.2 Additional diseases are thought
to be zoonoses, but conclusive evidence demonstrating
the animal and human disease relationship is missing
(e.g., Johne’s disease in dairy cattle and Crohn’s dis-
ease in humans (Collins, 1995; Thoen and Williams,
1994)). Some pathogens have changed or evolved
recently into much more virulent strains (e.g., E. coli
O157:H7 and Salmonella Typhimurium DT-104).
Some strains of these bacterial pathogens have the
added threat that through genetic variations, they have
developed resistance to some antibiotic drugs. 
The links between animal and human health are com-
plex. In addition to the direct food safety links, there
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While there is some controversy whether the EU hor-
mone ban is a measure to protect food safety or to
protect EU beef producers, there is little doubt that it
originated from consumer concerns about the effects
of hormones on human health (Kerr and Hobbs,
2000). Roberts (1998) clarifies this point:
The original ban was proposed in response to
public anxieties that emerged in the late 1970s
and early 1980s following widely publicized
reports of ‘hormone scandals’in Italy. In 1977,
some northern Italian school children exhibited
signs of premature development which investiga-
tors suspected was linked to illegal growth hor-
mones in veal or poultry served in school lunches.
Although exhaustive examination of possible
causes of the abnormalities produced no concrete
conclusion, a public furor rose over the use of
hormones in livestock production. Then, in 1980,
numerous supplies of veal-based baby food in
Italy were found to contain residues of the illegal
growth promotant diethylstilbestrol (DES), a syn-
thetic hormone used as a feed additive to increase
productivity in animal production (p. 386).
In response to these human health concerns, the
European Commission (EC) banned the use of certain
hormones for farm animals (Directive 81/602). In
1985, the EU further extended this ban to include all
natural and synthetic hormones for growth promotion
and prohibited imports of meat from animals using
hormones (Directives 88/146 and 88/299). The import
ban went into effect in January 1989. 
In the only food safety disputes to advance to a World
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute panel, the United
States and Canada challenged the science basis for the
EU ban on growth hormones in beef production. The
EU’s defense of its measure rested on its claims that the
international standards for these hormones did not meet
its public health goals and that the ban represented a
precautionary approach to managing uncertain risks. 
The WTO Appellate Body upheld the original panel’s
decision that the EU’s ban violated the provisions of the
Sanitary Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement (Roberts,
1998). Both decisions affirmed the right of WTO mem-
bers to establish a level of consumer protection higher
than the level set by international health standards. The
ban was nonetheless judged to be in violation of the
SPS Agreement as it was not backed by an objective
risk assessment (in violation of Article 5.1 and Article
3.3). The panel and judges also rejected the EU’s use of
the “precautionary principle” in its legal defense, as
there is no explicit reference to this principle in the
treaty. The SPS Agreement does recognize a condi-
tional precautionary principle in Article 5.7, which
allows countries to provisionally adopt measures “on
the basis of available pertinent information” while seek-
ing additional information “necessary for a more objec-
tive assessment of risk.” However, the EU could not
defend its permanent ban under this provision.
Significantly, the Appellate Body did overturn the
panel’s ruling that the ban violated Article 5.5, which
requires countries to avoid variation in the levels of
health protection provided by its SPS measures, if such
variation results in discrimination or creates a dis-
guised restriction on trade. The judges concurred with
the panel that EU policies regarding the use of growth
promoting substances in animals were “arbitrary and
unjustifiable” as the EU allowed their use in pork.
However, they disagreed that the ban was “a disguised
restriction on trade,” perhaps in deference to public
anxieties that emerged in the late 1970s and early
1980s following widely publicized reports of illegal
veterinary drug use in Italy and France. But although
the Appellate Body was willing to acknowledge that
the ban was originally motivated by “consumer con-
cerns” rather than by protectionism, the overall out-
come of the case suggests that the WTO will rule
against measures based on popular misconceptions of
risks as well as more overtly discriminatory measures. 
The EU did not fulfill its obligation to bring its meas-
ure into compliance with the SPS Agreement by the
May 1999 deadline, stating that it needed more time
to complete risk assessments. The WTO consequently
authorized the United States and Canada to increase
tariffs on $128.1 million of EU exports until the EU
complied with the ruling or provided compensation
for the ban by lowering other trade barriers. The par-
ties continue to discuss options such as increased
market access for hormone-free beef and labeling, but
the case has not yet been settled. Both the ban and
the retaliatory tariffs remain in place. 
Box authored by Donna Roberts (ERS) and 
Laurian Unnevehr (University of Illinois)
Box 4.1—The Hormone Case and the WTO Dispute Panelalso appear to be tradeoffs between protecting human
and animal health. For example, the use of antimicro-
bial drugs for livestock may protect animal health by
reducing pathogens, but may pose some risks to
human health through decreased effectiveness of some
human antibiotics (CAST, 1994). However, scientific
uncertainty surrounds these tradeoffs. Much remains
unknown about the impacts of livestock drug use on
human health. For example, while it is known that
antibiotic use in livestock production can lead to an
increase in the presence of resistant bacteria in live-
stock and farms, the actual origins of the resistant bac-
teria or the resistance factors are not known. Also
unknown is the extent to which livestock drug use is
responsible for human foodborne illnesses due to
resistant bacteria.
Increased trade in livestock products also increases
the risk of introducing pathogens or foreign animal
diseases into countries. Risks from internationally
traded products differ from risks from domestic prod-
ucts in at least one important respect. With livestock
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Table 4.2—Animal diseases or pathogens that have human health implications1
Human diseases
or conditions  Annual
Foods beyond  gastrointestinal  fatalities 
Disease/pathogen Source affected symptoms in U.S.2 Comments
Prions
Bovine spongiform Cattle Brain, nerve Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob’s  0 (>115  BSE is always fatal in cattle 
encephalopathy (BSE) tissue, eyes, disease (vCJD) worldwide as is vCJD in humans
ileum since 1996)
Bacteria
Campylobacter Poultry, cattle, Raw milk, Reactive arthritis, 99 Leading cause of known 
pork poultry, beef, Guillain-Barré syndrome bacterial foodborne illness
pork, shellfish in the U.S.
Escherichia coli O157:H7 Cattle Ground beef, Hemolytic uremic  52 Children under 5 years of age
raw milk syndrome (HUS) are particularly vulnerable to 
this pathogen and to HUS
Listeriosis monocytogenes Many birds, Hot dogs, Sepsis, meningitis, 499 Can cause stillbirths and 
mammals, and  luncheon meat, bacteremia, acute spontaneous abortions
other animals and numerous  febrile gastroenteritis
other foods
Salmonella (non-typhoid) Poultry, cattle Meat, poultry, Reiter’s syndrome, 533 Second leading known 
milk, eggs, and  reactive arthritis bacterial cause of foodborne 
numerous other  illness in the U.S.
foods
Yersinia Swine Pork, milk, or  Joint pain 2 Most infections are 
milk products uncomplicated and resolve 
completely
Parasites
Toxoplasma gondii Swine and  Pork, Chronic reactive arthritis, 375 The primary source of 
contact with  insufficiently Reiter’s syndrome, infection for animals is feed
domestic cats’ cooked miscarriage, birth  contaminated with cat feces 
litter boxes hamburger defects and possibly with rodent
tissues. 30 to 60 percent of 
adults in the U.S. have 
Toxoplasma antibodies
1 According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), more than 200 known diseases are transmitted through food. In the interest of
space, this table is only a partial listing of source species, foods affected, and chronic complications. 
2Annual human fatalities in the United States from all food sources provided by Mead et al. (1999) and by DEFRA (2002) for BSE. 
Source: Adapted from CAST (1994), Frenkel (1990), Mead et al. (1999), Orriss (1997), Thoen and Williams (1994), and Reuters (5/15/96).products produced and consumed domestically, any
animal and human health concerns stem from
endemic diseases or pathogens, and responses to
problems are often established and ongoing or evolv-
ing. Diseases or pathogens introduced through inter-
nationally traded livestock products may not be
endemic and may pose a whole new set of problems
unfamiliar to the importing country. 
Foreign animal diseases can threaten trade and the
economic health of the importing country and some
pose potential threats to food safety and human health.
Recent examples, not all of which are food safety con-
cerns, include the Canadian BSE outbreak in 2003, the
exotic Newcastle Disease outbreaks in the United
States in 2002, the 2001 Foot and Mouth disease
(FMD) outbreak in the UK, the 1997 FMD outbreak in
Taiwan, the Avian Influenza outbreaks in Asia since
1995 and, the Avian Influenza outbreaks over the last
decade in the United States.  Not all of the foreign ani-
mal diseases in these examples caused food safety
issues per se, but they did disrupt international trade in
livestock products, and, in the case of the highly path-
ogenic form of Avian Influenza in Hong Kong, caused
human deaths (Cardona, 2003).
Case Study 1: 
Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE)
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad-
cow disease” is a highly publicized food safety con-
cern (see box 4.2). The associated human disease, a
newly labeled variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
(vCJD), is believed to be caused by consuming BSE-
contaminated meat. The BSE case study demonstrates
how major changes in international trade regulations
and standards for live cattle, bovine products, and
many other products can result from a disease with a
relatively low probability of infection but a high fatal-
ity rate. vCJD is always fatal and has caused over 115
deaths worldwide since 1996 (UK Dept. of Health,
Sept. 9, 2002). 
This case study chronicles three BSE episodes and
their trade impacts on the EU (1988, 1996, and 2000).
Because of data limitations on industry costs incurred
to meet domestic and international food safety stan-
dards, trade volumes and values are used as proxies for
measuring the effects from BSE. 
The Issue
BSE is a major food safety concern for several rea-
sons, including: (1) the uncertainty of exactly how the
disease is transferred to humans, which means that we
have limited knowledge of how to prevent it, (2) the
uncertainty of the total number of BSE and vCJD
cases, partly due to the long incubation periods in both
cattle and humans, (3) the inability to destroy the
“prion,” the agent believed to cause BSE and vCJD,
(4) the lack of a cure for BSE and vCJD, and (5) the
ability to confirm the presence of the disease only
through postmortem testing. As we shall see, BSE is
also a major animal health issue affecting production,
consumption, and trade. 
While cases of BSE have been found in many coun-
tries, over 95 percent of all BSE cases have been in the
United Kingdom (UK) (table 4.3).3 Estimated total
costs to the UK alone from BSE-related market losses
and for slaughtering, disposal, and selective cull
schemes are over $5 billion (Watson, 2000). The BSE
case study is presented chronologically and analyzes
the less obvious impacts of BSE during the last 15
years on the volume and value of EU beef exports.
The EU is the third largest beef exporter (after the
United States and Australia). Understanding the
impacts of a crisis like BSE is complicated as coun-
tries have many ongoing trade programs to meet the
various domestic goals. EU trade policies are particu-
larly complex and the introduction of new countries
into the EU over time complicates the analysis of trade
data series. The case study also provides a general dis-
cussion on the effect that BSE has had on countries
worldwide, both on countries where BSE is endemic
and where it is not, and the effects on other sectors
beyond livestock and beef.
The 1988 Episode: Emphasis on
Animal Health Concerns
The first BSE episode occurred in 1988 with the dis-
covery of about 2,500 cases of BSE-infected cattle in
the UK. More BSE-infected cattle in the UK were
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3 No cases of BSE have been confirmed in the United States. A
BSE risk assessment conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk
Analysis and commissioned by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) shows that the risk of BSE occurring in the United States
is extremely low and current early protection systems would pre-
vent its spread here. Canada has experienced two cases of BSE, the
first in 1993, and the second on May 20, 2003.quickly discovered, with over 7,000 additional cases in
1989 and a peak of 37,000 cases in 1993 (fig. 4.1).
This BSE outbreak was not really considered a food
safety issue at the time, and early trade restrictions
were imposed largely in response to the effects of BSE
on animal health. By mid-1989, Australia, Israel, New
Zealand, Sweden, and the United States had banned
imports of live cattle from the UK, while Canada,
Japan, Morocco, and South Africa introduced require-
ments that live cattle imports from the UK be certified
as BSE-free. These trade restrictions caused a signifi-
cant decline in UK live cattle exports. By 1990, UK
live cattle exports were little more than a fifth of their
1988 level and have never recovered (table 4.4). UK
exports, however, constituted only a small share of EU
exports even before BSE, and restrictions on UK cattle
did not have a commensurate effect on either EU or
world live cattle trade. Indeed, total EU live cattle
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BSE is a chronic, degenerative disease affecting the
central nervous system of cattle. The incubation period
usually ranges from 2 to 8 years, and most cases in
Great Britain have occurred in dairy cows between 3
and 6 years of age. Following the onset of clinical
signs, the animal’s condition deteriorates until it dies or
is destroyed. There is no vaccine or treatment for BSE.
BSE was first discovered in 1986 in Great Britain and,
to date, over 95 percent of all BSE cases have occurred
in the United Kingdom (UK). However, while there
has been a decline in the number of newly identified
cases of BSE in the UK due to recent prevention and
control efforts, cases have been confirmed in other
European countries with new cases discovered in
Austria, Finland, and Slovenia in 2001. No cases of
BSE have been confirmed in the United States in over
a decade of active surveillance. There have, however,
been two confirmed cases in Canada. 
In 1996, government officials in Great Britain
announced that there was a possible link between BSE
in cattle and a variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in
humans (vCJD). BSE in cattle and vCJD in humans
belong to the family of diseases known as the transmis-
sible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), which cause
the brain to have a spongelike appearance when exam-
ined under a microscope. vCJD is rare, invariably fatal,
and characterized by progressive deterioration of brain
tissue. The precise link between BSE and vCJD is
unknown. However, many scientists now believe that
humans contract vCJD by ingesting the causative agent,
thought to be a prion or abnormal protein, in products
made from brain, spinal cord, and some other organs
from BSE-infected cattle (Lorains et al., 2001). In par-
ticular, epidemiological data suggest that BSE may
have originally been caused by feeding cattle meat and
bone meal made from sheep infected with a mutant
form of scrapie or from feeding cattle protein contami-
nated with a previously unidentified TSE. Changes 
in rendering practices in the early 1980s may have
enhanced the causative agent’s survival in meat and
bone meal, resulting in the recycling of infected cattle
back to cattle. This increased the size of the epidemic.
BSE is transmitted through contaminated feed and
maternally. There is no evidence that BSE spreads
through contact between unrelated adult cattle (e.g.,
within a herd) or from cattle to other species by 
contact. 
Currently, tests cannot detect BSE in living cattle or
vCJD in living humans. Microscopic postmortem
examination of brain tissue and tests for prion protein
are the primary laboratory methods used to confirm a
diagnosis. As of September 2, 2002, vCJD had caused
115 deaths in the UK (UK Dept. of Health, 2002), and
there have been some deaths outside of the UK (e.g.,
in France and the Republic of Ireland). No cases of
vCJD have been detected in the United States except
for one individual who had lived in the UK.
BSE has had a substantial impact on the UK’s live-
stock industry and has altered international trade pat-
terns. As of May 30, 2003, 180,078 head of cattle on
35,796 farms had been diagnosed with BSE in Great
Britain. These animals, herdmates, and progeny, total-
ing over 5 million head, were destroyed. Even though
there have been no confirmed cases of BSE or vCJD
in the United States, the threat of BSE has increased
consumer concerns about food safety and has caused
the United States to impose international trade
restrictions and to increase expenditures for BSE sur-
veillance and other measures in order to protect ani-
mal and human health.
Source: Adapted from Buzby and Detwiler, 2001.
Box 4.2—Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease (vCJD)exports expanded between 1989 and 1996. Austria,
Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in 1996, account-
ing for part of this increase (i.e., membership was 12
countries during 1988-1995 and 15 countries during
1996-2001).
The 1988 BSE outbreak also affected UK beef exports,
but not as much as exports of live cattle. By early
1991, many countries had imposed bans on imports of
UK beef, and other countries had placed stringent cer-
tification requirements on beef imported from the UK
(e.g., Cyprus and Hong Kong).4 One beef sub-
category, UK exports of bone-in beef to other EU
countries, showed a significant decline between 1990
and 1991, but then quickly recovered in later years,
surpassing its pre-1988 levels.5 UK exports of bone-
less beef also declined in the first few years after the
1988 outbreak, but had fully recovered by 1995. 
The 1988 outbreak had little long-term effect on total
volume of EU beef exports. While the volume of EU
exports increased by 5 percent between 1988 and
1990, the value of these EU beef exports declined by
almost 37 percent with most of the decline between
1988 and 1989, suggesting a downward shift in
demand (table 4.4).
The 1996 Episode: A Switch to 
Human Concerns
The 1996 BSE episode began with the discovery of
BSE-infected cattle in EU countries outside the UK
(France, Ireland, and Portugal) and a March 1996
announcement of a potential link between vCJD and
eating BSE-infected meat. By 1996, 13 vCJD cases
had been reported in the UK. Media reports high-
lighted the slow, agonizing death suffered by vCJD
patients as well as a perceived inability of UK and EU
authorities to understand and control the spread of
BSE and vCJD. Although, the number of newly con-
firmed BSE cases in the UK in 1996 was almost half
of those discovered in the previous year (DEFRA,
2002), long incubation periods for BSE and vCJD
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Table 4.3—Number of reported cases of BSE in

























1 Source: May 30, 2003, data from Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)(2001), www.defra.gov.uk/
animalh/bse/bse-statistics/bse/general.html accessed July 23, 2003.
2 Source: Feb. 21, 2003, data from the Office International des
Epizooties (OIE) website. See original table on OIE website for
details and caveats about cases by year of confirmation:
www.oie.int/eng/info/en_esbmonde.htm
4 Countries that imposed bans include Algeria, Bahrain, Brazil,
Canada, China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Russia. 5 The UK was never a large exporter of bone-in beef in any case.
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Source: Crown copyright, 2002. UK Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) website (www.defra.gov.uk) 
by permission of HMSO Licensing Division.caused concerns about how high human and animal ill-
ness tallies would reach.
Evidence of a link to vCJD quickly turned BSE from
an animal health issue to a food safety issue. The EU
temporarily banned all UK beef exports to other EU
countries and the rest of the world. Additionally, most
countries imposed a total ban on imports of beef and
live cattle from the UK, and several countries also
imposed either a ban on beef or live cattle from the
EU or a ban on imports from those European regions
where BSE was discovered. Between 1995 and 1997,
UK exports of beef to non-EU countries dropped by
99 percent and exports to EU countries dropped by 97
percent. UK exports of live cattle, already at very low
levels as a result of the 1988 episode, fell to zero. 
Outside the UK, there were fears that the 1996 BSE
episode would affect total EU and world beef con-
sumption and trade for years, if not permanently. A
series of media reports predicted that the sudden drop
in beef consumption in some EU member states
(sometimes by as much as 20 percent) would last for a
long time and would quickly spread to other countries
and regions outside the EU. Several international con-
sumer, environment, and health advocacy groups
implied that BSE in the EU was a sign of a large,
worldwide epidemic and recommended eating other
meats besides beef or switching to a more vegetarian
diet.6 There were fears that BSE could eventually spell
the demise of the entire beef market.7
In retrospect, these fears were exaggerated. Total EU
exports of beef barely declined in the first couple of
years after the second episode (1996-1997) and sales
from the world’s major beef exporters either remained
stable or increased over this time.8 Not until 1998 did
EU beef exports decline considerably, about 30 per-
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Table 4.4—EU (excluding intra-trade) and UK (extra-EU) exports of live cattle and beef, 1988-2000
Live cattle Beef
EU1 UK EU1 UK EU1 UK
— Head — — Metric tons — — Million US$ —
1988 60,627 315 615,360 27,475 1,945.4 75.6
1989 61,187 249 851,240 26,554 1,340.1 66.6
1990 68,212 66 647,059 16,457 1,230.9 33.4
1991 161,879 41 1,026,691 24,159 1,382.4 49.0
1992 169,447 82 972,385 19,789 1,472.8 50.2
1993 286,542 16 829,198 34,490 1,229.3 69.0
1994 295,830 31 784,609 45,931 1,259.0 85.0
1995 387,787 33 730,159 50,395 1,171.7 93.3
1996 501,828 0 727,848 12,535 1,167.9 23.2
1997 287,119 0 740,465 401 1,132.6 0.0
1998 266,225 0 521,789 151 888.3 0.0
1999 330,758 —2 694,054 165 1,018.1 0.0
2000 306,982 3 433,282 181 585.2 0.0
Nov-00 25,575 0 38,841 42 60.6 0.0
Dec-00 13,356 0 27,275 26 40.6 0.0
Jan-01 12,205 0 26,850 4 34.5 0.0
Feb-01 6,377 0 34,786 13 38.3 0.0
1 Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in 1996.Therefore, data represent EU-12 during 1988-95 and EU-15 during 1996-2000.
2 Number not confirmed.
Source: Eurostat and H.M. Customs and Excise.
6 Examples include: (1) “Worldwide Meat Trade Might Have Spread
Disease,” International Herald Tribune, Dec. 23, 2000; (2) NOVA
television program, “The Brain Eater,” Aug. 17, 1999; (3) MSNBC
report “Where’s the Beef,” March 23, 2001; and (4) E-The
Environment Magazine, “The Case Against Meat,” Jan./Feb. 2002.
7 “Worldwide Meat Trade Might Have Spread Disease,”
International Herald Tribune, Dec. 23, 2000.
8 World exports of beef and pork increased steadily between 1992
and 2000 (USDA, Sept. 2001).cent, but that decline was due more to a downturn in
the Russian economy than to any long-term decline in
world import demand. In fact, world beef imports
remained steady between 1995 and 2000. After 1998,
as the Russian economy started improving, so did EU
beef exports, increasing 33 percent between 1998 and
1999. The 1999 depreciation of the Euro also made
EU export refunds less expensive and EU beef exports
more attractive.9 Although BSE spread to other coun-
tries both within and outside the EU from 1996 to
1999, the outbreaks were usually limited to one or two
cases at a time and did not cause a worldwide panic
until later in 2002, when new cases were identified in
Japan and Israel.
Several reasons account for why the 1996 BSE
episode had a much smaller and shorter-term effect on
import demand and exports than some had predicted:
(1) Predictions of a large, permanent switch from
beef consumption to consumption of other
meats or a more vegetarian diet as a result of
BSE were exaggerated.10 While EU con-
sumers are consuming more pork and poultry
and less beef per capita over time, this trend is
a gradual one. The source of this long-term
trend is likely caused by long-term changes in
the eating habits and demographics of EU
consumers, and not driven primarily by food
safety issues such as BSE and growth hor-
mones (EC, 1997; EC, 1998). However, short-
term changes in EU meat consumption may be
caused by information about BSE and its asso-
ciated risks described in the press (Verbeke et
al., 2000; Verbeke and Ward, 2001). 
(2) After the 1996 episode, the UK adopted an
extensive set of programs to ensure that cattle
used for beef production were BSE-free.
These actions included the Over Thirty Month
Cattle Slaughter Rule, which as the name
implies, mandated that all cattle over 30
months of age be destroyed (BSE is not
believed to affect cattle below this age) and a
ban of all meat and bone meal (thought to be a
carrier of BSE) in cattle feed. These actions
led to fewer BSE cases in the UK from 1996
to 2001 (fig. 4.1). Many EU countries also
adopted similar initiatives.
(3) During 1996-99, both EU beef consumption
and production were below pre-BSE levels,
leaving export quantities virtually unchanged.
This helped stabilize the EU beef market.
(4) Prices for cattle and beef from the UK and the
EU also declined, implying a downward shift
in demand in response to risks associated with
beef consumption. These price declines helped
move products in markets that might otherwise
have shown decreases in quantities traded (fig.
4.2 and table 4.4).
The 2000 Episode: A Widening
Epidemic
The October 2000 BSE episode occurred just as EU 
initiatives to bring stability to the domestic beef market
had started to be effective. Like the 1996 episode, the
2000 BSE episode was prompted by the discovery of
more BSE cases in European countries outside the
UK.11 Also of importance, the first vCJD cases were
discovered outside the UK in France and received a lot
of media attention. The discovery of BSE in countries
outside the UK was in part due to increased postmortem
testing of cattle. By 2001, every EU country had
reported at least one case of BSE.
The trade effects from the October 2000 BSE episode
were felt immediately. EU beef exports dropped 30
percent between November and December 2000, while
remaining UK beef exports fell by almost 40 percent
(table 4.4). Despite this being the third BSE episode in
the EU, EU beef exports appear to have quickly recov-
ered in the following months. Between January and
February 2001, EU beef exports had risen almost to
their pre-December 2000 levels. Even UK beef exports
showed some signs of recovering during this period,
although they were nowhere near their pre-BSE levels.
The drop in EU exports during December 2000 did not
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9 The declining value of the Euro against many currencies reduced
the export subsidy (difference between the world price and EU
intervention price for beef) to practically nothing. This allowed the
EU to export beef without fear of violating their WTO commit-
ments on export subsidies.
10 Adda (forthcoming) analyzed panel data from 2,798 French
households before and after the March 1996 announcement linking
BSE to vCJD (between Jan. 1, 1995, and June 24, 1996) and found
no evidence of participants’ becoming vegetarian, although house-
holds did reduce their expenditures on beef and switched to other
animal protein substitutes.
11 In 1996, Portugal reported 31 BSE cases, France reported 12
cases, and Ireland reported 74 cases of BSE. In 2000, Portugal
reported 150 cases, France 162 cases, and Ireland 149 cases.cause a drop in world beef exports, as exports from the
United States and Australia made up the difference.
Measures added by the EU in January 2001 to ensure
the safety of the beef supply may have helped dampen
the impact of this crisis. For example, the Over Thirty
Month Cattle Slaughter Rule was extended to other
EU members and a ban was imposed on all animal
feed (not just cattle feed) containing meat and bone
meal. USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) esti-
mates that this EU ban on meat and bone meal feeding
will cause the EU to import an additional 1.5 million
tons of soymeal per year to replace meat and bone
meal in livestock feed rations (USDA, 2002). 
In February 2001, a major FMD epidemic broke out in
the UK and spread to other EU countries, affecting EU
trade of cattle, swine, and sheep and their products
(Buzby et al., 2001; Mathews and Buzby, 2001).
Because FMD is infectious through live animals and
their products and countries typically stop exporting
these products when FMD is confirmed, this FMD
outbreak led to temporary market closures, affecting
world exports and imports of these products (FAS,
Oct. 2001). By the following month, EU beef exports
had fallen by more than 80 percent due to FMD, a
larger decline than during any of the three BSE crises.
Conclusions From the BSE Case Study
Although UK exports of live cattle and beef plum-
meted to nearly zero as a result of the three BSE crises
and have not yet recovered, the total volume of EU
exports has been much less affected to date. Also, for a
brief period of time after each BSE episode, domestic
consumption in the EU declined sharply but then grad-
ually increased to resume its long-term, downward
trend (fig. 4.3). This longer-term trend in beef con-
sumption began before the first BSE crisis. In essence,
the effects of BSE on EU beef consumption and trade
volumes were short-lived. Both the official USDA and
European Commission forecasts predict a similar pat-
tern for the future, estimating that long-term patterns
in beef consumption and trade volumes for the next 6
to 8 years will not be greatly affected by BSE (see box
4.3) (EC, 1998; USDA, 2002). 
EU beef prices, however, did not recover following the
three episodes, suggesting a downward shift in
demand for beef and severely affecting trade values. A
number of studies provide additional evidence that
consumer demand in the UK and EU has shifted
downward due to BSE (Burton and Young, 1996;
Verbeke, et al., 2000; Lloyd, et al., 2001; Verbeke and
Ward, 2001; Henson and Mazzocchi, 2002). The 3-
year average value of EU beef exports fell by 45 per-
cent between 1988-90 and 1998-2000, largely because
of the decline in prices (figs. 4.2 and 4.3).12 Other fac-
tors also affected prices, including changes in EU
country currencies associated with adoption of the
Euro (Bowles, 2003). Jin and Koo (2003) found evi-
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Figure 4.2
Nominal EU beef prices and consumption,  
1991-2000
€/100 kg
Source: OECD. Directorate for Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries.
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12 Negotiations are currently underway to resume UK exports to
Russia and Egypt, so UK exports may show improvement in the
near future.dence for changes in consumer demand for beef in
Japan, which they attributed to BSE, despite account-
ing for other factors, such as changes in importing
countries’ real income levels, third-country effects, and
exchange rates.
Although some developed countries are changing their
consumption patterns away from red meat (such as the
United States and EU), world beef exports have
increased during the past 12 years, largely due to mid-
dle-income countries’ increasing their beef consump-
tion (Regmi et al., 2001). This worldwide increased
demand for beef along with price declines in the EU,
indicative of a downward shift in demand in the EU,
have moderated the decline in total EU beef export
quantities. In general, fears of eating UK beef because
it might be tainted with BSE have not spread to fears
of eating beef from the EU. This is partly due to new
EU efforts such as slaughtering schemes and feed
restrictions that help assure consumers that the EU
beef supply is free of BSE contamination. Nor have
fears of eating UK beef spread to consumption of
other livestock species.
BSE has caused countries to impose numerous addi-
tional safeguards to protect animal and human health.
In addition to the Over Thirty Month Cattle Slaughter
Rule and EU bans of meat and bone meal in all animal
feed, BSE-related safeguards to protect animal and
human health include surveillance systems, new regu-
lations for domestic production, and international trade
restrictions. Countries that do not have endemic BSE
(the United States, for example) have also imposed
regulations, import restrictions, and other measures to
prevent the disease from crossing their borders and to
mitigate its impact if it should be found. For example,
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Some distinctions should be made regarding con-
sumption and demand. First, consumption and
demand are not the same. For a commodity, con-
sumption is production plus imports minus exports
and net of changes in storage stocks. For example, all
the beef that is produced and imported will be con-
sumed (or exported or wasted) at some price. Beef
production is generally stable due to cattle cycles and
long production lags except for all but the most dras-
tic changes in cattle inventories like the 30-month
cull for BSE or the 2001 depopulation of livestock in
the UK due to foot-and-mouth disease. If consump-
tion remains relatively constant or continues on a
downward trend, as beef consumption appears to
have done in the UK, a quick glance at prices may
give some indication about what is happening to
demand. Demand is an economic term representing
the quantity removed from the market for each price.
Demand is affected by income, prices of substitute
and complementary products, and other factors. 
Recent studies have argued that while EU beef con-
sumption may have recovered (Q below), beef
demand has not (Thompson and Tallard, 2003).
Significantly lower prices (e.g., a move from P1 to P2
in the figure below) for relatively similar quantities of
beef consumption (Q in the figure below) indicate a
downward shift in demand in the UK (Lloyd et al.,
2001; Atkinson, 1999) (move from D1 to D2 in the
figure). Earlier, Burton and Young (1996) attributed a
“long-term” loss in UK beef’s market share of 4.5
percent to the first BSE outbreak. Prices have not
recovered relative to consumption. Whether the same
demand shifts are observed for the EU has not yet
been demonstrated in the literature. 
Most economic forecasts do not predict any long-
term trade or consumption effects from the BSE
crises in the EU. However, these forecasts are based
on the assumption that EU beef consumption has
fully recovered or is fast approaching its long-term
trend. If beef consumption is still short of what
demand would have been in the absence of BSE, it
would indicate that studies have underestimated the
effects of BSE on demand and, consequently, trade
that is, trade effects from BSE would be larger if
demand were taken into account. More research
needs to be completed on this topic.





D2as a result of BSE, the United States enacted a regula-
tion prohibiting meat and bone meal in all ruminant
feed. In addition to policy changes in response to BSE,
markets have also changed. For example, U.S. beef
exports to Japan have not yet recovered from Japanese
consumers’ responses to their domestic BSE outbreak.
In turn, as safety standards are raised worldwide, mar-
ket access for some exports from both endemic and
nonendemic countries has been affected. For example,
EU regulations related to BSE are preventing the
importation of U.S. gelatin into the EU until all U.S.
production and inspection systems and measures are
found to be equivalent to those in the EU (see chapter
3). This is occurring even though the U.S. has not had
any cases of BSE.
In addition to gelatin, feed, livestock, and beef, BSE has
affected many other sectors, including the rendering
industry and cosmetic, medical, and pharmaceutical sec-
tors. The indirect effects on so many other sectors occur
because bovine byproducts and rendered products are
commonly used as intermediate inputs in many products.
Consequently, trade restrictions affect many sectors.
Some of these restrictions are not supported by science.
For example, many countries suspended imports of
European dairy products following the 1996 BSE crisis
and then later rescinded these bans when the World
Health Organization and the International Office of
Epizootics for animal and human health measures reaf-
firmed that existing scientific data did not identify these
products as BSE vectors (see chapter 3). 
Policy changes associated with BSE have resulted in
significant disruptions to international trade. As dis-
cussed in chapter 3 of this report, the number of com-
plaints (or counter notifications) to the World Trade
Organization related to the regulation of transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies, which include BSE,
account for nearly half of all counter notifications
related to food safety regulations since 1995.
Case Study 2: 
Salmonella and International
Meat Trade
Unlike vCJD, which has claimed relatively few lives
worldwide (115 in the UK as of Sept. 2, 2002, accord-
ing to the UK Dept. of Health), foodborne pathogens
cause an estimated 5,000 deaths annually in the United
States alone, out of an estimated 76 million foodborne
illnesses (Mead et al., 1999). Foodborne pathogens
affect international trade through standards and regula-
tions adopted by countries and sporadic bans on ship-
ments of specific items. 
In addition to other measures described later in this
chapter, countries commonly use import bans to reduce
food safety risks. Because the term “ban” is used in
many ways, we make a distinction between bans and
standards in this chapter. We use “standards” to refer to
laws, rules, or regulations that establish the food safety
standard for a country and that remain in place over
time. An example of a standard is the requirement by
some countries that all imported poultry must be cooked
or canned. We use “bans” to refer to short-term or spo-
radic responses by a country to infractions of their stan-
dards; bans usually apply to specific shipments for
specified periods. An example of a ban is the denial of
access to a country of a specific shipment of poultry that
tested positive for Salmonella contamination at the port
of entry. Here, “bans” may also apply to narrow groups,
a company for example.
World poultry trade for the 5 years ending in 2002
amounted to about 11-12 percent of world poultry
production.13 With meat and poultry consumption
expected to increase in future years (CAST, 1999),
this export share of world production will likely
increase despite the divergent sanitary and phytosan-
itary (SPS) standards across countries and despite
the likelihood that increased poultry exports will
come from the few countries (Brazil, Canada, China,
EU, Hungary, Thailand, and the United States)
already exporting 80 percent of poultry and poultry
products. The variety in SPS standards that import-
ing countries impose on exporting countries has con-
tributed to the number of disputes raised to the WTO
SPS Committee (Orden et al., 2002). Complaints ref-
erencing poultry products accounted for 8 percent of
total cross notifications raised within the first 5 years
of the SPS Committee’s authority (Orden et al.,
2002). These disputes can disrupt trade. 
While several types of pathogens have been identified in
animal product imports and have resulted in trade inter-
ventions (e.g., E. coli O157:H7 and Campylobacter),
Salmonella appears to be the most contentious in terms
of trade disputes. For example, Salmonella is the only
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13 USDA, Agriculture Outlook Statistical Tables, table 23,
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/Agoutlook/AOTables/, as accessed
on April 17, 2003.pathogen mentioned by name as a trade concern in
poultry import requirements imposed by many coun-
tries. Therefore, this second case study focuses on
Salmonella and its implications for food safety and
international trade. 
Each year in the United States alone, nontyphoidal
Salmonella causes an estimated 1.3 million cases of
foodborne illness, 15,608 associated hospitalizations,
and 553 deaths (Mead et al., 1999).14 The proportion
of illnesses attributed to Salmonella-contaminated
meat and poultry is unknown. More severe cases of
salmonellosis tend to occur in the very old, the very
young, and the immunocompromised. Human illness
from foodborne Salmonella has a higher infection rate
than vCJD but a lower fatality rate. Salmonella-related
food safety issues are important to international trade
for several reasons:
(1) Salmonella contamination occurs in a wide
range of internationally traded animal and
plant products, including poultry, eggs, beef,
pork, dairy products, seafood, and fruits and
vegetables.
(2) Salmonella is a common cause of foodborne
illness worldwide and the second leading bac-
terial cause of foodborne illnesses in the
United States, following Campylobacter. 
(3) Salmonella is the leading cause of death attrib-
uted to known foodborne illnesses in the
United States (Mead et al., 1999). 
(4) Many countries impose Salmonella restrictions
that limit trade in meat and poultry products.
(5) Such restrictions are sometimes inconsistent
with domestic standards or are applied more
strictly on imports.
(6) Some national standards are based on zero—or
near zero—tolerances, levels that are difficult to
achieve. These standards and restrictions are
inconsistent between countries and lack a
widely accepted scientific foundation. 
(7) Countries vary in their commitments and
resources allocated to reducing Salmonella at
the various production, slaughter, and process-
ing stages, which have spillover effects to trade.
Salmonella is very difficult to control, although
some countries, particularly Scandinavian coun-
tries, have invested large amounts of resources
to minimize this pathogen in hog operations
(Hayes et al., 1999) and in poultry (e.g., see
Molbak et al., 1999, for Denmark). Developing
countries have fewer resources to devote to
reducing Salmonella in food production to meet
strict tolerances. Additionally, countries may
have reduced incentives to devote more
resources to Salmonella reduction if other dis-
ease problems prevent them from exporting in
international markets, such as endemic
International Office of Epizootics (OIE) List A
diseases (diseases with potential for rapid
spread and serious socioeconomic conse-
quences) (Seitzinger, 2002).
The primary issue in this case study concerns the
range of importing countries’ tolerance standards for
Salmonella contamination in poultry. Because of data
limitations, the Salmonella case study describes the
pathology of the disease and the trade restrictions
imposed by various countries. 
Concerns About a Range of Tolerance 
Standards for Salmonella
The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures in April 1994 (see chapter
3) gives each WTO member the right to determine its
own level of SPS protection. Countries impose differ-
ent standards and regulations to handle the risks of
pathogen contamination from processing and other
stages of production. For example, U.S. producers
commonly add chlorine to the cold water bath to
reduce pathogen levels in poultry while some countries
do not allow chlorine to be used for domestic or
imported poultry. Countries’ trade restrictions for
Salmonella in poultry vary by type of restriction (by
specific products or processing methods), extent
(inspections of slaughter facilities, production prac-
tices), and duration of the trade interruption. For
example, some countries require certification of
slaughtering and processing facilities while others rely
on exporters’ domestic inspection systems. These
diverse national standards make compliance challeng-
ing for exporters, particularly if the standards have
zero or near-zero tolerances for Salmonella. 
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14 Salmonellas are divided into two groups in the human health lit-
erature, typhoidal and non-typhoidal. Typhoidal Salmonella causes
typhoid fever, a disease associated with contaminated water and
poor sanitation, while other salmonellas cause foodborne illnesses.
There is also a group of salmonellas that causes diseases in birds
or animals, but not in humans.Two main concerns arise when countries impose near-
zero or zero tolerances for Salmonella contamination in
imported meat products, especially poultry. First, a zero
risk may not be feasible from either a policy or pro-
ducer standpoint. In the case of Salmonella, a zero-risk
policy may keep out all imports. Some scientists believe
that Salmonella is ubiquitous in the environment and
that continuous testing will find it, particularly with
increased precision of diagnostic tools. Second, for
most risks, the cost to achieve further risk reductions
increases as the risk level approaches zero. Costs of
preparing poultry products to meet zero-tolerance
import standards of some countries would be in addition
to costs incurred from the implementation of Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) measures
required of U.S. federally inspected meat and poultry
processors and slaughterhouses (USDA, July 25,
1996).15 As part of HACCP, USDA’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) tests raw meat and poultry
products for Salmonella. 
The range of standards can be seen in FSIS library of
countries’ export requirements. Table 4.5 presents data
on Salmonella-related requirements for the top 10
importers of U.S. broilers.16 Russia and Estonia cur-
rently require Salmonella testing of certain imports
and have low- or zero-tolerance policies, and Japan
explicitly reserves the right to test for Salmonella.
Although only 3 countries covered in table 4.5 have
Salmonella-specific requirements, other countries
have regulations that indirectly deal with Salmonella
and other foodborne pathogens. For example, some
countries reserve the right to subject imports to gen-
eral microbial testing, which would likely include
testing for Salmonella and which would lead to the
rejection of shipments that test positive for
Salmonella. Chile was also included in the table as it
provides an example of a different standard. Chile
effectively imposes a zero-tolerance regulation for
imports by declaring that fresh/frozen (raw) poultry
is not eligible for importation; only fully cooked or
canned poultry products are eligible (FAS, 2002). As
proper cooking and canning kills Salmonella, this
regulation means that the allowed imports are
Salmonella-free. Bilateral consultations between the
United States and Chile on Salmonella began as
early as 1992. Historically, the United States has
been concerned that Chile holds poultry imports and
its domestic poultry to different Salmonella stan-
dards and that Chile has not substantiated the claim
that Salmonella is more prevalent in imports from
the United States than in Chilean poultry stocks
(WTO, 2001). 
In addition to Chile, four other countries (the Czech
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Slovakia)
applied zero-tolerance standards for Salmonella in
1996, according to the WTO (2001). Like the U.S.
response to Chile, the U.S. response to these four
countries in October 1996 was that this standard 
was discriminatory because these countries did not
have eradication and surveillance systems capable 
of reaching this high standard in domestic products,
yet expected imports to follow this standard (WTO,
2001). Negotiations between the United States 
and these five countries on Salmonella standards
continues.
There are several examples where U.S. poultry exports
to Russia, the Ukraine, and other countries have been
periodically interrupted when Salmonella contamina-
tion was found in shipments or suspected in imported
meat or poultry products. In 1995, Russia was the
leading importer of U.S. poultry meat, importing about
1.6 billion pounds of broiler and turkey meat valued at
almost $600 million (not including indirect shipments
through Baltic countries). Requests to certify the
absence of Salmonella was a key issue of contention in
1995-96, when Russia threatened to embargo U.S.
poultry meat exports. The Russian position on this
threatened embargo was based on the claim that U.S.
poultry products did not meet the health requirements
set forth in a 1993 bilateral agreement regarding
Salmonella standards. This claim was partly based on
some legitimate concerns (e.g., a spoiled shipment of
frozen U.S. poultry meat in June 1995). The threat of
this ban prompted Tyson Foods Inc., the largest U.S.
poultry producer, to announce plans to scale back pro-
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15 HACCP systems identify potential sources of pathogen contami-
nation and establish procedures to prevent contamination and their
transmission to humans through food. HACCP plans generally fol-
low seven steps: conduct a hazard analysis; identify critical control
points (CCP) for physical, biological, and chemical hazards; estab-
lish critical limits for preventive measures associated with each
CCP; establish CCP monitoring requirements; determine and per-
form corrective actions; establish recordkeeping systems; and con-
duct verification procedures.
16 Note that the U.S. imports very little poultry (table 4.1). The top
poultry exporters are the U.S. (2,825,000 mt) Brazil (947,000 mt),
Hong Kong (791,000 mt), France  (416,000 mt), China (410,000
mt), and Thailand (323,000 mt) (FAS, March 2001). Note that
countries may also be transhipment points for international trade
(e.g., Hong Kong). Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 63
Table 4.5—Import requirements for poultry and quantities for the top 10 importers of U.S. broilers and for Chile 
Importing  Products eligible for import from the U.S.1 Salmonella-specific Imports  from  US2
country regulations/requirements1
Mil. pounds
Hong Kong Fresh/frozen poultry and poultry products Products may be subjected to laboratory  1,291
examination for microbiological contamination 
and positive-testing shipments refused entry
Russia Poultry and poultry products, excluding  Negative Salmonella test results must be presented  986
consumer-size packages of ground poultry, to FSIS veterinarian before export certification can 
mechanically deboned poultry, and giblets be issued; consignments are ineligible if there are 
more than 1 (in 5 minimum) positive samples
Latvia  Poultry and poultry products, except  No separate Salmonella-specific requirements 500
mechanically separated and ground products; 
must be certified as not having been fed material 
originating from sheep 
Mexico Fresh/frozen poultry and poultry products No separate Salmonella-specific requirements 325
Japan All domestic poultry, except duckling giblets, Japanese Ministry of Health reserves the right to  224
coloring agents in raw products, and poultry  test shipments of ground and mechanically deboned 
and poultry products from or passing through  poultry for Salmonella and to reject positive-testing 
Pennsylvania shipments
China Fresh/frozen poultry products No separate Salmonella-specific requirements 163
Canada Federally inspected poultry and poultry  No separate Salmonella-specific requirements 157
products, except carcasses, parts, or mechanically 
separated poultry parts containing kidneys or sex 
organs
Korea Poultry and poultry products, except those  No separate Salmonella-specific requirements 131
imported into the U.S. from a third country
Estonia Poultry and poultry products Mechanically deboned poultry product is tested  247
for Salmonella at the port of entry; positive-testing 
shipments will be denied entry
Poland Fresh/frozen poultry and poultry products and  No separate Salmonella-specific requirements 98
poultry trimmings, except frozen ground and 
mechanically deboned poultry
Chile Fully cooked and canned products Cooking and canning requirement effectively means --3
no Salmonella
1 FSIS, 2002.
2 Economic Research Service, 2002. Average for 1999-2000. 
3 Not listed separately.duction by over 5 percent (Associated Press, March
18, 1996). High-level negotiations ensued and trade
was resumed. 
Later in 2002, there was a short-lived Russian ban on
U.S. poultry meat exports as Russia cited Salmonella
and antibiotic use in poultry production. Partly as a
result of this 2002 ban, poultry exports from the
United States for 2002 dropped by 13 percent, and
U.S. poultry exports to Russia dropped by 35 percent.
Orden et al. (2002, p. 162), reporting results from a
spatial equilibrium model, suggested that an imposi-
tion of sanitary restrictions by Russia on U.S. imports
of low-value poultry products would be mitigated
because there are sufficient arbitrage possibilities in
world markets—as long as the restriction is not
imposed on other exporters. However, the restriction
was imposed on countries other than the United States
(e.g., the Netherlands) and there were real impacts on
prices for U.S. poultry exporters.
Similarly, poultry trade between other pairs of coun-
tries has been interrupted by real or perceived
Salmonella contamination. For example, in September
1999, McDonald’s temporarily suspended poultry sales
in Lithuania after Lithuania banned a Polish com-
pany’s delivery of 1.5 tons of cooked products contam-
inated with Salmonella (Reuters, Sept. 2, 1999). 
The United States also has restrictions on poultry meat
imports, largely to keep certain animal and/or human
diseases out of the country. For example, imports are
restricted from regions where Exotic Newcastle
Disease is known to exist. In fact, currently only four
countries (Canada, Great Britain, France, and Israel)
are permitted to export fresh, frozen, and chilled poul-
try to the United States, although some plants in north-
ern Mexico may also re-export poultry meat of U.S.
origin back to the United States after minimal process-
ing (see chapter 3). As a major poultry producer, how-
ever, the United States does not and would not be
likely to import significant quantities of poultry in the
absence of these restrictions (table 4.1).
Responses to breaches in countries’ Salmonella stan-
dards have taken the form of temporary bans with
corrective action or refusals of specific contaminated
shipments of products. Vertical integration in the
U.S. poultry industry protects producers from some
risks, but the importance of poultry exports com-
bined with the possibility of new or extensive
Salmonella-related embargoes, bans, or new zero- or
low-tolerance standards poses financial risks for
many integrated producers.17
Conclusions From the Salmonella
Case Study
Many countries have trade restrictions for Salmonella
and these restrictions vary widely by type (specific prod-
ucts or processing methods), extent (inspections of
slaughter facilities, production practices), and duration.
Some countries have zero- or low-tolerance standards for
Salmonella in imported poultry while others reserve the
right to test for Salmonella or permit imports of cooked
or canned products only, which in practice implies a
zero-tolerance standard for Salmonella. These standards
affect international trade in livestock products and could
also affect the choice of production technologies used in
exporting countries. For example, an exporter may
choose not to trade with a country having a zero-toler-
ance standard if the net gains to trade do not cover the
costs of meeting the standard. Despite the permanent
standards for Salmonella, trade interruptions due to
Salmonella are mostly shortlived bans against specific
products or rejections of specific contaminated ship-
ments. Some countries’import standards are inconsistent
with their domestic standards; to avoid running afoul of
WTO regulations, such differences need to be based on
science or legitimate differences in risk preferences, oth-
erwise they might face allegations that they are being
used as trade barriers. Further research is needed to
determine whether world poultry trade would be higher
if countries were to harmonize around lower standards or
vice versa. Also, further research is needed to increase
our understanding of the size of food safety diversions
relative to total world poultry trade.
Case Study 3: 
Concerns about the Potential
Trade Impacts from Antibiotic-
Resistant Salmonella
Another dimension of the potential trade impacts from
pathogen-food safety issues, and the focus of this third
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17 The U.S. poultry industry is very different from the U.S. beef
industry. Although both poultry and beef production are moving
toward fewer and larger producers, poultry operations are currently
more integrated, while beef operations remain dispersed among a
greater number of smaller independent operations. One cost-reduc-
ing benefit of low-level antimicrobial drug feeding is the ability to
have greater numbers of livestock at one facility.case study, is the capacity of many foodborne
pathogens, including Salmonella, to develop resistance
to antimicrobial drugs. This case study discusses three
elements of this issue and trade implications: (1) the
increasing drug resistance observed in Salmonella, (2)
the controversy over the extent to which antibiotic
drug use in livestock production contributes to the
development of drug-resistant pathogens, and (3) the
potential for food contamination with drug residues.
Increasing Drug Resistance
Drug use in livestock is implicated in antimicrobial
resistance in humans because many antimicrobial drugs
used for livestock are the same as or similar to drugs
used for humans. Some pathogens can pass from live-
stock to humans, either directly through contact
(Feinman, 1979; Fey et al., 2000; Holmberg et al.,
1984) or through food products that are improperly
processed, handled, or prepared. Some foodborne ill-
nesses in humans caused by resistant pathogens have
been traced to livestock products (Gashe and
Mpuchane, 2000; USDA, 1997; White et al., 2001) and
have been linked to live animals on farms (Feinman,
1979; Holmberg et al., 1984; Molbak et al., 1999). 
In livestock trade, the importing country not only sets
product standards (e.g., the zero tolerances for
Salmonella), they may also set process standards (e.g.,
the EU hormone ban) (FAS, 2003). They may also
require government verification of the standard which
can lead to a virtual ban in two ways—the cost of verifi-
cation is prohibitive (e.g., hormones), or the government
is unable to provide the desired verification and certifi-
cation (FAS, 2003). While not now directly a trade
issue, drug use by livestock could become more of an
international trade issue if prohibitions against domestic
production technologies in importing countries were
expanded to more fully cover imports. For example,
Russia and the Ukraine both periodically threaten or
impose temporary prohibitions on imports of U.S. poul-
try products based on drugs or chemicals used in pro-
duction (e.g., Reuters, Jan. 23, 2002). These
prohibitions could mean that exporters who use the
implicated antibiotics in animal production would have
to sell their products to other countries (perhaps at
lower prices), incur higher transportation costs, or
destroy contaminated shipments altogether. Data are not
readily available on the magnitude of imports diverted
because of this issue. To date, no country has proposed
formal prohibitions against therapeutic uses of livestock
drugs (i.e., antibiotic use for treatment of disease),
which would have animal welfare implications.
S. Typhimurium (hereafter referred to as Typhimurium)
is the type of Salmonella most often mentioned in dis-
cussions about antibiotic resistance from livestock drug
use. Typhimurium strains have caused numerous human
illnesses and deaths worldwide. Typhimurium DT-104 is
particularly troublesome, with a hospitalization rate
double that of other foodborne Salmonella infections
and a fatality rate 10 times higher (WHO, 1997). 
Human illness from DT-104 was first recognized in
England and Wales in the 1960s, but resistant DT-104
has been known only since the 1980s (Threlfall, 2000).
The first resistant isolates were taken from gulls and
exotic birds. The resistance was not isolated from
humans until 1989, and was then isolated from cattle
over the next 5 years (Threlfall, 2000). It has also been
isolated from poultry, swine, other domestic animals,
and wild animals (USDA, 1997). DT-104 has been
detected mainly in industrialized countries with more
concentrated livestock production technologies (e.g.,
Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, UK, and
the United States) (USDA, 1997).
About 95 percent of DT-104 strains are resistant to
ampicillin, chloramphenicol, streptomycin, sulfon-
amides, and tetracycline (GAO, 1999), antibiotics com-
monly used to treat human illnesses. Since 1996, UK
scientists have also reported resistance to fluoro-
quinolones (GAO, 1999). This resistance to fluoro-
quinolones occurs in about 14 percent of DT-104 strains
in the UK (GAO, 1999), but is currently rare in the
United States (Marano et al., 1999). In the United States
alone, there are an estimated 68,000 to 340,000 human
illnesses from S. Typhimurium each year with resist-
ance to five antibiotics, and most of these illnesses were
probably due to DT-104 (Glynn et al., 1998).
Pathogens affecting livestock and pathogens affecting
humans are often of different types or are often present
in differing concentrations. For example, while many
of the same Salmonella serotypes are found in both
humans and livestock, the 5 most common types of
Salmonella in cattle (of 26 serotypes identified) were
different from the 5 most common human types identi-
fied by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention as associated with human illnesses (USDA,
1995). This difference in primary serotypes empha-
sizes the fact that we do not have a thorough under-
standing of the epidemiological link between humans
and animals.
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terms of infected U.S. livestock operations and mar-
kets, their prevalence in livestock populations
appears much lower. The share of animals that tested
positive for Salmonella, Escherichia coli, or other
selected bacteria has ranged from 1 to 5 percent,
while the number of livestock operations or markets
that had at least one positive test has ranged from 
10 to 67 percent (USDA, 1995, 1996b, 1998, 2000).
The prevalence of drug resistance in bacteria from
these samples, however, is not known. While some
samples likely contained resistant strains of bacteria,
it is unlikely that all samples contained resistant 
bacteria.
Livestock Drug Controversy
Some countries (e.g., EU member countries) prohibit
the low-level (subtherapeutic) use of certain antimicro-
bial drugs as growth promotants in livestock produc-
tion. Others have proposed such prohibitions based on
policymakers’ perception that enough evidence links
livestock drug use and human antibiotic effectiveness
in treating foodborne illnesses. In the United States,
several bills have been introduced to prohibit antibi-
otics from at least some uses in animal agriculture
(e.g., H.R. 3266 on Nov. 9, 1999, H.R. 3804 on Feb.
27, 2002, S. 2508 on May 13, 2002, and S.1460 and
H.R. 2932, both on July 25, 2003). In June 2000, the
WHO adopted a statement of principles proposing that
use of antimicrobial livestock drugs to promote growth
be terminated. In June 2001, the EU prohibited all but
four antimicrobial drugs used as growth promotants in
livestock production (Mathews et al., 2001). The four
remaining drugs will be phased out by 2006 (European
Council, 2002). 
Livestock Drug Residues
A related issue concerning antibiotic drug use in live-
stock pertains to antibiotic drug residues that are con-
sidered unsafe yet remain in some internationally
traded animal products (see box 4.4). Some importing
countries have refused entry to shipments testing posi-
tive for these drug residues. Others have invoked tem-
porary bans on shipments from specified countries.
For example, the EU’s veterinary committee recom-
mended that the EU suspend imports of some meats
and seafood from China because of antimicrobial drug
residues in farm-raised shrimp and prawns (Reuters,
1/28/02).18
The EU has prohibited the subtherapeutic use of some
antimicrobial drugs in livestock production and other
countries have proposed such prohibitions because of
their concerns about possible effects on resistance in
foodborne pathogens. These restrictions could extend to
antimicrobial drug use in livestock production by export-
ing countries and could also force changes in production
technologies. A concern of the United States is the sci-
ence base for these and other food regulations. Countries
vary in what they accept as sound science, which is par-
ticularly important in risk assessments.
Conclusion
Increased urbanization, increasing populations, and ris-
ing incomes have increased per capita demand for meat,
milk, and eggs worldwide. The increased demand for
high-quality protein to improve children’s growth, cog-
nitive development, and health has also contributed to
increased global demand for meat and poultry. Concerns
about food safety hazards in meat and poultry have
motivated public and private efforts to ensure safer food
and to protect markets, both domestically and interna-
tionally. These food safety hazards are particularly wor-
risome if they make a large number of people ill
worldwide (e.g., Salmonella) or if they are particularly
virulent (e.g., BSE).
Public sector responses have ranged from position
statements (WHO, FAO, and OIE) to regulations
affecting imports and exports, such as minimum stan-
dards for pathogen, chemical, and residue contami-
nants in imported food products. The regulations
related to these standards range from rejection of spe-
cific shipments (e.g., for Salmonella) to longer term
bans against all potentially contaminated products
(e.g., against imports of live cattle from the UK
because of BSE concerns). Food safety standards and
regulations vary by country but are evolving in
response to the WTO principles, emerging food safety
incidents and risks, and new technology. 
Impacts and regulations often extend beyond the sec-
tors directly affected by a food safety issue. For exam-
ple, BSE has affected the rendering industry and feed,
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18 The United States has embargoed shipments of aquacultural
products contaminated with chloramphenicol.gelatin, cosmetic, pharmaceutical, and medical sectors.
In many countries, new rules and regulations for feed-
stuffs have been put in place to allay public sector con-
cerns over BSE and food safety threats such as vCJD.
But new regulations to solve one food safety problem
can create new trade challenges. For example, higher
EU standards for gelatin are currently blocking U.S.
gelatin exports to the EU even though BSE has never
been identified in the United States. Countries world-
wide, with and without endemic BSE, are affected by
the crisis both in terms of market access for exports
and new, targeted restrictions for imports.
International food safety standards concerning
Salmonella and poultry vary by type (specific products
or processing), extent (inspections of slaughter facili-
ties, production practices), and duration. These bans
usually pertain to contaminated shipments, but govern-
ments may also impose temporary bans against spe-
cific products from specific producers or countries.
Meanwhile, production and process standards can
extend to drugs administered to livestock even when
residues have not been identified as a problem (e.g.,
threatened Russian ban against poultry) and in part,
because of concerns that some pathogens, such as
Salmonella, can develop resistance to drugs meant to
kill them. 
This variety in standards is one example of national
sovereignty where each WTO member has the right to
determine its own level of SPS protection. Part of the
diversity in standards may reflect differences in the
science base among countries. Two challenges related
to Salmonella facing international bodies are how to
handle “zero-tolerance” standards when science sug-
gests that zero risk is infeasible, and how to ensure
that any differences between standards for domestic
and imported products are based on science or legiti-
mate differences in risk and are not simply trade barri-
ers in disguise. 
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Drugs administered to livestock can affect human
health and food safety through drug residues in food
products. Small amounts of such residues have been
deemed safe for human consumption worldwide by the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA, for exam-
ple, established 1.5 milligrams per person per day as
the acceptable daily intake (ADI) of noncarcinogens.
For antimicrobial drugs, this is a level that should pro-
duce no effects on the human intestinal bacteria. Other
antimicrobial drugs have not been approved for use in
livestock production or have been outlawed.
Residues from some antibiotics are considered unsafe
at any level. FDA has not established ADIs for these
drugs. For example, chloramphenicol is still used occa-
sionally to treat diseases in aquacultural operations in
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Vietnam, all of which are major exporters of shrimp. Its
use has declined in these areas as information reaches
farmers about its toxicity—it has caused leukemia and
can cause genetic damage, possibly leading to cancer.
The chemical has, however, found its way into livestock
feeds and livestock products in Europe. 
Developing new drugs is expensive. Drug manufac-
turers and sellers must abide by increasingly stringent
and time-consuming regulations and legislation when
developing new drugs for use on either humans or
animals. The Animal Health Institute estimates that
only 1 in 20,000 discovered chemicals becomes avail-
able for farm use. Approval of a new drug can take a
decade or longer.
Major legislation affecting animal drug use and
residue levels since 1989:
Nutrition, Labeling, and Education Act of 1990—
Pre-empts State requirements about food standards,
nutrition labeling, and health claims.
Animal Medicinal Drug Use Clarification Act 
of 1994—Allows licensed veterinarians to prescribe
human drugs for use in animals under certain 
conditions.
Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996—Adds flexi-
bility to animal drug approval process.
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1997—Regulates advertising of unapproved uses
of approved drugs.
Box 4.4—Antibiotic ResiduesIn addition to public sector approaches, private
approaches to reduce food safety risks are becoming
more widespread and stringent (Caswell and Henson,
1997) and are helping firms improve their international
competitive positions in cases where the products are
perceived to be safer. Private sector approaches for
meat and poultry include self-regulation, vertical inte-
gration (to ensure quality/safety of inputs and trace-
ability, for example), voluntary or mandatory HACCP
systems, and third-party certification such as the
International Organization for Standardization. For
example, in the United States, McDonald’s has
imposed antibiotic restrictions on its livestock suppli-
ers (Lipsky, 2003), even though the U.S. government
does not believe this is necessary (FAS, 2003).
Effective implementation of such private sector
approaches is key to enhancing food safety, in tandem
with public approaches (e.g., country-of-origin label-
ing). Some of these private responses may have supply
implications for exporting countries.
Many producer groups have voluntarily developed
guidelines for their members aimed at enhancing the
safety of their commodities.19 These “Quality
Assurance Programs” are designed to ensure whole-
some livestock products. They include elements aimed
at reducing pathogens and at properly using pharmaceu-
ticals (Committee on Drug Use in Food Animals, 1998).
Other private organizations that have adopted guidelines
for antimicrobial drug use include the American
Veterinary Medical Association, American Association
of Bovine Practitioners, and American Association of
Swine Practitioners (USDA, 1999). Several U.S. pro-
ducers have also reduced or plan to reduce their use of
certain antibiotics to ease consumers’fears (Burros,
2002; Kilman, 2002). For example, several U.S. poultry
producers have begun withdrawing their use of the fluo-
roquinolone drug Baytril. 
Some ongoing meat and poultry disputes have high-
lighted the difficulty in separating actions designed to
ensure food safety of imported food products from
actions to erect trade barriers using SPS standards as
the justification. For example, Russia restricted or
threatened to restrict poultry imports several times
over the past decade, justified in part by its zero toler-
ance for Salmonella contamination and the use of cer-
tain antibiotics in U.S. poultry production that are not
registered in Russia. Even after the United States made
changes to meet Russian demands, Russia imposed
import tariffs and quotas in 2003. These restrictions
and tariffs are crucial in terms of trade because Russia
is the world’s largest importer of broilers (FAS,
3/11/02). Ukraine continues to ban U.S. poultry even
after a protocol was negotiated that met its concerns
(FAS, 2003).
The twin goals of ensuring food safety and protecting
trade can be enhanced through transparent and immedi-
ate public responses to food safety crises, as well as up-
to-date prevention and monitoring efforts. Transparent
and immediate public response to food safety crises is
necessary to protect consumer confidence in the food
supply and in the government (Pickelsimer and Wahl,
2002). For example, consumer confidence in the UK
declined in 1996 when the British government reversed
its previous position that BSE was not related to human
illnesses. Given emerging food safety issues and the
spread of known problems to new regions (e.g., spread
of BSE to Japan and Canada), it is increasingly impor-
tant for policymakers to anticipate foodborne hazards
and, if these hazards materialize, to launch control
measures that mitigate their effects on human health,
animal health, and international trade. Ideally, actions
should be commensurate with the food safety risks to
human and animal health. 
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19 The Committee on Drug Use in Food Animals (1998) provides
examples of these producer groups, which include the National
Pork Producers Council, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association,
National Milk Producers Federation, American Sheep Industry
Association, American Veal Association, National Broiler Council,
National Turkey Federation, United Egg Producers, Catfish
Farmers of America, National Aquaculture Association, and U.S.
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O
utbreaks of foodborne illness in the United
States associated with imports of fresh produce
affect not only consumers and the growers of the
contaminated product, but also frequently other suppliers
to the U.S. market, including U.S. producers. Because
most produce is highly perishable, the United States
depends on seasonal imports for a year-round supply of
some items. Often by the time someone falls ill from an
imported product and an investigation identifies both the
product and its origin, that country may no longer be
exporting the product to the United States. For example,
a foreign grower may just supply the United States for a
brief market window before the U.S. season begins. Of
course, many foreign suppliers have much longer sea-
sons. The negative publicity about an outbreak will often
affect whichever suppliers are selling their product at
that time—often U.S. producers—whether they had any-
thing to do with the outbreak or not. 
The impact of a foodborne illness outbreak on trade
depends on whether foreign producers can quickly
correct the contamination problem and convince buy-
ers that their product no longer poses a risk. This
chapter reviews outbreaks of foodborne illnesses asso-
ciated with Guatemalan raspberries, Mexican straw-
berries (contaminated either in Mexico or the United
States), and Mexican cantaloupe. In the Mexican
strawberry case, after just one outbreak and an initial
collapse of trade, strawberry trade rebounded in the
following years. In the Guatemalan raspberry and
Mexican cantaloupe cases, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) refused to accept these products
into the United States after outbreaks in consecutive
years. The Guatemalan raspberry industry has never
really recovered from the experience although it is
now free to ship to the United States under a rigorous
food safety program. The impact of the ongoing can-
taloupe problem on future trade is still unknown.
FDA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
the produce industry, retailers, and foreign govern-
ments have worked together to keep unsafe produce
off the market and resolve food safety problems. The
FDA's voluntary guidelines for good agricultural prac-
tices (GAPs) provide recommendations to growers,
both domestic and foreign, on how to reduce microbial
hazards. FDA emphasizes that GAPs only reduce the
risk of microbial contamination and cannot eliminate
the risk. If invited by a foreign government, FDA will
often visit an area associated with an outbreak to try to
identify practices that are inconsistent with GAP
guidelines. FDA also provides training in foreign
countries on GAPs. 
Many individual growers have responded to increased
concern about foodborne illnesses (and attendant
financial losses) by improving their food safety sys-
tems. Grower organizations have been instrumental in
developing better food safety and traceback systems to
protect the reputation of their particular crops. While
individual farmers might not want a contamination
problem traced to their operation, the industry as a
whole is more concerned with accountability.
Retailers, who face unwanted publicity in a foodborne
illness outbreak, have also taken the initiative by
demanding more stringent food safety programs from
their suppliers. Some demand that their produce sup-
pliers have third-party audits to verify that they are
complying with GAP guidelines.
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Chapter 5
Produce, Food Safety, 
and International Trade
Response to U.S. Foodborne Illness Outbreaks
Associated with Imported Produce
Linda Calvin1
1 Agricultural economist with the Market and Trade Economics
Division, Economic Research Service.Introduction
The U.S. food supply is one of the safest in the world
(Crutchfield and Roberts, 2000). In the mid-1990s,
however, outbreaks of foodborne illnesses linked to
microbial contamination of both domestic and imported
produce focused attention on the potential for contami-
nation at the grower and shipper level (Tauxe, 1997).2
For example, in 1996 the potentially dangerous bac-
terium Escherichia coli O157:H7 was linked to
California lettuce associated with farm-level contamina-
tion. In the same year, a very large foodborne illness
outbreak was linked to imported Guatemalan raspber-
ries contaminated at the farm level with the parasite
Cyclospora. The economic impacts of outbreaks made it
clear to the produce industry, particularly those sectors
associated with contaminated produce, that improved
food safety programs were necessary. The U.S. govern-
ment also became more involved in produce food safety
at the farm and shipper level. 
In the United States, responsibility for food safety of
imported foods resides with USDA’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) and the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). FSIS deals with meat,
poultry, and some egg products, and FDA covers all
other food products, including produce. Both agencies
require imported foods to meet domestic food stan-
dards. FSIS allows only imports from countries with
food safety systems it deems to be equivalent to those
in the United States, thus putting the burden for safety
on the exporting country. Unlike FSIS, FDA does not
have legal authority to require that imports of the
products it covers be produced with food systems
equivalent to those in the United States. 
Food safety concerns can focus on pesticide residues,
microbial and chemical contamination, and the effects
of biotechnology. FDA randomly tests both imported
and domestic produce for pesticide residues. FDA
also randomly tests chemical residues, although this
testing is much more limited in scope. Concern about
microbial contamination is relatively new.
Biotechnology, an important determinant of trade
flows for other agricultural products, is not yet a cen-
tral concern for fruit and vegetables. Traditionally,
FDA has relied on inspections at the port of entry to
ensure safety of the products. While this worked well
for food safety issues such as detecting pesticide
residues exceeding U.S. tolerance levels, testing for
microbial contamination is a completely different
challenge. The FDA tolerance for microbial pathogens
is zero, so it would deny entry to any produce with
contamination that could be detected, but testing for
microbial contamination is not very successful.
Microbial contamination is often low level and spo-
radic so it can be difficult to detect. Also, if perishable
produce is held at the border while microbial tests are
completed, it may deteriorate in quality to the point
where it cannot be sold. In comparison, if produce has
pesticide residues that exceed the legal tolerance, it is
likely to be pervasive and contamination would show
up in random testing. FDA does targeted sampling for
microbial contamination when there are concerns
about a specific product.
In 1997, President Clinton announced the Produce and
Imported Food Safety Initiative, which called for addi-
tional resources to improve domestic standards and to
ensure that imports were equally safe (Crutchfield,
1999). Three broad areas of action were identified.
First, the President directed FDA to seek new legal
authority to require equivalence in food safety systems
in foreign countries (but there has been no change in
legislation). Second, the initiative targeted more
resources at improving inspection activities abroad by
providing technical assistance. This has been an impor-
tant means of improving food safety abroad. Third, the
initiative focused on providing guidance to both
domestic and foreign producers on good agricultural
practices (GAPs). 
In 1998, FDA published voluntary guidelines for
both domestic and foreign producers on GAPs for
reducing microbial contamination (FDA, 1998).
Although voluntary, GAPs are now an important part
of the produce industry. FDA does not have manda-
tory food safety requirements with respect to micro-
bial contamination for the fresh produce industry.
This situation provides incentives to the produce
industry to voluntarily adopt GAPs and ensure that
food safety does not become a bigger issue. FDA
and the produce industry have developed a good
working relationship and have made important
improvements in food safety. FDA could impose
mandatory food safety standards for fresh produce if
deemed appropriate. For example, in the late 1990s,
there were three foodborne illness outbreaks associ-
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2 Shippers are the first marketers in the produce distribution chain
and are often involved with harvesting and packing produce, a
stage at which contamination may occur. Many shippers are verti-
cally integrated grower-shippers.ated with fruit juice—one E. coli O157:H7 outbreak
associated with apple juice and two Salmonella out-
breaks associated with orange juice. Two people
died. In 2001, FDA published a final rule requiring
juice processors to use hazard analysis and critical
control point (HACCP) principles (FDA, 2001b).
FDA also requires HACCP for seafood processors.
These mandatory requirements also apply to
imported products.
FDA promotes adoption of GAPs as a means to min-
imize microbial contamination, instead of relying on
relatively ineffective testing at the border to detect
problem produce. According to FDA, even with
GAPs it is not possible to eliminate microbial con-
tamination for produce although it is possible to
reduce the risk. For fresh and fresh-cut produce,
there is no effective microbial elimination step such
as pasteurization for milk. 
GAPs provide growers with a structure to evaluate dif-
ferent practices and their potential to reduce microbial
food safety hazards so they can develop a food safety
program tailored to their own operations (see box 5.1).
Many grower practices—such as water sampling or
worker hygiene programs—could reduce the risk of
microbial contamination. Each grower must evaluate the
benefits and costs of investing in risk-reducing prac-
tices. This assessment will vary by crop, environmental
conditions, and individual grower situation. 
It is not always clear how much additional invest-
ment in food safety practices is enough. A foodborne
illness outbreak may occur if a farmer cuts corners
and fails to adopt a practice considered standard in
the local industry. Other outbreaks may represent
cases where growers and scientists misjudge what 
is required to prevent problems and growers 
underinvest in food safety practices. The science and
tools available to growers to reduce the risk of con-
tamination are still evolving. Of course, with uncer-
tainty, growers may also overinvest in food safety
precautions. There is always the concern that a prac-
tice may be a technical but not an economic success.
Some segments of the produce industry are undoubt-
edly more advanced than others in their efforts to
reduce these risks, but there is no systematic survey
of growers to identify their progress.
This chapter examines one aspect of the food safety
issue, the private and public responses to U.S. food-
borne illness outbreaks due to microbial contamination
associated with imported produce.3 Even when the
contaminated product is imported, the U.S. industry is
often affected and both domestic and foreign growers
need to take action to protect their economic well
being. The chapter begins with information on micro-
bial contamination of produce and the role of produce
imports in U.S. consumption. Three examples of food-
borne disease outbreaks follow which demonstrate
how growers, grower organizations, governments in
the United States and abroad, and retailers responded
to contamination problems. The analysis also includes
a brief look at the impact of contaminated imports on
trade. The three examples are: (1) imports of
Guatemalan raspberries associated with Cyclospora,
(2) imports of Mexican strawberries associated with
hepatitis A (contaminated either in Mexico or the
United States), and (3) imports of cantaloupe from
Mexico associated with Salmonella.4 In each case, the
contamination occurred, or may have occurred, at the
grower or shipper level. Then the analysis turns to a
comparison of the private and public responses to food
safety problems demonstrated by the three case studies.
Concluding comments focus on lessons learned and
areas for future research.
Foodborne Illness Outbreaks
Despite heightened concern about food safety, the vast
majority of growers for the U.S. market, both domestic
and foreign, has never been involved in food safety 
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3 This study does not examine pesticide residue contamination. A
study of U.S. winter vegetable imports from Mexico showed that
pesticide residue violations were relatively infrequent (Calvin and
Barrios, 1998). In 1997, FDA tested 3 percent of total shipments
through Nogales, Arizona, and only about 3 percent of the tested
products were in violation of pesticide residue standards. Of the
winter vegetables—tomatoes, bell peppers, cucumbers, eggplant,
summer-type squash, and snap beans—only snap beans had any
violations. Of course, the winter vegetable industry in Mexico is
well established. When Guatemala began exporting snow peas, a
nontraditional export, in the late 1980s, it had a serious problem
with pesticide residues that took several years to control. A pro-
gram to pretest shipments in Guatemala to ensure they would pass
FDA inspections finally resolved the problem. 
4 Cyclospora is a protozoan parasite that causes cyclosporiasis, a
potentially debilitating diarrhea that can last for three weeks or
more. The disease is treatable and is only considered potentially
life threatening to those with compromised immune systems. The
hepatitis A virus causes liver disease. The bacterium Salmonella
causes salmonellosis, which is characterized by diarrhea, fever, and
abdominal cramps. Most people recover without treatment but it
can cause death in some cases when the infection spreads beyond
the intestines.Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 77
There are many sources of potential microbial contam-
ination for produce and some regions will face more
challenges than others. Some of the major sources at
the grower and shipper level include: soil, water, green
or inadequately composted manure, dust in the air,
wild and domestic animals, human handling, and con-
taminated equipment (FDA, 2001e). Sources of water
contamination include water used for irrigating, mixing
with pesticides, washing and rinsing produce, and
making ice to cool produce. Different food safety prac-
tices can mitigate the chances of contamination. Other
factors unique to specific plants also affect the proba-
bility of contamination.
Good agricultural practices (GAP) principles pro-
vide growers with guidelines to reduce the potential
for microbial contamination of their products.
Guidelines cover growing, harvesting, sorting, pack-
ing, and storage operations. National-level guide-
lines on GAPs enhance the consistency and
scientific basis of food safety programs developed
by public and private institutions. Using GAPs
reduces but does not eliminate all risk—an unob-
tainable goal with current technologies. 
Growers and shippers are directed to evaluate their
operations in terms of water quality; manure/munici-
pal biosolids; worker hygiene; field, facility, and
transport sanitation; and traceback capabilities.
Traceback is the ability to track food from the con-
sumer point of purchase back to the grower.
Recommended practices are provided to mediate each
risk. Since there are numerous potential ways to
reduce risk, FDA encourages growers to pick the
most cost-effective combination of practices.
Therefore, two growers in different areas with differ-
ent environmental conditions could both adhere to
GAP principles but use different methods to do so. 
GAP guidelines do not outline specific testing and
monitoring regimes because scientific data is lacking
for establishing more specific guidelines (FDA,
2001e). The GAP guidelines state “Water quality
should be adequate for its intended use. Where water
quality is unknown or cannot be controlled, growers
should use other good agricultural practices to mini-
mize the risk of contamination.” The guidelines do
not specify how to measure whether water quality is
adequate; no one knows for sure and what is adequate
varies by crop. For example, irrigation water for a
crop that matures on the ground may need to be
cleaner than water for an orchard crop. 
Use of the GAP guidelines can be broken down into
three stages. First, growers and shippers can use GAPs
to evaluate their food safety system and assess needs.
Some large firms with food safety staff may evaluate
their own systems. Some smaller growers might hire a
third-party audit firm to do an evaluation. FDA does
not regulate third-party audit firms. In 2001, a FDA
report estimated the cost of an evaluation at $300-$500
per farm (FDA, 2001e). An evaluation would include a
review of the current food safety system and an assess-
ment of what additional practices might be needed to
reduce the chance of contamination, including the doc-
umentation necessary to assure continuous compliance
with GAPs.
Once growers have a food safety system evaluation and
needs assessment, they may decide to adopt new prac-
tices to reduce risks. The cost of implementation
depends on the particular crop, the existing food safety
system, and the environment in which the growers
operate (e.g., some areas may have more water contam-
ination problems to contend with than others). Some
typical practices that a farmer might adopt could
include: water testing; water treatment programs; devel-
opment of a documentation system to corroborate prac-
tices and trace product; and provision of additional
hygiene facilities for workers. 
Growers may opt to have their food safety program
audited periodically by third-party audit firms. Some
retailers now require third-party audits to verify that
growers and shippers are in compliance with GAPs.
In 2001, FDA estimated the typical cost of an audit to
be similar to the cost of an evaluation, about $300-
$500 per farm (FDA, 2001e).
Box 5.1—Microbial Contamination and FDA’s Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs)outbreaks. It is difficult to assess the exact incidence of
foodborne outbreaks associated with produce and how 
it has changed over time. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) collect data on all
reported foodborne outbreaks. The average annual num-
ber of foodborne illness outbreaks associated with fresh
produce, both domestic and imported, more than dou-
bled between 1973-87 and 1988-91, from 4 per year to
10 (Tauxe et al., 1997). The increasing trend appears to
have continued through 1997 (Sivapalasingam, 2002).
More recent data are not yet available. 
What does this trend indicate? The data are incomplete
so it is difficult to generalize about food safety out-
breaks beyond saying the number reported has
increased. Researchers assume that most sporadic cases
and many outbreaks of foodborne diseases are unre-
ported since a case cannot be reported unless individu-
als seek medical care. Many outbreaks are never
definitively linked to a particular contaminated product
or source. In the case of perishable fruit and vegetables,
by the time the authorities begin to investigate, the
physical evidence has usually been consumed or dis-
carded. As a result, it is not possible to say anything
authoritative about the incidence of contamination for
various types of fruit and vegetables. It is also not possi-
ble to say whether imported produce is any more prone
to food safety problems than is domestic produce (Zepp
et al., 1998).
The data also include outbreaks associated with con-
tamination at all levels. Produce can be contaminated
at the grower or shipper level, at some intermediate
level of the distribution system, or at the final point of
service (retail store, foodservice establishment, or pri-
vate residence, etc.). Data are limited and inconclusive
regarding what percent of outbreaks are attributable to
contamination at the grower or shipper level compared
with other points along the distribution chain, or
whether contamination at any one level is increasing. 
Efforts are underway to further investigate the inci-
dence of food safety problems in produce. As part of
the Produce and Imported Food Safety Initiative,
USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) is
implementing the Microbiological Data Program, a
nonregulatory program that will provide baseline
information on microbial contamination of produce. A
select group of produce items, both domestic and
imported, are being tested for pathogenic E. coli and
Salmonella (AMS, 2001). There is industry concern,
however, that since USDA is testing at terminal mar-
kets and chain store distribution centers, it will not be
clear where any detected contamination occurred
(Produce News, 2002). A problem might be mistak-
enly attributed to the farm level when it could have
occurred somewhere else along the distribution chain.
On the other hand, a finding of no contamination at
the terminal market and chain store distribution center
level would shift concern towards problems at the final
point of service.
For the Produce and Imported Food Safety Initiative,
FDA collected data on the incidence and extent of
pathogen contamination (FDA, 2001a). Beginning in
March 1999, FDA tested domestic and imported pro-
duce items for three microbial pathogens—Salmonella,
Shigella, and E. coli O157:H7.5,6 Salmonella and
Shigella were both found in imports and domestic
products, but no E. coli O157:H7 was found in either.
The focus of these studies was to identify problems
resulting from failures to implement adequate GAPs
and good manufacturing practices (GMPs).7 The test-
ing program was not intended to determine whether
imported or domestic produce is more prone to safety
problems since the statistical properties of the samples
did not allow broad conclusions about general food
safety of produce or comparisons between countries. 
Policymakers and researchers are concerned about
why reported food safety outbreaks associated with
produce are increasing. Better reporting due to
improved outbreak investigations and better diagnos-
tics have undoubtedly contributed to some of the
increase (FDA, 2001e). Some scientists, however, do
not believe that better reporting alone explains the
increased level of outbreaks (Tauxe et al., 1997). It is
difficult to sort out the competing factors. 
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5 The Shigella bacteria causes shigellosis, an infectious disease
characterized by diarrhea, fever, and stomach cramps. People with
severe cases can usually be treated with antibiotics. Those with
milder cases will usually recover without antibiotics. 
6 For the imported produce survey, FDA sampled broccoli, can-
taloupe, celery, cilantro, culantro, loose-leaf lettuce, parsley, scal-
lions, strawberries, and tomatoes from 21 countries. The crops
were selected based on a combination of five factors that con-
tributed to overall food safety risk: previous association with out-
breaks, structural characteristics that might provide a particularly
hospitable environment for bacteria, growing conditions, degree of
processing, and importance in U.S. consumption (FDA, 2001a).
7 GMPs are FDA regulations for food processors. FDA recom-
mends firms packing raw, intact fruit and vegetables use GMPs,
but they are not required to do so. Firms packing fresh-cut prod-
ucts, like bagged salads, are required to use GMPs.One explanation for increased foodborne illnesses is new
and emerging pathogens. Several outbreaks in the 1990s
were due to these pathogens, and scientists had to
develop new practices to avoid contamination. The
microbial pathogen E. coli O157:H7 was identified in
1982 and was initially associated with ground ham-
burger.8 In the early 1990s, E. coli O157:H7 was first
associated with a number of produce items. The parasite
Cyclospora was described definitively only in 1994 and
has been linked to numerous outbreaks since.
Cyclospora has only been associated with a few prod-
ucts—raspberries, basil, and lettuce—although many
cases could not be traced to a particular product.
Another potential explanatory factor behind the rise in
outbreaks attributed to produce is the change in U.S.
consumption habits. U.S. per capita consumption of
fresh fruit and vegetables (not including juices and other
processed products) increased from 249 pounds in 1981
to 339 pounds in 2000, an increase of 36 percent. The
types of food consumed have also changed. The typical
grocery store carried 345 produce items in 1998, com-
pared with 173 in 1987 (Calvin et al., 2001). 
Retailers now routinely provide produce items that
were once considered seasonal on a year-round basis.
Most produce is highly perishable and cannot be
stored to provide a year-round supply, so imports are
important. However, even storable produce is some-
times imported; apple imports provide consumers with
different varieties and qualities (e.g., fresh-harvest
apples from Southern Hemisphere countries during the
spring versus stored apples). In 2000, imports
accounted for 19.5 percent of fresh fruit consumption
(excluding bananas), up from 3.1 percent in 1975.9
Similarly, in 2000, imports accounted for 13.6 percent
of fresh vegetable consumption (excluding fresh pota-
toes), up from 5.7 percent in 1975 (table 5.1). 
Bananas top the list of per capita fruit consumption in
the United States, with imports accounting for 99.6
percent of consumption. Likewise, 76.1 percent of
pineapples, another tropical product, are imported. For
a storable crop like apples, imports are 7.2 percent of
consumption. For grapes, which are now available
every month of the year, the import share increased
from 5.9 percent in 1975 to 44.1 percent in 2000. For
the vegetable and melon category, 37.4 percent of can-
taloupe consumption was imported in 2000, up from
12.4 percent in 1975. Less than 1 percent of lettuce is
imported because it can be produced year-round
domestically. Tomatoes, bell peppers, and cucumbers
have high import shares due largely to winter imports
from Mexico and increasing greenhouse imports, par-
ticularly from Canada.
There is no reason, however, to assume that imports
are more prone to food safety problems than domestic
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8 One of hundreds of strains of the E. coli bacterium, E. coli
O157:H7 produces a powerful toxin that can cause severe illness.
Infection often produces bloody diarrhea, but most people recover
without antibiotics or other specific treatment. Some people, par-
ticularly children and the elderly, may develop hemolytic uremic
syndrome, a life-threatening disease that causes kidney failure. 
9 Data are not true consumption data from consumer surveys but
rather disappearance data (production for the fresh market plus
imports and minus exports equals disappearance—a proxy for
consumption).
Table 5.1—Fresh fruit and vegetable consumption
and imports
Per capita Imported share of
consumption consumption
Item 2000 1975 2000 1975
— Pounds farm weight — — Percent —
Fruit:1
Bananas 28.4 17.6 99.6 99.9
Apples 17.4 19.5 7.2 2.2
Oranges 11.7 15.9 8.5 0.8
Grapes 7.3 3.6 44.1 5.9
Peaches 5.5 5.0 6.4 0.3
Grapefruit 5.1 8.4 3.0 0.6
Strawberries 5.0 1.8 5.8 8.9
Pears 3.2 2.7 20.6 3.5
Pineapples 3.2 1.0 76.1 48.0
Tangerines 2.8 2.6 25.7 9.5
Vegetables and melons:2
Potatoes 47.2 52.6 5.7 1.2
All lettuce 32.0 23.5 0.7 0.0
Onions 18.3 10.5 9.3 4.0
Tomatoes 17.6 12.0 32.9 21.9
Watermelon 13.9 11.4 11.5 5.9
Cantaloupe 10.8 5.2 37.4 12.4
Carrots 10.4 6.4 5.5 4.4
Sweet corn 9.2 7.8 2.1 0.0
Cabbage 9.1 8.9 3.5 0.3
Bell peppers 7.0 2.5 19.6 12.6
Cucumbers 6.4 2.8 41.4 21.6
Broccoli 6.0 1.0 6.3 0.0
1 For citrus, the year reflects the end of the harvest; for noncitrus,
the beginning of the harvest.
2 ERS traditionally reports melons with vegetables. Consumption is
on a calendar-year basis.
Source: Fruit and Tree Nut Yearbook, and Vegetable and
Specialties Yearbook, ERS, USDA.produce. Many growers in foreign countries specialize
in exports. For example, in the Mexican winter veg-
etable industry, growers are producing to comply 
with relevant U.S. government standards (pesticide
residues, microbial contamination, etc.) as well as
demands of their U.S. marketer and final buyers such
as a particular retail chain. Growers are well aware of
the food safety requirements. If prices are favorable,
they may sell some of their production to the domes-
tic Mexican market but produce grown in Mexico for
the domestic market could not easily be sold into the
U.S. market. 
Much of the U.S. and foreign produce industry has
developed a global focus. A network of business rela-
tionships tie domestic and foreign producers and
encourage high standards of food safety (see box 5.2).
However, with improvements in communications,
storage technology, and transportation, it is possible
to acquire commodities from many new areas. In
recent years, imports have arrived from many nontra-
ditional suppliers. The Caribbean Basin Initiative and
the Andean Trade Preference Act have eliminated tar-
iffs on many agricultural items and encouraged
imports from these areas. The share of total volume
of fresh produce imports (excluding bananas) from
three traditional suppliers—Mexico, Chile, and
Canada—dropped from 81 percent in 1990 to 72 per-
cent in 2000. Less traditional suppliers have
increased their market share of imports. For example,
in 1990 only 10 percent of asparagus imports came
from Peru, compared with 47 percent in 2001.
Similarly, Costa Rica and Guatemala accounted for
17 percent of cantaloupe imports in 1990 and 60 per-
cent in 2001.
Another consumption trend that may affect outbreaks is
the growing share of food eaten at foodservice establish-
ments, potentially increasing the number of people han-
dling produce before it is eaten (and the chance of
contamination). In 2001, 47.4 percent of total food
expenditures went to the foodservice sector, up from
33.4 percent in 1970 (ERS, 2002).
Three Examples of Foodborne
Illness Outbreaks Associated
With Imports
Three case studies examine recent food safety prob-
lems: (1) disease outbreaks due to Cyclospora contami-
nation of Guatemalan raspberries, which began in 1996,
(2) the 1997 outbreak of hepatitis A associated with
strawberries from Mexico, and (3) the 2000-2002 out-
breaks due to Salmonella contamination associated with
Mexican cantaloupe. By coincidence, all three cases
deal with fruit but this does not imply that vegetables
are not also associated with foodborne illnesses. 
Raspberries and Cyclospora
In the spring and early summer of 1996, CDC and
Health Canada received reports of more than 1,465
cases of foodborne illness due to Cyclospora in the
United States and Canada (for more details on the rasp-
berry case, see Calvin et al., 2002). There were no fatal-
ities. This was a very large outbreak compared to others
associated with fresh produce. On June 8, 1996, the
Texas Department of Health issued a health warning
that erroneously identified the source of the problem as
California strawberries, then at peak production. On
July 18, 1996, the CDC and the Ontario Ministry of
Health issued a statement reporting that Guatemalan
raspberries were the most likely source of the outbreaks.
The California Strawberry Commission estimated that
this false alarm led to $16 million in lost revenue to
growers in the central coast of California during the
month of June (Mishen, 1996).
By the time raspberries were identified as the source 
of contamination, the Guatemalan raspberry spring sea-
son was over so no immediate regulatory action was
taken. FDA and CDC sent a team of investigators to
Guatemala later that year to observe growing conditions
and to better understand the berry industry there.
Because the disease was relatively new to scientists, no
one knew which raspberries were contaminated, how
they became contaminated, or how to solve the prob-
lem. The CDC concluded, after considering the many
differences in various aspects of the distribution systems
for the implicated raspberries, that simultaneous and
persistent contamination on multiple farms was the
most likely explanation for the outbreak (Herwaldt et
al., 1997). Subsequent research, based on the events for
which well-documented traceback data were available,
indicated that the 1996 outbreak could have been
accounted for by as few as six farms (Herwaldt et al.,
1999). Traceback is the ability to track food from the
consumer point of purchase back to the grower. FDA
provided advice/technical assistance and suggested
using GAPs (then under development), GMPs, and sani-
tation standard operating procedures.
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Commission (GBC), developed a system to characterize
farms according to risk and allowed only certain farms
to export. However, the plan had no enforcement mech-
anism for the 1997 spring season and another outbreak
of foodborne illness (with no fatalities) in the United
States and Canada was again traced to Guatemalan
raspberries. Either the new practices were not com-
pletely implemented, were ineffective, or were not
directed at the true source of contamination (Herwaldt
et al., 1999). After consulting with FDA, the GBC vol-
untarily stopped raspberry exports to the United States
on May 30, 1997. Guatemala estimated that stopping
exports in the middle of the spring season resulted in a
loss of $10 million in income (Powell, 1998). 
After a second season with Cyclospora contamina-
tion problems, both the GBC and the government of
Guatemala realized that more stringent controls and
enforcement were required. In November 1997, the
Guatemalan government created a commission to
lead the effort to improve food safety. This gave the
GBC’s certification process enforcement power that
was critical to making any export plan manageable.
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A firm importing produce into the United States to
supply the offseason market will want a product that
is equal in quality to their own to maintain their repu-
tation. This takes planning. The pressure to coordi-
nate year-round production, often in far-flung
locations, and provide food safety assurances may
favor both horizontal and vertical integration or coor-
dination (Wilson et al., 1997; Hennessey, 1996). For
example, a U.S. grower-shipper may decide to collab-
orate with a foreign grower-shipper to provide a year
round supply with particular characteristics—hori-
zontal integration or coordination. A U.S. shipper
may decide to collaborate with a foreign grower for
the same reason—vertical integration or coordination. 
U.S. firms have many types of interests in foreign
production to expand their season. For the U.S. firm,
it is important that the foreign product be consistent
with the quality their firm sells from domestic
sources. For example, a U.S. firm may grow product
on its own farms in a foreign country for sale in the
U.S. market. A U.S. firm might also have a joint ven-
ture with a firm in a foreign country to produce a
crop to be sold in the United States. In some cases,
U.S. firms may merge with a foreign supplier. Many
U.S. shippers and grower-shippers also market for
foreign growers and charge a sales commission.
Some U.S. grower cooperatives have foreign mem-
bers who must meet domestic production standards  
These suppliers must develop relationships with reli-
able foreign growers to provide these products.
Suppliers may travel frequently to foreign production
regions to cement the relationship with their growers.
The suppliers may send agronomists to check on pro-
duction and crop conditions. Some even have staff liv-
ing in foreign countries. The stakes are high when
procuring product from another country. In any of
these situations, if the product has food safety prob-
lems and cannot be sold, the U.S. supplier may not
have adequate supplies for its customers, a serious
problem in the competitive produce industry. On the
other hand, selling a substandard product may damage
the firm’s reputation if a foodborne illness outbreak is
traced back to the firm. The stakes are also high for the
foreign producer too. Many foreign countries have
very specialized produce industries geared almost
exclusively towards exports. If products are not accept-
able in the U.S. market they often have few alternative
markets. For example, some of the products grown in
Mexico for export to the U.S. market, such as bell pep-
pers, cherry tomatoes, and eggplant, have virtually no
alternative domestic market. 
Large foreign suppliers are following the same trend
in horizontal and vertical integration in reverse. For
example, some large Mexican and Chilean winter
suppliers are expanding into production or joint ven-
tures in the United States and other countries to pro-
vide a year-round supply for their U.S. buyers.
Foreign growers have also vertically integrated by
acquiring marketing operations in the United States.
This provides foreign growers with the ability to bet-
ter market fruit and vegetables since they directly
control the quality of their production. For example,
many of the shippers located in Nogales, Arizona,
where winter vegetables from Mexico enter the
United States, are really just the marketing arms of
large Mexican growers. In the 1996/97 season, 63
percent of the tomatoes in Nogales were sold by
these vertically integrated, Mexican-owned firms
(Calvin and Barrios, 1998).
Box 5.2—Ties That Bind the Domestic and Foreign Produce IndustryIn December 1997, FDA, not yet convinced that
Guatemala had adequately addressed the Cyclospora
contamination problem, issued an import alert for
Guatemala for the following spring season, putting
all shipments from the country under detention with-
out physical examination (DWPE) and denying
imports entry into the United States. Denying all
imports of raspberries based on country of origin
rather than rejecting products from a specific shipper
with problems was an unusual response, and one
used only after all other means of resolving the
problem were exhausted. Generally, FDA collects
random samples at the border, preventing entry of
products that fail inspections. FDA can also detain a
product without physical examination if the shipper
has failed previous FDA port inspections or if FDA
has other information indicating that the product
might violate standards. The product may remain in
DWPE status until the shipper proves that the prod-
uct meets FDA’s standards.
Denying imports without physical evidence was very
rare in 1997, and in this case the import alert was
based only on epidemiological evidence about past
outbreaks and FDA observations on current produc-
tion practices. Not until 2000 did FDA actually
observe Cyclospora on a Guatemalan raspberry (Ho
et al., 2002). Since 1997, FDA has become less
reluctant to deny imports on epidemiological evi-
dence alone.
FDA, Health Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency, and Guatemalan officials consulted to con-
sider improved intervention strategies for raspberry
production. Beginning in the spring 1999 season, the
United States allowed entry of raspberries produced
under the Model Plan of Excellence (MPE), a joint
program of the GBC and the government of
Guatemala. Farmers are only allowed to join the MPE
program and export by complying with a detailed pro-
gram of food safety practices and successfully passing
Guatemalan government inspections and FDA audits.
Food safety practices include the use of filters for
water and better worker hygiene facilities. The pro-
gram also requires a code applied to each clamshell of
raspberries, which allows traceback to an individual
grower. Traceback and traceforward capability is criti-
cal in the event of a food safety problem. These tools
can be used to revoke the export authority of any firms
associated with a food safety problem in order to
maintain the integrity of the MPE. In some cases,
traceback can be used to eliminate Guatemalan rasp-
berries as a potential source of contamination. In
spring 1999, there were several outbreaks in the
United States and Canada due to Cyclospora but the
GBC could show, using its traceback and traceforward
capabilities, that Guatemalan raspberries were not
served at the events associated with the outbreaks. In
2000, there were two outbreaks associated with
Cyclospora contamination of raspberries traced to one
Guatemalan farm that was consequently removed from
the MPE program. There have been no further out-
breaks associated with Guatemalan raspberries since
2000. In 2002, only three raspberry growers remained
in the MPE program. In 1996, before the contamina-
tion problem began, the number of growers was esti-
mated to be 85. 
The MPE program is a process standard. GAPs, for
example, recommend that water quality be adequate for
its intended use, but the MPE program requires farmers
to use a nominal 1 micron filter as a prefilter to remove
particulate matter and an absolute 0.45 micron filter for
water used on plants and for employee hygiene. When a
food safety problem becomes intractable, a process stan-
dard may be necessary rather than relying on the more
flexible GAPs. Some firms might have been able to pro-
duce a safe product without the expensive filters, so a
process standard may introduce inefficiency. However,
the MPE process standard may have resolved the food
safety problem faster, reducing economic losses, than if
the industry had relied on voluntary GAPs.
The problem with raspberries affected other products.
U.S. demand for Guatemalan blackberries also declined;
blackberries were never cited as a definitive cause of any
foodborne illnesses in the United States, although they
were in Canada. In addition to possible food safety con-
cerns, blackberries faced decreased demand because
retailers prefer to buy a range of berry products all from
one buyer if possible. When Guatemala could provide
only blackberries, many buyers purchased berries from
other regions that could provide the desired mix of
berries. The blackberry industry has, however, fared
much better than the raspberry industry; in 2001, U.S.
imports of Guatemalan raspberries were 16 percent of
1996 levels and blackberries were 55 percent of their
1996 level. Guatemala has a voluntary food safety pro-
gram for the much larger blackberry industry but it is
much less rigorous than the MPE.
When confronted with the food safety problems in
Guatemala, many berry shippers made alternative
plans. One Guatemalan shipper closed all his domestic
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Chilean firm that ships to the U.S. and Europe had
raspberry operations in Guatemala but after the first
outbreak this firm stopped shipping raspberries from
Guatemala and began to develop production in
Mexico. This change of strategy might have occurred
even without the Cyclospora problems; it is cheaper to
transport raspberries from Mexico by truck than from
Guatemala by airfreight. 
While Guatemala worked to increase food safety stan-
dards, other competitors, particularly Mexico, made
inroads into its spring and fall market niches in the
U.S. market (fig. 5.1). Prior to the 1996 outbreaks, the
size and growth of Guatemalan and Mexican exports to
the United States were very similar. With outbreaks in
1996 and 1997, many U.S. buyers decided to purchase
raspberries elsewhere. Some buyers still feel that there
is no reason to take a risk when there are alternate
sources of raspberries. Others are reassured by the
MPE, arguably the strictest industrywide program for
raspberry production in the hemisphere.
In addition to the changes in Guatemala, the outbreaks
led to improved private food safety programs for rasp-
berry producers in Chile, Mexico, and the United
States (although none of these countries were associ-
ated with Cyclospora contamination of raspberries).
After the Cyclospora problem had such an adverse
impact on the California strawberry industry, the
California Strawberry Commission (CSC) developed a
food safety program. California raspberry shippers
(and their growers) also use this plan since all rasp-
berry shippers also market strawberries.
Strawberries and Hepatitis A
In March 1997, more than 200 schoolchildren and
teachers in Michigan contracted hepatitis A. Cases
were reported in other States as well (Hutin et al.,
1999). It was quickly determined that the source of the
contamination was frozen strawberries processed by a
firm in California. The processor had used fresh straw-
berries shipped to the United States in April 1996, a
year earlier, from Baja California, Mexico. Most of the
Mexican berries had been sold in the fresh market and
some were sold to the processor (FAS, 1997). FDA
was able to determine that California-grown strawber-
ries were not the source of contamination. However,
FDA could not determine whether the Mexican-grow-
ers fruit was contaminated in Mexico at the farm level
or at the California processor. The product was not
contaminated in Michigan. 
General concerns about the safety of fresh strawberries
affected demand for berries from all sources. The
monthly price received by growers fell 40 percent from
March to April in 1997, compared with an average
decline of 16 percent for the years 1990-1996 and 1998-
2000. Initial estimates from the CSC put losses at $15
million with later estimates at $40 million, but both esti-
mates are subject to debate (Richards and Patterson,
1999). As some of the California growers had joint 
ventures in Mexico, they shared in the financial losses
there too.
The 1996 outbreak associated with Cyclospora-
contaminated raspberries, when California strawberries
were initially and incorrectly implicated, increased the
strawberry industry’s awareness of their vulnerability to
food safety problems. Following that outbreak, the CSC
began developing the voluntary Quality Assurance Food
Safety Program to help producers improve their food
safety standards and mitigate microbial contamination.
The CSC worked with FDA and the California
Department of Health Services to develop the program.
This was one of the earliest good agricultural practices
programs for the produce industry that focused on miti-
gating microbial contamination. An industrywide food
safety program is expensive and the CSC has spent
about $250,000 to date. 
California standards for production practices and docu-
mentation were already fairly rigorous, but the CSC’s
Quality Assurance Food Safety Program strengthened
both. Traceback is a critical part of the voluntary pro-
gram. If there is a problem, the industry wants to be
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Figure 5.1
U.S. imports of raspberries, 1990-2001
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Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce.
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Chileable to say the product is not from California or trace
the product back to the field and isolate the problem
farm from the rest of the industry. Growers use a variety
of traceback systems. The best systems include informa-
tion on shipper, date, field, and picker on each box.10 It
is not enough to just have safe products; growers must
be prepared to quickly demonstrate their food safety
program in the case of an outbreak. The Quality
Assurance Food Safety Program encourages farmers to
always have all their documents regarding food safety
ready in the case of emergency. This includes docu-
ments regarding water, soil, and any fruit testing; pesti-
cide and fertilizer use; and records of hygiene practices. 
This program was introduced in November 1996 and
was in effect, although still in its infancy, when the
strawberry problem occurred in 1997. Although the con-
taminated product was frozen strawberries, consumer
confidence in fresh strawberries was also shaken. In
response to a second year of media scrutiny, the CSC
was prepared to deflect unwanted attention from their
industry. The CSC announced that fresh California
strawberries were not responsible for the outbreak and
that because growers were using a sophisticated food
safety program they were unlikely to ever be responsible
for such an outbreak. Researchers estimated the impact
of positive and negative publicity in this case. Prices
responded more strongly to bad news than good news,
so it is very important to prevent or stop negative public-
ity as soon as possible (Richards and Patterson, 1999).11
Before the outbreak of hepatitis A associated with straw-
berries, the growers in Mexico were members of the
California Strawberry Commission. After the outbreak,
the Commission decided to limit membership to
California producers to maintain the California focus
and a consistent message in its marketing program.
However, because the Baja California and California
strawberry industries are so integrated, with growers in
Mexico marketing through California shippers, the
Mexican producers still benefited from the CSC’s food
safety research.
Although it was never proven that the contamination
occurred in Mexico, the outbreak had a serious impact
on the Baja California, Mexico industry. The United
States imports very small amounts of fresh strawber-
ries—just 6 percent of total U.S. consumption in
2001—and almost all of that is from Baja California,
Mexico. The Baja California season runs from January
to July, with the highest production typically in April.
Baja California production augments the low winter
supply in the United States. Figure 5.2 shows the
importance of Mexican strawberries during the winter
for firms offering a year-round supply. 
The publicity surrounding the hepatitis A outbreak had
an immediate effect on fresh strawberry shippers from
Baja California. Figure 5.3 shows the precipitous decline
in fresh strawberry shipments from Mexico in April
1997, compared with 1996. Due to the collapse of mar-
ket demand in the United States, the primary market for
Baja California producers, U.S. shippers told their
Mexican growers to stop harvesting, and about 200
hectares of strawberries in Baja California were left
unharvested (out of 563 planted hectares). 
In response to the outbreak, the Baja California straw-
berry growers and their local grower organization
established more stringent food safety standards
(FAS, 1998). Since most of their production is
exported, the growers needed to ensure their product
would be accepted in the United States. Growers
started using third-party audits immediately for straw-
berries as well as other produce items. Many of the
large U.S. third-party audit firms have operations
abroad in important growing areas. Some growers
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10 In the case of strawberries, information on the picker was fairly
easy for many shippers to incorporate into their traceback pro-
grams. Because the strawberry industry uses an hourly wage as
well as a piece-rate payment, the industry already had to be able to
tie product to individual pickers.
11 Two other aspects of the outbreak kept the news in the public
eye. The processor illegally sold the frozen berries as U.S.-grown
berries to the National School Lunch Program, which requires
domestic product (Richards and Patterson, 1999). Also, many
schoolchildren were immunized against hepatitis A as a precau-
tionary measure when there was concern that some of the contami-
nated product might have been served in Los Angeles area schools.
Figure 5.2
U.S. monthly strawberry shipments, 2001
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Floridaadopted the CSC’s food safety program. In an inte-
grated industry, new practices in the United States are
quickly adopted in Baja California. 
FDA officials went to the California processor and the
Mexican strawberry fields to inspect operations but
results regarding the origin of the contamination were
inconclusive. FDA provided training on GAP recom-
mendations that were just being developed. These rec-
ommendations provided guidelines similar to those of
the CSC program. The Mexican state-level department
of agriculture was instrumental in disseminating infor-
mation on FDA’s GAP recommendations to growers.
Since that time, they have also hosted FDA and the
California Department of Food and Agriculture,
among others, for classes on food safety (Avendaño,
2002). At the time of the outbreak, there was no effec-
tive way to test for the presence of hepatitis A on
strawberries so there was no increased microbial sur-
veillance specifically targeted at this pathogen. FDA
was also involved with the recall of frozen strawber-
ries and processed products made with the berries. In
the case of produce consumed in fresh form, there is
rarely any product to recall by the time an outbreak is
detected and the source is identified. 
Although fresh strawberry imports from Mexico in
1997 were only 47 percent of 1996 levels, imports in
1998 increased to 86 percent of the earlier level. In
1999, U.S. imports of fresh strawberries from Mexico
were at record levels. This outbreak had only a short-
run impact on fresh trade.12 Apparently U.S. shippers
were confident that their Mexican strawberry growers
had taken adequate precautions. 
Cantaloupe and Salmonella
In 2000, 2001, and 2002 there were outbreaks of
Salmonella associated with Mexican cantaloupe.
Mexico exports cantaloupe from various regions dur-
ing its long export season; in each case, contaminated
cantaloupe came only from one region in the south.
While Mexico only supplied 7.2 percent of total U.S.
consumption in 2001, Mexico and Central America are
the major suppliers during the winter season (fig. 5.4
shows suppliers in 1999, the last year of trade without
Salmonella contamination problems).
In 2000, cantaloupe from southern Mexico were impli-
cated in a Salmonella poona outbreak. Forty-seven
people became sick in March and April and by late
May cantaloupe was implicated (Anderson et al.,
2002). The outbreak occurred during the spring when
Mexico ships a large volume of cantaloupe to the U.S.
market. By the time the outbreak was traced to can-
taloupe, the Mexican season was coming to a close.
U.S. producers then bore the brunt of consumer back-
lash against cantaloupe. The outbreak was traced to a
particular shipper in Arizona selling cantaloupe from
southern Mexico. FDA issued an import alert for this
shipper and one farm. In the fall, FDA visited the farm
in southern Mexico. Although scientists are more
familiar with Salmonella than emerging pathogens like
Cyclospora, they cannot always determine exactly how
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Figure 5.3
Strawberry shipments from Mexico, 1996-1997
1,000 cwt
Source:  Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA.
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12 U.S. imports of frozen strawberries from Mexico were higher in
1997 than in the previous year. Frozen strawberries come from
central Mexico and were apparently not affected by concerns about
food safety problems in Baja California.
Figure 5.4
U.S. cantaloupe supply, 1999
1,000 cwt
*Central California shipments are estimated.
Source:  Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA.















the worldthe contamination occurred and how to definitively
resolve the problem. The primary host for Salmonella
is animals, followed by humans. A firm shipping prod-
uct contaminated with Salmonella is most likely fail-
ing to follow GAPs and GMPs. FDA prepared an
adverse findings report, which identified farm activi-
ties that were inconsistent with GAPs and GMPs; FDA
does not tell a farmer how to fix the problem. When
the distributor provided documentation demonstrating
corrective actions taken to respond to FDA’s adverse
findings, the import alert was lifted and the firm and
farm resumed exporting to the U.S. market. 
In late spring 2001, two additional outbreaks of
Salmonella attributed to cantaloupe occurred (first
Salmonella poona and then Salmonella anatum). Fifty
people were sickened and two died from Salmonella
poona (Anderson et al., 2002; FDA, 2001c). Fewer
people were sickened in the Salmonella anatum out-
break. Although Salmonella can cause serious and
sometimes fatal infections in young children, frail or
elderly people, and others with weakened immune sys-
tems, healthy people who become infected generally
experience less severe medical problems. Based on the
traceback investigation, FDA determined that the con-
taminated cantaloupe in 2001 came from the same farm
in Mexico and shipper in Arizona that were implicated
in the 2000 outbreak. The firm is a large shipper of
winter melons from Mexico and has been in the busi-
ness for 30-40 years (The Packer, 2001). Either imple-
mentation of the new practices was inadequate or the
changes failed to address the problem. Again, by the
time cantaloupe from Mexico were determined to be
the culprit, most of the Mexican shipping season was
over. FDA announced that anyone who had any can-
taloupe from this company should remove it from sale,
and the company issued a recall of its cantaloupe.
Growers from northern Mexico were still selling small
volumes to the United States. Some shippers in Arizona
told their Mexican growers to sell to the Mexican mar-
ket. On May 25, 2001, FDA issued an import alert for
the distributor and grower that is still in effect in early
2003. The firm cannot ship cantaloupe to the United
States but it can still ship honeydew melons. 
In May 2002, an outbreak of Salmonella poona in the
United States and Canada was associated with
Mexican cantaloupe shipped through McAllen, Texas.
Fifty-eight cases were identified (Anderson et al.,
2002). The importing firm issued a voluntary recall
and FDA issued an import alert (FDA, 2002a). This
was the third season of outbreaks traced to southern
Mexico. The Mexican government is investigating the
source of contamination. 
U.S. cantaloupe imports from Mexico in the 2001-
2002 season were 64 percent of the previous season’s
volume (fig. 5.5). However, one large multinational
firm’s decision to move operations to Central America
accounts for at least some of the decline. Other factors
behind declining imports from Mexico include produc-
tion problems and increasing input costs. Honeydew
imports in 2001-2002 were 97 percent of the previous
season’s volume. Unlike the case in Guatemala where
problems with raspberries affected demand for black-
berries, commercial buyers do not seem to be particu-
larly worried about honeydew melons from Mexico.13
Repeated outbreaks within an industry prompt several
concerns. First, the industry fears that when people get
sick, investigators may immediately, and incorrectly,
focus on the product with a history of trouble. Second,
the produce industry is concerned that FDA might issue
a consumer warning about eating the contaminated pro-
duce.14 Third, growers are concerned that if a problem
looks like it affects more than a few growers, the FDA
might decide to initiate an import alert against all pro-
ducers from a particularly country, as in the case of
Guatemalan raspberries. Fourth, there is concern that an
ongoing problem could hurt the reputation of other
products from the same region. Fifth, FDA introduced a
mandatory food safety program for fruit and vegetable
juices after three outbreaks. FDA always has the option
of making food safety programs mandatory—something
most growers would like to avoid. 
The California cantaloupe industry’s efforts to promote
food safety predate the 2000-2002 Salmonella outbreaks
associated with Mexican cantaloupe. Over the years,
cantaloupe has been associated with several other food-
borne disease outbreaks. Outbreaks of Salmonella in the
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13 Although all field-grown melons mature on the ground and are
therefore exposed to potentially contaminated soil and irrigation
water, cantaloupe appear to be particularly susceptible to microbial
contamination, perhaps because of the rough webbing on the rind,
which may harbor pathogens (FDA, 2001a). Smooth-skinned hon-
eydew melons, which are often grown in similar areas, appear to
be less prone to contamination problems. 
14 Beginning in 1995, there were numerous outbreaks traced to
sprouts that the industry could not seem to resolve. In 1998, FDA
warned high-risk groups to avoid eating raw alfalfa sprouts. Then
in 1999, FDA broadened the warning to include all consumers, not
just those at high risk, and all types of raw sprouts (FDA, 1999).
This warning was repeated in 2002 and expanded to include lightly
cooked mung bean sprouts (FDA, 2002c).United States in 1990, 1991, and 1997, and in Canada in
1991 and 1998 were traced to cantaloupe (FDA, 2001d).
In 1991, the news about contaminated cantaloupe
emerged in August, when half of the large Central Valley
crop in California is shipped (fig. 5.4). The U.S. can-
taloupe industry initiated a food safety program called
the “Melon Safety Plan” (Tauxe, 1997). Once the crisis
was over, however, the program ran out of money and
sputtered to a stop. 
Since 1998, the California Melon Research Board,
which represents all California melon producers,
except watermelon growers, has spent more than
$300,000 on funding melon food safety research at the
University of California at Davis. Growers who
remember the economic chaos of the 1991 outbreak
and are concerned about the potential impact of any
new food safety problems fund the research. This
group of California growers, with the largest can-
taloupe production in the United States, views this
investment in food safety as critical for the reputation
of their industry. This research focuses on California
cantaloupe and while the general principles of this
research will be widely applicable, the specifics will
not. California melons are mostly field packed and
forced-air cooled. In other parts of the United States,
Mexico, and Central America, shed packing and cool-
ing with cold water or ice are more common and these
practices pose different food safety challenges. 
Beginning in 2000, the California Cantaloupe
Advisory Board (a marketing order for California can-
taloupe grown north of Bakersfield) began requiring
additional traceback information on cantaloupe boxes
as part of their State marketing order (this program
was voluntary in 1999). This was not a very difficult
process. California cantaloupe is packed in the field
and the Board had already contracted with the
California Department of Food and Agriculture to
inspect cantaloupe during harvest for quality control
and apply an inspection sticker to every box (growers
pay the Board a per-box fee for this service).
Cantaloupe from this area cannot be sold without the
sticker identifying the county and shipper. The new
program requires information on the packing date,
field, and packing crew, which allows a grower to
trace the problem right back to a particular part of a
field. Some growers had already been providing this
additional information. Adding this additional trace-
back information to the box was neither particularly
costly nor complicated. It did take some administrative
changes, however. 
To be able to require traceback, the members of the
Board had to propose a change to their marketing
order and vote on it. Their original marketing order
covered grades and quality standards. The new 
marketing order specifically approves “such grade 
and quality standards of cantaloupes as necessary,
including the marking or certification of cantaloupes
or their shipping containers to expedite and implement
industry practices related to food safety” (California
Department of Food and Agriculture, 2000). If another
outbreak were to occur, this program would allow the
industry to immediately pinpoint the source of the
problem or deny that the problem is due to California
cantaloupe, depending on the situation. This may be
the only mandatory program for produce in the United
States that requires such detailed traceback informa-
tion on each box. 
The Mexican cantaloupe industry is also concerned.
In FDA’s first round of microbial testing of produce,
both imported (1999-2000) and domestic (2001-
2002) shipments of cantaloupe tested positive for
Salmonella. The FDA followup survey (beginning in
January 2001) on imported cantaloupe showed no
contaminated samples from Mexico. CDC contends
that the interpretation of the 2001 results are limited
by the small size—only 29 samples (Anderson et al.,
2002). Mexican industry insiders feel that the initial
results from the FDA served as a wake-up call to
growers; an indication that normal operations would
not be sufficient and that the cantaloupe industry
would have to be seen as proactive on the food safety
issue to maintain its reputation. This may be particu-
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Figure 5.5
U.S. imports of cantaloupe from Mexico  
and Central America
1,000 metric tons
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce.
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400larly important when cantaloupe from Central
America are also available during much of the
Mexican season. Results from the 2002 sampling
program are not yet publicly available. 
In 2001, the Mexican government agency in charge of
food safety, Servicio Nacional de Sanidad, Inocuidad y
Calidad Agroalimentaria (SENASICA), began devel-
oping a food safety program for cantaloupe. The pro-
gram is based on planting permits, production
programs requiring GAPs and GMPs for growers and
packinghouses, and monthly melon testing. The pro-
gram also includes more sophisticated traceback capa-
bility. As in other cases, it is imperative to identify any
grower or packer that harms the integrity of a food
safety program. All exports must have an international
phytosanitary permit, which will only be issued if
compliance with GAPs and GMPs is certified (The
Packer, 2002c). FDA and SENASICA were discussing
this program in early summer of 2002. Parts of this
system were in place on a voluntary basis in some
states in fall 2002. Also in 2002, FDA and SENASICA
began preparing to conduct joint training for govern-
ment inspectors and farmers.
U.S. cantaloupe growers lobbied FDA to take a more
aggressive role in this evolving case (this was appar-
ently not the case in the raspberry outbreaks). On
October 28, 2002, FDA issued an import alert against
all cantaloupe imports from Mexico (FDA, 2002d).
Although the outbreaks had been traced just to two
States in southern Mexico (Michoacan and Guerrero),
FDA justified the countrywide import alert because of
FDA samples showing Salmonella contamination in
cantaloupe from other States (Sonora, Jalisco, Colima,
Coahuila, Mexico, and Tamaulipas). Also, FDA was
concerned that with a regional approach, melons from
restricted regions could be commingled with melons
from a nonrestricted area. On November 4, 2002,
Canada issued a similar import alert for all Mexican
cantaloupe (CFIA, 2002).15
Mexican growers have complained about the timing of
the decision—just as growers in Sonora were ready to
begin harvesting cantaloupe for the U.S. market. They
also complained that the penalties FDA is imposing
are higher than those for U.S. cantaloupe producers
with similar food safety problems. While FDA sam-
ples showed Salmonella contamination in shipments
from several regions of Mexico, samples from the U.S.
in 2001 also showed contamination, but the U.S. grow-
ers are not faced with similar restrictions (FPAA,
2002). Also, for Mexican growers to be removed from
the countrywide import alert, they will have to demon-
strate higher food safety standards than U.S. growers.
An individual Mexican firm can petition FDA to
remove their firm from the import alert by providing
documentation of their food safety program.
According to the import alert announcement “after
reviewing these submissions, FDA, either solely or in
conjunction with the relevant Mexican regulatory
authority may conduct a limited number of onsite
inspections of the growing/processing areas to audit
the validity of the information submitted to FDA. FDA
intends to give first priority to firms or growers who
have their operations inspected by a third-party audit
firm that has expertise in agricultural and transporta-
tion processes.” A third-party audit showing compli-
ance with GAPs will not necessarily be enough to be
removed from the import alert list. In contrast, U.S.
cantaloupe growers are not required to use GAPs,
although many comply voluntarily.
November 2002 saw developments on both sides of the
border. On November 8, Mexico presented a formal
complaint to the World Trade Organization’s Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Committee claiming that the U.S.
import alert against all Mexican cantaloupe was not con-
sistent with U.S. trade commitments with respect to dis-
crimination, protectionism, and unnecessarily trade
restricting actions (SAGARPA, 2002). On November 13,
the Mexican government published legislation that gave
the government legal authority to require all cantaloupe
growers to comply with the new food safety program.
On November 20, importers associated with the 2000
and 2001 outbreaks were indicted in the United States
on Federal charges of “trying to impede and defeat law-
ful government functions of the U.S. Customs Service
and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration” in their
traceback efforts (The Packer, 2002d). The importers
entered a plea of not guilty and the trial, initially sched-
uled for January 2003, has been delayed. On November
27, 2002, FDA authorized imports from two farms from
the northern Mexican state of Sonora (The Packer,
2002e). This paper only covers events through
November 2002 in a case that will continue to evolve.
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15 In the raspberry case, between 1998 and 2000, either the United
States or Canada had an import alert but never in the same year.
Since Cyclospora was an emerging pathogen, it was not clear what
actions were adequate to resolve the problem. This inconsistency in
policy raised concerns in Guatemala about the scientific basis of
trade policy. Summary of Responses to 
Food Safety Problems
Private Response
In a food safety outbreak, the grower’s first line of
defense is to adopt GAPs if they are not already in
place.16 Some growers develop their own food safety
programs that are even more stringent than FDA’s
GAP guidelines. However, it is often difficult to
determine how contamination occurred and what
practices are adequate to resolve the problem. In
Guatemala the problems took several seasons to
resolve and the exact means of contamination was
never determined. It is not clear how long it will take
to solve the problem in Mexico since neither the
extent of the problem nor the source of contamina-
tion have yet been identified. 
In the past, an individual grower could adopt a better
food safety program when faced with a food safety prob-
lem, but it was difficult to signal to buyers that the firm’s
product was safer than that of others in the industry. In
the raspberry case, the two market leaders—large U.S.
and Chilean firms—adopted new food safety programs
for all their growers in different countries. These firms
are so large that the cost of improved practices and addi-
tional testing was likely small compared with the losses
associated with a potential food safety problem and
damage to their reputation. If consumers and large-scale
buyers recognize the brand name, then these firms may
be able to maintain consumer confidence even if other
firms’reputations suffer from a food safety problem. 
The growth in the use of third-party audits for GAPs
has provided growers with a new tool to indicate that
appropriate practices are in place. An audit can reduce
asymmetric information between the grower and ship-
per and between the shipper and commercial buyers. In
the late 1990s, with GAPs in place, third-party auditors
began to verify food safety programs for field opera-
tions as being in compliance with these guidelines.
While FDA developed GAPs, the private sector has
developed the third-party auditing industry for microbial
contamination.17 There is no government oversight of
third-party audit firms—an issue that concerns many in
the produce industry (The Packer, 2002a). Standards
may vary between auditing firms and between retailers
requiring use of audits. Growers and shippers are con-
cerned that this raises their costs if they need to have
different audits for different buyers. 
Another concern regarding third-party audits for
microbial food safety is that this focus is relatively
new for produce. The third-party audit industry has its
roots in pesticide residue testing and auditing of
indoor HACCP programs. Examining produce for pes-
ticide residues is much easier than looking for micro-
bial contamination. Although adherence to GAP
guidelines and successful third-party audits of food
safety programs do not guarantee food safety, FDA is
concerned that some outbreaks have been traced back
to firms that have successfully completed third-party
audits.18 An audit can verify that growers are using
certain food safety practices that should help reduce
microbial contamination but it is much harder to
observe the potential for contamination. For example,
GAP guidelines say that water must be adequate for its
intended use. An auditor may take water samples in an
attempt to provide a more comprehensive assessment
of risk. However, water samples can be problematic
since water contamination is not necessarily a constant
presence. A sample of surface water that tests negative
for microbial organisms on one day indicates nothing
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16 Of course, some firms already had sophisticated food safety
practices in place, even before the more recent concern with food
safety. Many of the largest firms have their own food safety pro-
grams with trained scientists overseeing production and packing
operations. This is particularly important for the new fresh-cut
products like bagged salads which often have consumer-recog-
nized brands. Investment in food safety protects the brand name.
Branding is becoming more common in produce; in 1997, 19 per-
cent of retail produce sales were branded products, compared with
only 7 percent in 1987 (Kaufman et al., 2000).
17 In 2001, USDA’s AMS began a pilot program offering third-
party audits for produce in several States, the Fresh Produce Audit
Verification Program (AMS, 2002). The AMS audits are similar to
private audits. The AMS program does not seek to influence the
third-party audit industry, just to provide another source of the
same service. The program is run through the State departments of
agriculture. AMS has inspectors at shipping-point locations and
has experience working with growers. This program grew out of a
request from New Jersey growers. Currently, the program is
offered in New Jersey, California, and Oregon. It is just starting in
Washington and Florida. The cost of an AMS audit is similar to
those offered by the private sector. The typical audit takes 5-6
hours. In California, an audit costs $65 per hour plus $31 per hour
in travel costs (The Packer, 2002b).
18 This concern has become more obvious in the import alert for
Mexican cantaloupe, which states that FDA will conduct their own
investigations and not rely solely on third-party audits. This is sim-
ilar to FDA conducting audits of Guatemalan raspberry farms in
the early stages of the MPE program.about the chances of contamination on another day.
Tests of water from wells that are protected from sur-
face contamination are more helpful; for example, a
yearly sample from such a well might be sufficient to
determine the overall water quality.
Growers have another reason to adopt GAPs and use
third-party audits. In 1999, Safeway, the third largest
U.S. food retailer, expanded their food safety program
to require all their suppliers of certain commodities to
verify that they follow government food safety stan-
dards and specifications in production and packing.
Some other retailers have followed suit. To qualify as a
Safeway supplier, a grower must have an independent
third-party auditor verify that they are using GAPs for
production and GMPs for packinghouses. Requiring
verification of use of GAPs and GMPs was a new idea
and met with initial opposition. Domestic and imported
produce sold by Safeway must meet the same standards.
Research covering a select group of U.S. fruit and veg-
etable shippers indicates that in 1999, almost half of
those studied provided third-party audits for GAPs or
GMPs for at least one of their buyers. While shippers
were not always happy about complying with this
request, most indicated that they would implement veri-
fication programs in response to changing buyer prefer-
ences (Calvin et al., 2001).
In each of the case studies, shippers tried to distance
themselves from those associated with a food safety
problem. Shippers can reduce their risk by requiring
growers to provide third-party audits or by dropping
growers with less sophisticated food safety programs
or more challenging environments. The problems in
Guatemala may have helped the small but growing
industry in Mexico since shippers could satisfy most
of their needs with Mexican raspberries. Mexico can-
taloupe growers may face a similar situation in the
future if U.S. buyers decide to reduce their risks by
switching to Central American cantaloupe. 
Grower Organization Response
Grower organizations have also been important forces
for resolving food safety problems. Beginning in the
mid-1990s, the fresh produce industry became aware
of the potential cost of food safety problems related to
contamination at the farm level. Many trace this
heightened awareness to the well-publicized 1996 out-
break of E. coli O157:H7 that was traced to mesclun
(lettuce mix) grown and packed on one small farm in
California. This was the first reported multistate out-
break of E. coli O157:H7 associated with lettuce
(Hilborn et al., 1999). It was also one of the earliest
cases clearly identifying microbial contamination at
the farm level. 
Concerned about potential government regulation,
the Western Grower’s Association, which represents
the California and Arizona produce industry 
(including almost all U.S. lettuce production), and the
International Fresh-cut Produce Association, took the
initiative and developed their own set of guidelines for
fresh produce food safety. Similarly the CSC devel-
oped its own set of guidelines following the raspberry
contamination problem in 1996. FDA’s GAP guide-
lines published in late 1998 built, in part, on these ear-
lier industry efforts.
One grower organization has been active in providing
guidance to the third-party audit industry. The United
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association has developed a
training program on food safety auditing. Growers
were concerned that some auditors experienced only in
indoor audits were unfamiliar with the produce indus-
try and outdoor settings where some factors cannot be
controlled. This program also serves a need for contin-
uing education for growers interested in evaluating
their own food safety programs.
Grower organizations have become more concerned
about the reputation of their crops for food safety. A
very large and important firm may be able to maintain
its reputation despite the actions of others in the indus-
try, but most firms must rely on the overall reputation
of the industry. Retail buyers may know that a particu-
lar firm has never been associated with an outbreak,
has a strong food safety program, and has successful
third-party audits for adherence to GAP principles, but
consumers generally do not have that great a knowl-
edge of the industry. News reports of an outbreak asso-
ciated with a particular grower may affect consumer
perceptions about all growers of that product in that
same area or anywhere else. 
A grower organization’s effort to build a reputation for
food safety is a public good. At least in the short run,
everyone benefits from the reputation for safety even if
they are not investing in improved food safety. In each
of the three cases studied, grower organizations have
focused on developing systems to trace products from
final selling point back to the grower, which encour-
ages grower responsibility and reduces the free-rider 
90 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDAproblem.19,20 In the case of an outbreak, a grower
organization that encourages traceback can prove to
the public that their product is not responsible for the
problem. Or, where the industry is responsible for the
outbreak, the responsible grower or growers can be
identified and damage can be limited. 
In the raspberry case, the Guatemalan food safety pro-
gram with its traceback and traceforward capabilities
is mandatory. With the California Strawberry
Commission, the Quality Assurance Food Safety
Program is voluntary but the Commission is confident
that all shippers use some sort of traceback, although
the degree of sophistication varies. The Baja California
strawberry growers appear to follow the California
Strawberry Commission’s program closely. In the case
of cantaloupe, the California Cantaloupe Advisory
Board’s traceback program is mandatory. Mexico’s
new cantaloupe food safety program with enhanced
traceback is also mandatory.
This level of traceback capability may not be represen-
tative of other industries who have not yet faced food
safety problems, even though traceback capability is
an integral part of GAPs. The difficulty of implement-
ing a traceback program may vary by crop because of
particular harvesting or marketing practices. For exam-
ple, products that are packed in the field can easily be
labeled with the origin of the product. If products are
harvested and then packed in a central facility, a little
more care is required to maintain traceability. Crops
like tomatoes present a particular traceability chal-
lenge. They are often harvested, packed, and then sent
to repackers where tomatoes from several producers
may be commingled before being resorted by maturity.
Government Response
FDA’s most important contributions to improving food
safety for produce is the development of guidelines for
food safety practices. The value of GAPs will increase
as science provides more answers regarding how to
reduce risk of microbial contamination.
Because it is so difficult to identify microbial contami-
nation on produce, FDA cannot rely on random testing
at the border to detect contaminated produce. FDA
will do inspections when there is reason to think there
might be a problem. Because of the problems with
cantaloupe in recent years, FDA conducts microbial
testing on imported and domestic cantaloupe. Instead
of focusing on testing, FDA has concentrated much of
its efforts on education in foreign countries. All efforts
to solve food safety problems abroad reduce the bur-
den on the consuming public and on the FDA and
CDC, which investigate outbreaks. In 1997, FDA spent
6,274 hours investigating the Cyclospora-contaminated
raspberries (U.S. GAO, 1999).
When invited by a foreign government, FDA will visit
individual farms associated with contamination prob-
lems and identify practices that are not consistent with
GAPs. Findings compiled from these visits are used to
identify trends for future training and guidance develop-
ment. FDA, in association with the University of
Maryland, teaches food safety practices in the United
States and abroad through the Joint Institute of Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition. This program has pro-
vided classes on GAPs. In addition, FDA provides train-
ing for conducting farm investigations. In 2002, FDA
conducted several training courses in Mexico on how to
do farm investigations for produce. 
When an outbreak is associated with imported pro-
duce, FDA must determine whether the problem can
be easily solved or whether the individual firm or
country should not be allowed to ship to the United
States until the problem is fixed. Traditionally, FDA
relies on laboratory identification of pathogens on a
product before making decisions on withdrawing a
product from the market or banning its import. This is
a problem for fresh produce, which is rarely available
for analysis when an outbreak develops. Over time,
FDA has become more comfortable with making deci-
sions based on epidemiological evidence alone. The
Cyclospora case in Guatemala was the first big pro-
duce case that relied solely on epidemiology. The
Mexican Salmonella case demonstrates again the
reliance on epidemiology.
The role of FDA varies depending on the case. For
Guatemalan raspberries, FDA eventually banned all
imports because an individual farm could not be iden-
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19 Even before recent food safety problems and emphasis on using
GAPs, some firms voluntarily adopted traceback programs as a
good business practice.
20 The Federal Government does not currently require traceback 
nor monitor voluntary activities (Golan et al., 2002). However,
the newly enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 will eventually require
some traceability capability (FDA, 2002). Although farmers are
exempt, shippers and most other firms in the distribution channel
will be required to be able to identify where any product came from
and where it went to (“one up, one down”). FDA must publish their
regulations for establishing this system by December 12, 2003.tified and the problem seemed pervasive. FDA and
CDC sent researchers to Guatemala to investigate the
industry and provide assistance in developing a pro-
duction system to minimize the potential of microbial
contamination. FDA’s role in the Mexican strawberry
case appears to have been limited at the farm level,
particularly since no one could determine where the
contamination occurred. In this case, however, the
strawberries were processed so FDA was involved in
the recall of the processed product. With a fresh prod-
uct, there is often no product to recall. In the Mexican
cantaloupe case, FDA first issued import alerts for
three firms selling cantaloupe associated with
Salmonella outbreaks. In late 2002, FDA banned all
cantaloupe imports from Mexico. FDA is evaluating
petitions from individual Mexico growers for exemp-
tion from the ban. 
State organizations, such as the California Department
of Food and Agriculture, are also involved in food
safety outreach programs to producers in other coun-
tries. Again, the motivation is self-interest since con-
tamination problems traced to imports can have such
negative impacts on U.S. producers.
As the case studies demonstrate, in most cases foreign
governments have tried to resolve food safety problems,
although perhaps not as aggressively as desired by the
United States in the early stages. In Guatemala, the gov-
ernment became involved in the GBC’s efforts to
develop a workable and enforceable food safety plan. In
the strawberry case, the industry in Baja California
acted almost as a part of the U.S. industry and benefited
in an indirect way from food safety initiatives of the
CSC. Mexican government activities appear to have
been limited to the state level in that case. In November
2002, the Mexican government put into place a food
safety program to try to resolve the cantaloupe problem. 
Conclusions
Food safety and produce trade are clearly compatible;
the vast majority of imports are never associated with
food safety outbreaks. Producers in the United States
and foreign countries, grower organizations, govern-
ments, and commercial buyers are actively involved in
improving food safety. 
Producers are self-motivated to provide safe produce
because of the financial consequences of an outbreak
traced back to their operation. Of course, there are
always some cases where people will not invest suffi-
ciently in food safety practices because they think their
product is safe or they deliberately cut corners. As trace-
ability improves, however, the probability that responsi-
bility for contaminated food will fall on those farmers
with inadequate food safety programs will increase. 
Grower organizations are motivated because of the 
public good nature of a product reputation. Since an 
outbreak anywhere can have a negative impact on con-
sumers’perceptions of the product, grower organizations
must do something to try to reassure the public that their
product is safe and distinguish themselves from other
groups of growers associated with a problem. 
Fears of economic and reputation losses if a contami-
nated produce item is traced to their firm motivate
retailers and other commercial buyers to demand high
food safety standards. Buyers want to know about a
grower’s food safety plan. Some demand third-party
verification of compliance with GAPs and GMPs. 
In the United States, FDA encourages farmers to follow
guidelines to reduce microbial contamination in pro-
duce. It does have the power to impose mandatory food
safety programs if necessary. With respect to trade,
FDA restricts imports from individual firms or all pro-
ducers in a region or country when food safety prob-
lems cannot be resolved. FDA has been active in
promoting improved food safety abroad. In both Mexico
and Guatemala, microbial food safety programs have
traditionally been voluntary. Government programs
became mandatory for the particular products after food
safety problems resulted in U.S. import alerts. 
There is no reason to think that this trend toward more
sophisticated food safety programs is any more diffi-
cult for foreign growers to cope with than for domestic
growers. However, increased concerns about microbial
food safety programs pose particular challenges for
smaller farmers in both the United States and foreign
countries. When there are food safety problems, the
costs of production increase for everyone producing
for the U.S. market. New fixed costs, such as purchas-
ing a water filtration system, would be particularly
problematic for small producers spreading the cost of
the new investment over smaller volume of output.
Also, smaller farmers (or geographically dispersed
farmers) might not be able to support the grower
organizations that have been so important in resolving
food safety problems. 
The case studies show that failure to resolve food safety
problems quickly can have serious impacts on an indus-
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when government intervention may be required to
resolve a problem. Science is not as definitive as desired
when trying to make decisions about trade and food
safety. While some practices clearly increase the proba-
bility of microbial contamination, it is often difficult for
FDA and others to identify the source of contamination
and the new practices that would yield safer food. There
is a chance that too aggressive a stance would unneces-
sarily restrict international trade when using GAPs
might resolve the problem in the next season. In the
hepatitis A outbreak linked to strawberries, if the con-
tamination occurred in Mexico, use of GAPs alone may
have been sufficient to solve the problem (or it may be a
sporadic problem that might pop up again in the future).
Restricting trade can be economically devastating for an
industry, as in the Guatemalan raspberry case. However,
the raspberry and cantaloupe cases show that it can take
several years to resolve a problem and in both cases the
foreign governments intervened. In these cases a more
moderate response may be inadequate, leading to more
outbreaks and economic losses in affected industries.
In each case, damage was not limited to the producers
of the contaminated product. Anyone producing a prod-
uct for the U.S. market, including U.S. growers, may
be caught in the consumer backlash against a product
and will probably have to adopt more stringent food
safety programs. Given the widespread impacts of food
safety outbreaks, there may be opportunities for grower
organizations in different countries to organize joint
efforts to resolve problems. Organizations would have
to weigh the negative fallout of a food safety problem
originating with their competitors against the potential
gain if their competitors’sales were restricted. The
costs and benefits would vary by industry.
The case studies show the actions of growers, grower
groups, and governments caught up in foodborne ill-
ness outbreaks. Future research should investigate what
other sectors of the produce industry, which have not
yet faced the economic disruption of a foodborne ill-
ness outbreak, are doing to prepare for the possibility.
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T
he risk of contamination by mycotoxins is an
important food safety concern for grains and
other field crops. Mycotoxins are toxic byprod-
ucts of mold infestations affecting as much as one-quar-
ter of global food and feed crop output. Food
contaminated with mycotoxins, particularly with afla-
toxins, a subcategory, can cause sometimes-fatal acute
illness, and are associated with increased cancer risk. 
To protect consumers from these health risks, many
countries have adopted regulations to limit exposure 
to mycotoxins. As with many food safety regulations,
domestic and trade regimes governing mycotoxins 
often take the form of product, rather than process, stan-
dards. The World Trade Organization’s Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement states that these standards must
be based on sound risk assessments. However, diverging
perceptions of tolerable health risks—associated largely
with the level of economic development and the suscep-
tibility of a nation’s crops to contamination—have led to
widely varying standards among different national or
multilateral agencies. For example, of the 48 countries
with established limits for total aflatoxins in food, stan-
dards ranged from 0 to 50 parts per billion. 
In the United States, aflatoxins are not commonly cited
as a reason for import “refusals” by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Federal agency that enforces
mycotoxin regulations. In 2001, only 4 of 1,781 FDA
import detentions of cereals (grain) and cereal products
(which include consumer-ready processed products)
were due to aflatoxins, although detentions were more
common for contamination of nut and seed imports.
Nevertheless, several studies indicate that the economic
costs of enforcing standards, and the lost trade opportu-
nities stemming from unharmonized global product stan-
dards on mycotoxins, are substantial:
● One study estimated that crop losses (corn, wheat,
and peanuts) from mycotoxin contamination in the
United States amount to $932 million annually, in
addition to losses averaging $466 million annually
from regulatory enforcement, testing, and other
quality control measures (CAST, 2003).
● Wilson and Otsuki (2001) estimated that, for a
group of 46 countries—including the United
States—the adoption of a uniform aflatoxin stan-
dard based on international Codex Alimentarius
Commission (Codex) guidelines would increase
trade of cereals (grains) and nuts by more than $6
billion, or more than 50 percent, compared with
the divergent standards in effect during 1998.
There are several reasons why trade disputes related to
the setting of regulatory standards on mycotoxins could
persist, or even worsen. First, mycotoxin contamination
is recognized as an unavoidable risk. Codex, for exam-
ple, notes that many factors that influence the level of
contamination in cereals and grains are environmental—
such as weather and insect infestation—and therefore are
difficult or impossible to control. Second, perceptions of
tolerable health risks are not likely to narrow signifi-
cantly in the near future since they appear to hinge
largely on the level of economic development and the
susceptibility of a nation’s crops to contamination.
Finally, under the “precautionary principle,” some coun-
tries may set new standards on certain mycotoxins for
which scientific evidence of a health risk is unclear.2
One strategy to lower both the health risks and the
economic costs associated with mycotoxins is to
increase awareness among food producers and han-
dlers of practices which would minimize mycotoxin
contamination, and to encourage the adoption of
process-based guidelines such as good agricultural
practices (GAPs) or good manufacturing practices
(GMPs).
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Chapter 6
Mycotoxin Hazards and Regulations
Impacts on Food and Animal Feed Crop Trade
Erik Dohlman1
1 Agricultural economist with the Market and Trade Economics
Division, Economic Research Service, USDA.
2 The "precautionary principle" is a term referring to the use of
environmental or health precautions in situations where the extent
or source of a particular risk is unclear.Introduction
Concerns about human health arise when grains and
other field crops are found to contain unsafe chemicals,
additives, or other contaminants. Many countries have
established sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations
to protect consumers from these health risks, while
seeking to balance health benefits with the potential
trade disruptions, economic losses, and market uncer-
tainties that regulations can cause. Among grains and
other field crops, perhaps the most prevalent—if pub-
licly unrecognized—source of food-related health risks
are naturally occurring poisonous substances called
mycotoxins. Consuming grains or other foods contami-
nated with certain mycotoxins can be fatal if the toxins
are present at very high levels. Long-term exposure to
mycotoxins can increase cancer risk, and suppress the
immune system, among other health problems. 
Although humans face health risks stemming from the
contamination of grains with other naturally occurring
substances, mycotoxins are unique in that they are pro-
duced naturally on the grain, and their presence (at least
initially) is usually associated with uncontrollable factors
such as climatic conditions.3 The presence of mycotox-
ins can also be distinguished from plant infestations that
affect grains—such as TCK smut and Karnal bunt infes-
tations which are still subject to SPS-related import con-
trols designed to protect the quality of domestically
produced crops—but pose no food safety risk.
Mycotoxins are produced by certain fungi (e.g.,
Aspergillus ssp., Penicillium ssp., and Fusarium ssp.)
that grow on human food and animal feed ingredients
such as corn, sorghum, wheat, barley, peanuts, and
other legumes and oilseeds. Five broad groups of
mycotoxins—aflatoxin, vomitoxin, ochratoxin A,
fumonisin, and zearalenone—are commonly found in
food and feed grains (table 6.1). Among mycotoxins,
probably the most widely recognized risk comes from
aflatoxins. Aflatoxins are extremely potent carcino-
genic and mutagenic substances that first came into the
public spotlight—and were formally identified—in the
early 1960s following the deaths of more than 100,000
young turkeys on a poultry farm in England. The so-
called Turkey X disease was eventually tied to high
levels of aflatoxin in Brazilian peanut meal imported
as a feed ingredient. Aflatoxin contamination is most
common in African, Asian, and South American coun-
tries with warm and humid climates, but also occurs in
temperate areas of North America and Europe. These
five groups of mycotoxins all pose health concerns and
are subject to SPS or other regulatory measures. 
The fungi (mold) that produce mycotoxins can emerge
either in the field (in soil, decaying vegetation, and
grains undergoing microbiological deterioration) or
during postharvest transportation or storage.
Temperature stress is an important cause of fungi
growth on crops in the field, and high moisture content
(water activity) and temperature are associated with
the growth of fungi in stored grain. Detection and con-
trol of the fungi is a continuous concern since the
fungi can become established and remain with the
commodity anywhere along the production, storage,
transportation, and processing chain. A further concern
is that the absence of visible mold does not guarantee
the grain is free from mycotoxin, and cooking or pro-
cessing the food product does not necessarily rid it of
mycotoxin contamination. For example, molds con-
taminated with aflatoxins have been isolated in
processed food products such as bread, macaroni,
cooked meat, cheese, and flour (Guerzoni, 1999).
For the consumer, a food safety concern is potential
exposure to mycotoxins through consumption of food
from contaminated crops, which can produce acute
and/or long-term health problems. Consuming food
products that contain high levels of certain mycotoxins
can cause the rapid onset of mycotoxicosis, a severe ill-
ness characterized by vomiting, abdominal pain, pul-
monary edema, convulsions, coma, and in rare cases,
death. Although lethal cases are uncommon, acute ill-
nesses from mycotoxins, particularly aflatoxins (aflatoxi-
cosis), have been reported from many parts of the world,
usually in developing countries. Some notable outbreaks
include the deaths of 3 Taiwanese in 1967, and the
deaths of more than 100 people in Northwest India in
1974. Both outbreaks were attributed to aflatoxin con-
tamination, of rice in Taiwan and corn in India.
Vomitoxin was responsible for another large-scale inci-
dent of mycotoxicosis in India in 1988.
Although more difficult to directly associate with
mycotoxin contamination, an equal, or perhaps even
greater, food safety concern than acute illness is the
long-term effects of lower-level mycotoxin consump-
tion, particularly the risks of cancer and immune defi-
ciency. Aflatoxin B1 was placed on the list of known
human carcinogens by the International Agency for
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3 For example, dioxins also occur naturally—sometimes as a result
of forest fires or volcanic eruptions—but they are often the
byproduct of industrial processes (see chapter 8).Research on Cancer (IARC) in 1988, and other myco-
toxins are suspected or known to be carcinogenic or to
have other adverse health consequences (table 6.1).4
Aflatoxins are a particular concern for populations
with a high incidence of hepatitis B because the rela-
tive rate of liver cancer in people with hepatitis B is up
to 60 times greater than normal when those people are
exposed to aflatoxin (Miller, 1996, p. 4). 
In addition to direct risks to humans from consumption
of mycotoxin-contaminated grains, there are indirect
health risks to those who consume animal products con-
taining residues of carcinogenic mycotoxins.
Mycotoxins can be detected in meat, milk, and eggs
from animals that have consumed feed ingredients con-
taining mycotoxins, and many countries have tolerance
standards for mycotoxin residues in these products. 
Another concern related to the consumption of myco-
toxin-contaminated feed by livestock is the potential
for economic losses from animal health and productiv-
ity problems. Aflatoxins in feed are known to be asso-
ciated with liver damage in animals, reduced milk and
egg production, poor weight gain, and recurrent infec-
tions due to immunity suppression. The young of any
particular species are most vulnerable, but the degree
of susceptibility varies by species. 
Regulatory Actions
As with many public food safety regulations, domestic
and trade regimes governing mycotoxins in most coun-
tries take the form of product, rather than process, stan-
dards. That is, tolerance levels for the amount of
mycotoxin in a product are established rather than regu-
lating the production or treatment of the commodity
along the marketing chain (Henson and Caswell, 1999).
The United States began regulating the concentration of
mycotoxins in food and feed in 1968, following some of
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Table 6.1—Common mycotoxins, commodity affected, and health effects
Mycotoxin Commodities Fungal source(s) Effects of ingestion
Aflatoxin B1, B2 Corn, peanuts, and many  Aspergillus flavus Aflatoxin B1 identified as potent human
G1, G2 other commodities Aspergillus parasiticus carcinogen by IARC.1 Risk of human
toxicosis. Adverse effects in various
animals, especially chickens.
Deoxynivalenol Wheat, corn, and barley Fusarium graminearum Human toxicoses in India, China, Japan,
Nivalenol Fusarium crookwellense and Korea. Toxic to animals, especially 
(Vomitoxin) Fusarium culmorum pigs.
Zearalenone Corn, wheat Fusarium graminearum Identified by the IARC as a possible
Fusarium culmorum carcinogen. Affects reproductive system
Fusarium crookwellense in laboratory animals and pigs.
Ochratoxin A Barley, wheat, and many  Aspergillus ochraceus Suspected by IARC as human carcinogen. 
other commodities Penicillium verrucosum Carcinogenic in laboratory animals 
and pigs.
Fumonisin B1 Corn Fusarium moniliforme Suspected by IARC as human carcinogen. 
plus several less  Toxic to pigs and poultry. Cause of 
common species equine eucoencepha-lomalacia (ELEM),
a fatal disease of horses.
1International Agency for Research on Cancer.
Source: adapted from GASCA, "Mycotoxins in Grain." Group for Assistance on Systems Relating to Grain after Harvest. 
Technical Center for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), the Netherlands, Technical Leaflet No. 3. 1997.
www.fao.org/inpho/vlibrary/x0008e/X0008E00.htm#Contents.
4 Specifically, “mycotoxins may be carcinogenic (e.g., aflatoxin
B1, ochratoxin A, fumonisin B1), estrogenic (zearalenone and I
and J zearalenols), nephrotoxic (ochratoxins, citrinin, oosporeine),
dermonecrotic (trichothecenes), or immunosuppressive (aflatoxin
B1, ochratoxin A, and T-2 toxin)…. Much of the published infor-
mation on toxicity comes from studies in experimental animals,
and these may not reflect the effects of mycotoxins on humans and
other animals…. [Nevertheless] residues in animal products of car-
cinogenic mycotoxins, such as aflatoxin B1, M1, and ochratoxin
A, pose a threat to human health, and their levels should be moni-
tored” (Orriss, 1997, p. 2). the early incidents of animal and human health problems
related to mycotoxins. A study by the United Nations’
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on worldwide
regulations for mycotoxins revealed that at least 77
countries now have specific regulations for mycotoxins.
Thirteen countries are known to have no specific regula-
tions, and no data are available for about 50 countries,
many of them in Africa (Van Egmond, 1999).5 Survey
data by the FAO also reveal that the number of countries
adopting mycotoxin regulations grew significantly from
the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, and that the range of toler-
ance levels vary widely (Van Egmond, 1999). In 1996,
for example, 48 countries had established tolerance lev-
els for total aflatoxins in food—up from 30 in 1987—
with standards ranging from 0 parts per billion (ppb) to
50 ppb. For the 21 countries with total aflatoxins stan-
dards on animal feeds, the tolerance levels ranged from 0
ppb to 1,000 ppb (table 6.2).
According to the Joint FAO/World Health Organization
(WHO) Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA),
the scientific body that develops advisory international
standards on food additives and contaminants for the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, reaching consensus on
maximum levels for aflatoxin (and other mycotoxin)
standards is complicated by the fact that:
levels of contamination of foodstuffs vary
tremendously around the world, and … with
respect to trade, the perspectives of delega-
tions differ profoundly. Those representing
countries in which aflatoxin contamination is
not prevalent want low standards because they
do not wish to see the quality of their food
supply degraded. Those delegations from
countries in which aflatoxin contamination is a
problem because of their climatic conditions
naturally wish to have standards in which
higher levels of contamination are permitted
so that they can trade their products on world
markets (Hermann, 1999, p. 3).
Thus, for a large number of countries, the risks associ-
ated with mycotoxin contamination are generally recog-
nized and the levels entering the food chain subject to
limitations. Enforcing these limitations naturally imposes
costs on domestic producers and consumers (e.g., of
monitoring, testing, destroying the crop or diverting it to
lower valued use). At the same time, when the cost and
benefit analyses—or risk assessments—underlying
domestic regulations lead countries to set different toler-
ance standards, these divergent standards can also affect
producers in other countries, disrupt trade, and result in
trade disputes. 
U.S. Regulatory Provisions
In the United States, authority to regulate mycotoxins
(i.e., aflatoxin, fumonisins, and vomitoxin) is established
by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA),
which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The FDA has established specific “action” levels
for aflatoxin present in food or feed and “advisory” lev-
els for other mycotoxins. The action and advisory levels
are designed to provide an adequate margin of safety to
protect human and animal health (Robens, 2001; USDA,
1998). The standard for aflatoxins is 20 ppb for human
food and animal feeds (corn and other grains) intended
for immature animals or unknown destinations. Except
for mandatory aflatoxin testing on U.S. corn exports,
however, mycotoxin testing for domestically produced or
imported foods and feed ingredients is not required by
law. That is, testing for mycotoxins in grains that are not
exported is voluntary, and contamination levels are not
considered part of official grading standards for agricul-
tural commodities. The FDA does have a monitoring
program, however, and “reserves the right to take appro-
priate enforcement actions when circumstances warrant
such actions” (CAST, 2003, p. 109). 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Grain Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) also
offers aflatoxin testing for corn, sorghum, wheat, and
soybeans as “official criteria” under the United States
Grain Standards Act, and has an official understanding
with the FDA that it will report to them samples that
exceed established action levels. In the event this occurs,
any action by the FDA on a lot sample that tests above
that level is taken on a case-by-case basis, and can
involve diverting the commodity to alternative uses with
less stringent standards (e.g., corn for ethanol production
or “finishing” beef cattle), and will only rarely require
disposal (table 6.3).
In addition, purchasers may regularly test grains as part
of their routine quality control efforts (Lijewski, 2002),
and contracts between buyer and seller may be contin-
gent upon achieving an aflatoxin (or other mycotoxin)
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5 Most of the existing mycotoxin regulations concern aflatoxins in
food, and in fact all countries with mycotoxin regulations at least
have tolerances for aflatoxin B1 (considered the most toxic afla-
toxin) or the sum of the aflatoxins B1, B2, G1, and G2 in foods
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Table 6.2—Medians and ranges of maximum aflatoxin tolerance levels and number of countries 
with regulations (1987, 1996)
1987 1996
No. of No. of
Category Median Range countries Median Range countries
— Parts per billion — Number — Parts per billion — Number
B1 in foodstuffs 4 0-50 29 4 0-30 33
B1+B2+G1+G2 7 0-50 30 8 0-50 48
in foodstuffs
B1 in foodstuffs 0.2 0-5.0 4 0.3 0-5.0 5
for children
M1 in milk 0.05 0-1.0 13 0.05 0-1.0 17
B1 in feedstuffs 30 5-1,000 16 20 5-1,000 19
B1+B2+G1+G2 50 10-1,000 8 50 0-1,000 21
in feedstuffs
Source: Adapted from Van Egmond, Hans, “Worldwide Regulations for Mycotoxins.” Third Joint FAO/WHO/UNEP International Conference on
Mycotoxins. MYC-CONF/99/8a, March 1999.
Table 6.3—Product standards for aflatoxins (United States, European Union, and Codex Alimentarius)
United States1 European Union2
Product Standard Product Standard
Parts per billion Parts per billion
Raw peanuts (industry standard). 15 Peanuts, nuts, dried fruit, and processed products 4 (2)
thereof, intended for direct human consumption.
Human food, corn, and other grains intended for  20 Peanuts to be subjected to sorting or other 15 (8)
immature animals (including poultry) and for dairy  physical treatment, before human consumption
animals or when its destination is not known.  or use as an ingredient in food.
For animal feeds, other than corn or  20 Nuts and dried fruit to be subjected to sorting 10 (5)
cottonseed meal. or other physical treatment, before human 
consumption or use as an ingredient in food. 
For corn and other grains intended for breeding 100 Cereals and processed products thereof  4 (2)
beef cattle, breeding swine, or mature poultry. intended for direct human consumption or an 
ingredient in food.
For corn and other grains intended for  200
finishing swine of 100 pounds or greater.
For corn and other grains intended for finishing 300
beef cattle and for cottonseed meal intended for
cattle, swine, or poultry.
Codex
Peanuts intended for further processing. 15
1 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standard unless otherwise noted. 
2 Numbers in parentheses refer to separate standard for aflatoxin B1 alone. 
3 Additional standards exist for “complementary feedingstuffs.”
Sources: USDA (GIPSA), 1998; Otsuki et al., 2001; EC, 1999. 
Feed materials and complete feedstuffs with the (50)
exception of:3
- feed materials from peanuts, copra, palm-kernel,
cottonseed, corn and products processed thereof, (20)
- complete feedstuffs for dairy cattle (5)
- complete feedstuffs for pigs and poultry (20)
(except young animals)
- other complete feedstuffs. (10)level at, or even below, FDA-established action or advi-
sory levels.6According to a private commodity analyst,
most grain purchase contracts of corn processors specify
aflatoxin levels below the FDA standard, often 10 ppb or
less (Brenner, 2002). Under industry guidelines devel-
oped by the U.S. Peanut Administrative Committee,
mandatory testing and a separate industry standard of 15
ppb does exist for aflatoxins in raw peanuts. 
Testing for aflatoxins in imported foods is not required,
but the FDA does test samples of food and feed imports
on a regular basis, and import refusals are authorized
under the FFDCA. Between 1987 and 1997, the FDA
inspected an average of about 500 samples of imported
foods and feed per year for aflatoxins, with about 4 per-
cent of samples testing above the 20 ppb level, almost
exclusively in food products (CAST, 2003, p. 43). In
2001, the FDA recorded more than 2,100 detentions of
imported cereals (grains), cereal products, nuts, and
seeds due to food safety concerns, although just 29 of
the detentions were due to aflatoxins. 
Multinational Standard Setting 
and the SPS Agreement
At the international level, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission of the United Nations (henceforth “Codex”)
has, since 1963, developed general principles of food
safety and hygiene designed to promote food safety and
facilitate trade, including the setting of advisory stan-
dards on natural and environmental toxins such as myco-
toxins (FAO, 2002).
Codex standards are advisory, not mandatory, and the
data in table 6.2 demonstrate that national standards
vary widely, with aflatoxin standards for foods fluctuat-
ing from zero tolerance to more than three times the
Codex standard of 15 ppb.7 Nevertheless, within the
regulatory framework of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Agreement—while not ceding authority over food
safety standards from national governments—maintains
that measures which conform to Codex standards,
guidelines, or other recommendations are science-based,
appropriate, and nondiscriminatory (Park et al., 1999). 
Henson and Caswell (1999) point out that the SPS
agreement essentially requires WTO members to jus-
tify the food safety regulations that they apply and
demonstrate that any trade distortive effects (costs) are
proportionate to the potential health benefits. Food
safety regulations can be justified either by simply
adopting international standards (i.e., Codex stan-
dards), which are assumed to be unchallengeable, or
by conducting a scientific risk assessment of the health
concerns addressed by the food safety regulation.8
Thus, the SPS agreement represents an effort to pro-
mote transparency in the establishment of food safety
regulations and, if possible, to harmonize regulations
based on sound risk assessment principles. Ultimately,
the goal is to facilitate trade without compromising
consumer protection.
However, the idea that there can be a uniform assess-
ment of how to balance human safety concerns with
“proportionate” impacts on trade can be both problem-
atic and controversial. Some argue that food safety
regulations, particularly standards stricter than those
proposed by Codex, impose unfair economic, and even
safety, burdens on lower-income food exporting coun-
tries. The argument is that such standards limit export
opportunities because compliance is either too costly
or unachievable given a lack of technical capacity,
infrastructure, and food hazard management experi-
ence. Stricter regulations in importing countries are
even cited as an additional health risk burden on the
exporting country population since only the best qual-
ity foods leave the country, leaving commodities with
higher levels of mycotoxin contamination for the
domestic population (Cardwell et al., 2001).
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6 Testing is also provided for processed products such as corn
meal, corn gluten meal, corn/soy blend, popcorn, rice, and other
products governed by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946.
7 It should be noted that the only crop for which Codex has
adopted a mycotoxin standard is peanuts, with a total aflatoxin
(B1+B2+G1+G2) standard of 15 ppb. Codex has also established a
standard for aflatoxin M1 in milk and a 50 ppb standard for the
mycotoxin patulin in apple juice and apple juice ingredients. It is
also considering a proposed maximum of 5 ppb for ochratoxin A
in raw wheat, barley, rye, and derived products.
8 The adoption of stricter standards than those prescribed by the
Codex Alimentarius to achieve a lower level of risk is allowed under
the SPS agreement, but according to Henson and Caswell (1999, p.
599), the setting of national standards are supposed to meet certain
criteria. Risk assessment should involve generally recognized tech-
niques, must be supported by currently available scientific evidence
(or “pertinent information”), must demonstrate that the level of pro-
tection is appropriate given the level of risk that the country aims to
achieve, and must show that actions taken to achieve the desired
level of protection do not impede trade unnecessarily.Economic Impact on
International Trade
The economic losses associated with mycotoxin con-
tamination are difficult to assess in a consistent and
uniform way, and no comprehensive analysis of the
costs to U.S. and foreign crop and livestock producers
is available. The lack of information on the health
costs and other economic losses from mycotoxin-
induced human illness is partly due to the difficulty of
establishing cause-and-effect relationships between the
mycotoxins and the chronic diseases they are sus-
pected of causing. However, with an estimated 25 per-
cent to 50 percent (Miller, 1995) of the world’s food
crops affected by mycotoxins, the economic costs are
likely to be considerable.9 Numerous reports focusing
on different countries/regions, commodities, toxins,
and cost categories (e.g., costs of regulations, testing,
production loss, trade losses) offer some indication of
these losses.
For the United States, one study using FDA sample
data and computer simulations estimated that crop
losses from mycotoxin (aflatoxin, fumonisin, and
deoxynivalenol) contamination of corn, wheat, and
peanuts averaged $932 million annually (CAST,
2003). Additional losses averaging $466 million stem
from efforts to prevent or reduce contamination
(through regulatory enforcement, testing, and other
quality control efforts). In this study, livestock losses
were estimated at only $6 million annually. However,
an earlier report estimated that, in some years, produc-
tion losses to the U.S. poultry and swine industries
have surpassed $100 million (CAST, 1989).
Numerous other reports of economic losses to specific
commodities in selected years—due to complete loss
of the crop value or diversion into discounted markets
such as feed or ethanol use—indicate that for the U.S.,
economic losses from mycotoxins are primarily con-
fined to domestic crop producers and their potential
downstream users, including export markets.10
As for imports into the United States, data on import
refusals by the FDA during 2001 reveal that the pres-
ence of aflatoxins was not a commonly invoked reason
for detaining food product imports into the United
States that year—because contaminated products were
detected and diverted to other uses before exportation,
or perhaps because the U.S. does not import a large
volume of products most susceptible to aflatoxins
(e.g., peanuts or corn). In 2001, there were 1,781
import detentions of cereals (grain) and cereal prod-
ucts (which include consumer-ready processed prod-
ucts), and another 387 detentions of nuts and edible
seeds. However, only 29 of the detentions were due to
aflatoxins, only 4 in the cereal and cereal product cate-
gory. Of the 1,781 detentions in this category, only 52
were due to “naturally occurring” safety concerns
(other than “filth”): 47 detentions for Salmonella, 4 for
aflatoxins, and 1 for Listeria. The majority of deten-
tions were due to labeling or branding issues, or the
presence of unsafe additives.
For developing countries, lost export opportunities to
developed countries—which typically have more strin-
gent mycotoxin limitations—appear significant. The
potential for disruptions to developing-country food
exports resulting from regulatory actions in high income
markets is underscored by the fact that the majority—
nearly 70 percent—of developing Middle East and
African country food exports are destined for high-
income countries.11
In some cases, developing countries have experienced
market losses due to persistent mycotoxin problems or
the imposition of new, stricter regulations by importing
countries. Thailand was once among the world’s leading
corn exporters, regularly ranking among the top five
exporters during the 1970s and 1980s. But partly due 
to aflatoxin problems, Thai corn regularly sold at a 
discount on international markets, costing Thailand
about $50 million per year in lost export value
(Tangthirasunan, 1998). According to FAO estimates,
the direct costs of mycotoxin contamination of corn and
peanuts in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines) amounted to several hundred million dol-
lars annually, with most of the losses accounted for by
corn (Bhat and Vasanthi, 1999). India also saw exports
of peanut meal to the European Union (EU) drop by
more than $30 million a year when the EU imposed
new mycotoxin regulations in the early 1980s (Bhat and
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9 Alternatively, Park et al. (1995) estimate that the actual global
production of commodities at “high risk,” including corn, peanuts,
copra, palm nuts, and oil seed meal, comes to about 100 million
metric tons, a significant but smaller proportion of global produc-
tion than cited by Miller (1995).
10 Some other examples of estimated losses in the U.S. include:
peanuts - $25 million/year (1993-96); cottonseed - $20-$50 per ton
discount (Arizona); barley - $406 million between 1993 and 1998
(Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota); wheat - $300 million (1996) in
Red River Valley (Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota) (Robens, 2001).
11 Otsuki et al., 2001. Data are from the mid-1990s. Only 16 percent
of Middle East and African country food trade was intraregional.Vasanthi, 1999). Total peanut meal imports by the cur-
rent 15 EU member countries fell from over 1 million
tons in the mid-1970s to just 200,000-400,000 tons
annually after 1982. 
Balancing Food Safety Costs and
Benefits From Trade: The Case of EU
Mycotoxin Regulations 
Several recent studies have helped to crystallize the fact
that the setting of tolerance levels for mycotoxins
involves clear, but controversial, tradeoffs between
human health and economic opportunity. One study
measured the potential health impacts on cancer death
rates from the adoption of two alternative standards for
aflatoxin. Motivated by a proposed harmonization of EU
mycotoxin standards at a level lower (more stringent)
than advisory standards set by Codex Alimentarius, sev-
eral other studies looked at the trade impacts of different
aflatoxin standard harmonization scenarios.
In 1997, the JECFA—which provides scientific advice
to Codex—evaluated the potential risks of aflatoxins
and considered the possible impact of two alternative
aflatoxin standards (10 and 20 ppb) on human health.
Two examples were developed, a European diet with 1
percent of the population testing positive for hepatitis
and a Far Eastern diet with 25 percent testing positive
for hepatitis. The JECFA study concluded that, for the
first example (European diet), implementation of a 20-
ppb standard would lead to a risk of 41 cancer deaths
per year per 1 billion persons. Adoption of the lower
10-ppb standard would reduce the risk to 39 cancer
deaths per year per 1 billion persons, or 2 lives per
year for a population of 1 billion persons. The same
change in standards would lower cancer deaths by
about 300 persons per year per 1 billion people for the
Asian diet (and high incidence of hepatitis) scenario
(Herrman and Walker, 1999). 
Also in 1997, the EU proposed a new harmonized stan-
dard for aflatoxins, provoking a number of complaints
by nonmember countries. The proposal recommended
establishing a standard of 4 ppb of total aflatoxins
(B1+B2+G1+G2)—2 ppb for B1 alone—in cereals
(grains), edible nuts, dried and preserved fruits, and
groundnuts (peanuts) intended for direct human con-
sumption. This level represented a stricter standard than
the standards in effect in most EU countries at the time,
and considerably lower than Codex recommendations
and standards in many developing countries (table 6.3).
Codex, for example, has a recommended standard of 15
ppb for total aflatoxins in peanuts, and the average
African standard for peanuts was as high as 44 ppb—14
ppb for aflatoxin B1 (Otsuki et al., 2001).
The originally proposed standard was relaxed for some
categories of use following complaints by Argentina,
Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico,
Pakistan, Peru, and Uruguay. These countries argued
that “the EC [European Commission] requirements not
only departed from the Codex Alimentarius recom-
mendations, but also had considerable social and eco-
nomic impacts on the concerned countries” (WTO,
1998, p. 3). The subsequently proposed standards,
implemented in March 2001 (and amended in 2002),
were nevertheless still more stringent than those previ-
ously in place for eight of the EU countries, and the
standards for cereals and nuts intended for direct
human consumption were not relaxed from the origi-
nally proposed level (Otsuki et al., 2001). 
A widely cited journal article by Otsuki et al. (2001)
found that cereal (and cereal preparations) exports by 9
African countries to the EU during 1998 would have
declined by 59 percent, or $177 million, if the EU had
harmonized their aflatoxin regulations at the proposed
limit and enforced this limit on all shipments.
Alternatively, the adoption of the somewhat more lax
Codex standard by the EU would increase the African
country cereal (and preparations) exports to the EU by
$202 million, a 68-percent increase. For edible nuts and
dried and preserved fruits, the estimated decline in
African exports to the EU would be $220 million (47
percent) if the EU harmonized its regulations at the pro-
posed level, but would increase $66 million (14 percent)
if the Codex standard was adopted.
Another study by the World Bank (Wilson and Otsuki,
2001) broadened the analysis to evaluate the impact on
grain and tree nut trade among 15 importing and 31
exporting countries, including the United States.
Among the countries studied, the uniform adoption of 
a Codex standard of 9 ppb for aflatoxin B1 would
increase cereal and nut trade by $6.14 billion, or more
than 50 percent, compared with the (1998) status quo.12
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12 The study assumes that, for all cereals and nuts, the countries
would adopt standards based on the current Codex advisory stan-
dard for peanuts. The Codex standard for peanuts is 15 ppb for all
aflatoxins combined, but Wilson and Otsuki assume that aflatoxin
B1 comprises, on average, about 60 percent of the total level of
aflatoxin contamination (or about 9 ppb).The impact on the United States would amount to more
than $700 million in increased exports.13
Similarly, adoption of a proposed European Union
standard of 2 ppb for aflatoxin B1 by all countries
included in the study would reduce trade by $6.05
billion, compared with status quo regulations. The
results also show that, since less developed countries
generally have less stringent standards for aflatoxin,
less developed countries that conduct trade with one
another will lose more export opportunities than
developed countries. Under a scenario where all
countries adopt a uniform standard that maintains
global trade at baseline (1998) levels, the distribu-
tion of trade shifts to favor developed-country
exports and reduces less developed country exports
by 10 percent.
Process Standards Complement
Product Standards and Can
Accomplish Similar Goals
The studies cited earlier clearly illustrate that food
safety regulations—particularly product standards such
as specific tolerance levels—have significant economic
consequences, and that different perceptions about
appropriate tradeoffs between health and economic
losses are the source of potential conflict between
countries. With this in mind, what strategies can be
used to diffuse trade frictions, and at the same time
help reduce economic losses from mycotoxin contami-
nation and divergent standards? 
A common method of minimizing food safety risks is
the adoption of good agricultural practices (GAPs) at
the preharvest level and good manufacturing practices
(GMPs) at the processing and distribution stages.
These strategies—implemented independently by pri-
vate groups, or required by public agencies—can be
used to control and minimize risk throughout the pro-
duction, handling, and processing chain. These can
complement product standards, and potentially reduce
overall economic losses. In the United States, for
example, a standard practice among grain processors is
to clean corn before any manufacturing process in
order to sift out broken kernels and screenings that are
more susceptible to mycotoxin infestation. Grain pur-
chasers also conduct a regular program of testing fol-
lowing harvest to determine whether there are any
mycotoxin problems in particular supply areas
(Brenner, 2002).
In its 34th session held in March 2002, a Codex
Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants
(CCFAC) report recommended that GAPs and GMPs
be used to establish formal hazard analysis and critical
control point (HACCP) food safety systems to identify,
monitor, and control mycotoxin risks all along the
food production chain (Codex, 2002). Park et al.
(1999) suggest steps that can be taken at five stages of
food production to lower mycotoxin contamination. At
the preharvest stage, for example, insect control, ade-
quate irrigation, crop rotation, and other practices can
help minimize initial contamination in the field (table
6.4). During storage, properly dried crops should be
protected from moisture, insects and rodents, and
monitored for temperature, moisture, and humidity
changes. Electronic or hand-sorting can be conducted
before processing.
HACCP principles are thus likely to be among the
most effective means of lowering risks and economic
losses, especially since prevention of mycotoxin con-
tamination is widely considered more practicable than
decontamination.14 However, an effective long-term
strategy for controlling and monitoring mycotoxin
risks in developing countries most susceptible to the
problem may require technical assistance from public
agencies and improved adherence to quality control
measures and HACCP principles by private actors. In
India, for example, one report noted that more than
one-quarter of tested corn samples exceeded the Indian
tolerance limit of 30 ppb, and that if Codex standards
were applied, nearly one-half (47 percent) of the sam-
ples would have to be rejected (Van Egmond, 1995, in
Bhat and Vasanthi, 1999)—indicating high levels of
contamination most likely caused by improper drying
or storage.
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13 This compares to a survey-based estimate that places the impact
of “questionable” SPS-related food safety regulations on U.S. agri-
cultural exports at $2.29 billion. Of this, $1.02 billion of the trade
impact was to grain and feed grains, with “the Americas” account-
ing for the major share (69 percent) of the losses, followed by East
Asia (14 percent), Europe (11 percent), and Africa (6 percent). No
information on the specific nature of the SPS barriers was given
(Thornsbury et al., 1997).
14 According to Codex (1997), “to date there has been no wide-
spread government acceptance of any decontamination treatment
intended to reduce aflatoxin B1 levels in contaminated animal
feedingstuffs.”Conclusion
Although not publicly prominent, food safety issues
related to international trade in cereals and grains and
other crops—particularly those pertaining to myco-
toxin regulations—are economically important. Most
countries do recognize that placing standards on the
level of mycotoxins entering the food chain is prudent,
but diverging perceptions of how to balance economic
costs and health benefits have become a source of
trade friction between countries. For export-reliant
developing countries lacking the means to implement
stronger quality control measures, the issue is espe-
cially relevant. 
For several reasons, trade disputes related to the set-
ting of regulatory standards on mycotoxins are likely
to persist. First, mycotoxin contamination is recog-
nized as an unavoidable risk. Codex (2002) notes that,
in the field, many factors that influence the level of
contamination in cereals and grains are environmen-
tally related—such as weather and insect infestation—
and are therefore difficult or impossible to control.
Second, perceptions of tolerable health risks are not
likely to narrow significantly in the near future since
they appear to hinge largely on the level of economic
development and the susceptibility of a nation’s crops
to contamination. Finally, using the precautionary
principle, some countries may set new mycotoxin 
standards which lack internationally accepted risk
assessments.
To minimize the initial risk of mycotoxin contamina-
tion and consequently lessen the likelihood that toler-
ance levels will be exceeded, private sector actors or
public agencies can consider implementing process
standards based on GAPs, GMPs, and HACCP princi-
ples. Developing countries are likely to require techni-
cal assistance and economic support to implement
these strategies.
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Table 6.4—Possible HACCP application stages for agricultural commodities, food products, and animal feeds
Stage Commodity Hazard Corrective action
Preharvest Cereal grains, oil Mold infestation -use crop resistant varieties
seeds, nuts, fruits with subsequent -enforce effective insect control programs
mycotoxin formation -maintain adequate irrigation schedules
-perform good tillage, crop rotation, weed control, etc.
Harvesting Cereal grains, oil  Increase in mycotoxin -harvest at appropriate time
seeds, nuts, fruits formation -maintain at lower temperature, if possible
-remove extraneous material
-dry rapidly to below 10 percent moisture.
Postharvest, Cereal grains, oil Increase and/or -protect stored product from moisture, insects,
storage seeds, nuts, fruits occurrence of  environmental factors, etc.
mycotoxin -store product on dry, clean surface.
Post-harvest, Cereal grains, oil Mycotoxin -test all ingredients added
processing  seeds, nuts, fruits carryover or -monitor processing/manufacturing operation to 
and manufacturing contamination maintain high-quality product
-follow good manufacturing practices.
Animal Dairy, meat  Transfer of mycotoxin  -monitor mycotoxin levels in feed ingredients
feeding and poultry to dairy products, -test products for mycotoxin residues.
products meat and poultry products
Source: Park, Douglas, H. Njapau, and E. Boutrif. “Minimising [sic] Risks Posed by Mycotoxins Utilising [sic] the HACCP Concept.” Third Joint
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S
eafood safety, in relation to international trade,
is particularly important to the United States for
several key reasons. U.S. per capita fish con-
sumption has increased more than 50 percent since
1980 and is projected to continue increasing over the
next 20 years (Blisard et al., 2002). Also, imports’
share of total U.S. fish consumption now accounts for
more than 75 percent of total consumption, compared
with less than 50 percent in 1980. Finally, an increas-
ing number of countries are exporting seafood to the
United States and some of these countries have poor
internal control systems and/or are in tropical areas
where toxin and bacteria hazards are intrinsically
higher (Ahmed, 1991). 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
detains and inspects samples of imported seafood at
the port of entry and refuses adulterated shipments.
The 2001 FDA import detention data for seafood prod-
ucts indicates that out of 130 countries represented, 80
had violations for adulteration (safety, packaging
integrity, or sanitation problems). Detention rates in
terms of value were low, with an average of 0.46
detentions per $1 million of imports. Of the 6,405 vio-
lations, 84 percent were for adulteration, with
Salmonella accounting for 34 percent of all adulter-
ation violations. Shrimp, by far the largest import
item, accounted for one-quarter of all detentions.
Public and private entities are using measures to
ensure safer seafood in addition to end product testing
and inspection. Hazard analysis and critical control
point (HACCP) systems have been implemented
increasingly by private industry for seafood, some-
times voluntarily and sometimes as mandated by
Federal governments. Other actions being taken
include investment in new technologies and equipment
and in identity preservation systems.
As most contamination problems are from Salmonella
in shrimp and prawns, risk reduction efforts theoreti-
cally could be focused on that bacterium. Shrimp is
primarily an aquaculture product, so improvements in
sanitation and production practices perhaps could
make substantial differences in the occurrence and
extent of Salmonella contamination. However, for the
foreseeable future, shrimp will continue to be pro-
duced primarily by developing nations and dominate
seafood trade moving from developing nations to
developed nations (Wessells, 2002). One hurdle is that
many less developed countries have difficulty meeting
developed countries’ quality and safety standards
because of a lack of sufficient funds to invest in qual-
ity control measures, more adequately trained staff,
and expensive equipment (Rahman, 2001). 
Continued growth in international seafood markets
may increase market segmentation where wealthy
countries demand higher valued seafood products with
food safety ensured, while less wealthy countries con-
sume lower value species with fewer safety assurances
(Wessells, 2002). This means that the degree of food
safety could become, to some extent, a source of prod-
uct differentiation.
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Chapter 7
International Trade and 
Seafood Safety
Jane Allshouse, Jean C. Buzby, David Harvey, and David Zorn1
1 Allshouse, Buzby, and Harvey are economists with the Economic
Research Service; Zorn is an economist with the Food and Drug
Administration.Introduction
There have been several major developments affecting
international seafood trade since the 1970s. Most impor-
tantly, during 1976-78, the jurisdiction over coastal
waters by coastal nations was expanded to 200 nautical
miles offshore. This changed which countries imported
or exported particular types of seafood (Wessells and
Wallström, 1994). In essence, while most oceans remain
a common property resource, nations have limited priva-
tization giving them some control over maintaining fish
stocks and determining appropriate levels and proce-
dures for harvest (Wessells and Wallström, 1994). Also,
technological advances in fishery operations have
increased productivity and in turn altered patterns of
trade. These advances have at the same time added pres-
sures on wild fish stocks, which are inherently finite. 
Another development is the considerable growth in
aquaculture to supplement wild harvests. In the United
States alone, aquaculture production increased from 570
million pounds in 1990 to 880 million pounds in 2000
(National Marine Fisheries Service, 2001). Similar
growth can be seen in the aquaculture share of world
fish and seafood production (fig. 7.1). Aquaculture has
caused trade friction in instances where it has led to an
oversupply of certain species, resulting in drastically
reduced prices and charges of “dumping” of product
(e.g., charges by the U.S. International Trade
Commission that Norway dumped salmon into the U.S.
market in 1989). Meanwhile, governments, particularly
in developed countries, are increasingly recognizing the
importance of monitoring the state of aquatic ecosys-
tems and managing human interventions (FAO, 2000).
Two widely publicized marine resource management
examples are import restrictions on tuna harvested with
methods that do not minimize dolphin bycatch and
shrimp harvested in nets without turtle-excluder devices.
Although international disputes for seafood can arise
from different stances on jurisdiction, marine resource
management, and aquaculture, the focus here is on
seafood safety and international trade. In general, coun-
tries are increasingly concerned about seafood safety,
particularly as trading patterns shift among developed
and developing countries.
The United States is one of the world’s largest produc-
ers, exporters, and importers of fish and fishery products.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization’s
(FAO) 2000 statistics, the United States ranked fifth in
terms of volume of overall fisheries production (aquacul-
ture and wild catch together), fourth in terms of volume
of exports, and second in terms of volume of overall
imports. Figure 7.2 shows that the total amount of
seafood imported into the United States has been
increasing over time. At the same time, the level of U.S.
seafood exports has been sustained.
In relation to international trade, seafood safety is par-
ticularly important to the United States for several rea-
sons. First, fish consumption has increased over 50
percent since 1980 and a USDA study projects contin-
ued increases over the next 20 years (Blisard et al.,
2002). Second, the average import share of total U.S.
consumption for fish and shellfish is increasing. It was
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Figure 7.1
World production from capture fisheries 
and aquaculture
Million tons
Source:  FAO, 2000.











Note: Aquaculture quantities prior to 1984 are estimates.
Figure 7.2
Volume of U.S. exports and imports of edible 
seafood, 1991-2001
Billion lbs
Source:  NMFS, 2002.
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556.3 percent in 1990 and 68.3 percent in 2000.
Although there is no evidence that imported food, as a
whole, poses higher food safety risks than domestically
produced food (Zepp et al., 1998), the FDA has less
direct access to food safety information on foreign
seafood production and processing practices. Third, an
increasing number of countries are exporting seafood
to the United States and some of these countries have
poor internal control systems and/or are in tropical
areas where toxin and bacteria hazards are intrinsically
higher (Ahmed, 1991). Fourth, FDA import detentions
for “fishery/seafood products” accounted for almost 27
percent of the total number of detentions in 2001, sec-
ond only to the “vegetable/vegetable products” cate-
gory. Fifth, the large proportion of imported seafood
raises concerns about potential food security concerns.
Our heavy reliance on imported seafood means that any
significant concerns over seafood safety have the
potential to disrupt the flow of trade, reduce supplies to
consumers, and limit sales for producers. Combined,
these factors suggest that ensuring seafood safety is a
task that will become more difficult.
FDA detains and inspects samples of imported seafood
at the port of entry, refuses adulterated shipments,
inspects foreign processors who wish to export to the
United States, and inspects seafood importers in the
United States. The Federal agency that governs fishery
resources is the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) in the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). A brief discussion is presented of some of the
implications for policymakers. Seafood trade, in general,
is complex because of diverse harvest methods, produc-
tion areas, and markets, and because fish is not a homog-
enous commodity (Wessells and Wallström, 1994).
Therefore, seafood safety issues are complex.
U.S. Seafood Exports 
and Imports
In 2000, the U.S. fish and fishery harvest was esti-
mated at 9.1 billion pounds (edible and nonedible),
having peaked in 1993 and 1994 at just over 10 billion
pounds. The domestic catch is composed of a large
number of fish, shellfish, mollusk, and crustacean
species, but a handful of species dominate the catch.
The total landings (catch) of cod, flounder, menhaden,
pollock, salmon, crab, shrimp, and squid accounted for
6.9 billion pounds, or 76 percent of the total catch in
2000.2 The value of this total harvest was estimated at
$3.5 billion (see box 7.1).
The United States is a major producer and exporter
of fish and fishery products, on a value basis, but the
United States imported roughly $6.8 billion more
edible seafood than it exported in 2001: the U.S.
imported $9.9 billion (4.1 million pounds) and
exported $3.2 billion (2.6 million pounds) (NMFS,
2002) (fig 7.3).3 Imports and exports are relatively
similar to the domestic harvest in that a small num-
ber of species dominate the trade picture. Shrimp
products made up the largest single import item.
Imported shrimp products alone were estimated at
883 million pounds and were estimated to be worth
$3.6 billion. The four species next in importance in
terms of import values were tuna ($829 million),
lobster ($728 million), crab ($368 million), and fresh
and frozen salmon ($335 million). This would place
the combined values of these products at $5.9 bil-
lion, or 60 percent of the value of all U.S. fisheries
imports.
In general, seafood trade with the United States is less
restricted than trade for other agricultural products and
has no heavy quotas or duties on imports. The vast
majority of seafood products are tariff free. Probably the
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Figure 7.3
Value of U.S. exports and imports of edible 
seafood, 1991-2001
$ billion
Source:  NMFS, 2002.
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2 Menhaden was probably mostly for industrial uses such as to
make fish oil and meal for poultry feed.
3 In 2001, the United States imported a total of roughly $18.5 bil-
lion in seafood, of which $8.7 billion was for nonedible seafood,
and exported roughly $11.8 billion of seafood, of which $8.6 bil-
lion was nonedible. best example of imports that enter the country with no
tariff is frozen shell-on, head-off shrimp. This is the
most common product form of imported shrimp and
accounted for almost $3 billion in imports in 2001.
Imports of fresh or frozen Atlantic salmon, either as
whole fish or fillets, also enter with no tariff. The high-
est tariff rates on seafood imports were for tuna in an
airtight container in oil (35 percent) and sturgeon
roe/caviar (7.5 percent) (Koplin, 2002). One explanation
for the lack of tariffs or very low tariff rates on most
seafood is that traditionally imported seafood were
products not available from local fishermen or not avail-
able in sufficient quantities. Additionally, restrictions
may have lessened over time due to General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations.
The United States imports seafood from many coun-
tries. The largest suppliers of seafood to the United
States tend to be large producers of the top four
seafood imports by value (i.e., shrimp, crab, salmon,
and tuna). In 2001, Canada and Thailand were by far
the largest suppliers, followed by China, Mexico,
Chile, Vietnam, and Ecuador. Developing countries
supply about half of all seafood exported worldwide
(Sun and Caswell, 2002), and Asia is the leading
region in seafood exports, with 36.5 percent of the
total (Cato, 1998).
U.S. seafood exports are dominated primarily by
shipments of salmon products, surimi, lobster, caviar
(i.e., sturgeon roe), and other roe. U.S. seafood
exports was sold primarily to Japan and Canada.
These two countries accounted for almost 55 percent
of export value in 2001. In particular, Pacific salmon
harvested by the United States and not consumed in
the western States is generally exported in large
quantities to Japan. Meanwhile, the U.S. imports
large amounts of farmed Atlantic salmon from
Canada and Chile for consumption on the East Coast.
Surimi, a processed seafood product, uses pollock as
the major ingredient. The roe exports are a combina-
tion of products from herring, salmon, pollock, sea
urchin, and other species. 
Seafood Safety
Seafood is processed into a wide range of products and
is consumed in many forms (e.g., smoked, canned,
salted, dried, fresh, frozen, and raw). While thorough
cooking destroys most harmful organisms if any are
present, raw oysters and clams have been popular in the
United States and these products have been linked to ill-
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When using monetary values to measure production,
imports, and exports, values are not all estimated at
the same stage of production. Export value is the
“free alongside ship” value, or the value of the prod-
uct at the port of export, based on the sales price
including inland freight, insurance, and other
charges incurred prior to exportation. Production
values are typically ex-vessel prices, that is, the
value of the catch at the dock where the vessel is
offloading. Also, export values per pound from the
United States are usually significantly lower than
import values per pound to the U.S. This is because
the mix of species exported is different than the mix
of species imported, and because the level of pro-
cessing varies. Some of the seafood exported from
the United States is low value-added or low value,
whereas, a large percentage of the seafood imported
to the United States is high value-added (e.g., filets)
or high-value (e.g., shrimp). In fact, a significant
quantity of seafood produced in the United States is
exported to countries with significantly lower labor
costs for processing and then reimported into the
United States for consumption. This is part of the
explanation of how the same country could be both
a major importer and exporter of seafood. Lower
labor costs and manageable transportation costs per-
mit firms to profitably exchange substantial quanti-
ties of seafood in international commerce and still
provide consumers with high quality seafood at
affordable prices.
The other part of the explanation for countries being
both importers and exporters of seafood is that har-
vests of seafood, like that of most agricultural com-
modities, are seasonal. Seafood producers use their
access to international markets to stabilize their rev-
enues. When a given species is in season in one
country, some of the catch can be exported to other
countries where that same species is out of season. 
Therefore, both seafood producers and consumers
have an interest in maintaining open markets for
international trade to provide an almost year-round
supply of seafood to as many potential customers as
possible. If this is to be the case, then issues of
seafood safety must be addressed and controlled as
they arise.
Box 7.1—Measuring the monetary value 
of seafoodness from Vibrio vulnificus and other pathogens.4 The
1998 FDA Food Safety Survey of U.S. adults found that
12 percent said they ate raw oysters (Fein and Riggins,
1998). Most seafood-associated illness reported by U.S.
consumers point to consumption of raw bivalve mollusks
and to unspecified and unknown foodborne illnesses
with Norwalk-like viral gastroenteritis symptoms
(Ahmed, 1991). 
A National Academy of Sciences report indicates that
most of the seafood sold in the United States is whole-
some and unlikely to cause illness (Ahmed, 1991).
However, some unknown portion of the estimated 76
million foodborne illnesses that occur each year in the
United States (Mead et al., 1999) are attributed to
seafood. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), surveillance data for
foodborne disease outbreaks indicates that 6.8 percent of
the 2,751 outbreaks during 1993-97 were attributed to
consumption of shellfish and other fish (Olsen et al.,
2000). However, these data do not capture unreported
outbreaks or sporadic cases of foodborne illness, and so
the true share of foodborne illness due to contaminated
seafood is unknown.
On a global scale, the extent of illness from contami-
nated seafood is high. The World Health Organization
(WHO) estimates that 40 million people become
infected each year from trematode parasites by consum-
ing raw or inadequately processed shellfish, freshwater
fish, and aquatic plants (WHO, 1995). Data are not
available on the extent of foodborne illnesses worldwide
from all types of seafood hazards, which include:
● Bacteria. A number of different bacteria potentially
can be found in seafood. Some examples are Vibrio
parahaemolyticus, Listeria, Salmonella, and
Staphylococcus.
● Viruses. Illnesses from viruses, such as the
Norwalk virus, can be associated with the con-
sumption of shellfish, particularly raw shellfish.
● Toxins. Some naturally occurring toxins can accu-
mulate in fish and mollusks. Examples include
ciguatera found in some large tropical reef fish;
domoic acid found in shellfish and mollusks; saxi-
toxin, also found in shellfish; and histamine in
dolphin (i.e., mahi) and tuna.
● Parasites. A number of fish species are at risk of
having parasites such as roundworms. This normal-
ly becomes a human health problem only when fish
are eaten raw or not fully cooked. The FDA Model
Food Code requires freezing to destroy these organ-
isms in fish for raw consumption.
● Chemicals. Chemicals can be a localized problem
in freshwater species, but can also affect ocean
fish. Chemical contamination can result from local
spills or dumping of pesticides, industrial chemi-
cals, heavy metals, and petroleum products.
In general, many kinds of contamination can affect
both farm-raised and wild-caught seafood. Different
countries allow the use of different vaccines, feed
additives, and antibiotics for farm-raised fish and fish-
ery products and therefore, in some cases, residues
from these production inputs may cause food safety
concerns (FDA, 2001). On the other hand, wild-caught
seafood may be more likely affected by other kinds of
contamination such as from histamine (FDA, 2001).
For the most part, seafood is more perishable than
livestock or poultry. The potential for relatively faster
decomposition gives seafood a shorter shelf life and
makes handling more difficult.
FDA Import Detention 
Data for Seafood
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)
was enacted to protect the health and safety of
Americans and to protect them from mislabeled or
adulterated domestic or imported food products. In
particular, Section 801 directs the FDA to detain any
seafood imports that appear to violate the Act. FDA
may take a “detention action” based on:
(1) Regular detentions, which include shipments
where physical analysis or records show that
the food appears to violate the FFDCA and
other acts enforced by the FDA, or  
(2) Detentions without physical examination
(DWPE), which include:
(a) automatic detentions based on past viola-
tive history of individual processors, countries,
or geographic areas, or 
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4 Although Vibrio vulnificus causes fewer than 50 foodborne ill-
nesses in the United States each year, it has the highest case fatal-
ity rate (39 percent) and second highest hospitalization rate (91
percent) of known foodborne pathogens (Mead et al., 1999). In a
case study, Buzby and Frenzen (1999) analyze product liability
lawsuits associated with Vibrio vulnificus in raw oysters.(b) detentions based on import alerts, which
may cover one or more firms or countries, and
arise from new food safety concerns that are
identified by U.S. officials and perceived to be
a threat to human health. 
DWPE have a substantial deterrent effect on the incen-
tive to ship tainted or suspect seafood into the United
States, and also illustrate food safety concerns of U.S.
officials. DWPE are included in this analysis as they
represent the large majority of detentions.
FDA provided us with monthly data on detentions in 
the form of electronic Import Detention Reports (IDR).
Each IDR provides insight into the range and number of
possible import violations. Here we analyzed FDA
import detention data for “fishery/seafood products”
with each record in the IDR representing one detained
shipment. Each record generally includes data naming
the country, product, product code, product description
(e.g., frozen shrimp), manufacturer, city and state of the
manufacturer, detention type, sample number, and rea-
sons for detention. Some limitations or caveats of the
IDR data for seafood products include:
● Only a small percentage of all seafood imported
into the United States is physically inspected,
meaning that the detention data likely does not cap-
ture all food safety problems. On average, during
1999-2001, less than 1 percent of shipments were
detained for any of the above reasons, and even
fewer were physically sampled for contamination.5
However, the sampling strategies by FDA and other
agencies are designed to focus enforcement and
inspection efforts on areas that have the highest
probability of having a problem (Ahmed, 1991).
● The sample of detentions includes many ship-
ments that are found to pose no food safety prob-
lems and are released so that trade is resumed.
That is, most detained shipments are released with
re-examination, new documentation, or new label-
ing. Other detained shipments are re-exported
elsewhere or destroyed. On average, during 1999-
2001, 78 percent of detained shipments were
released for import into the United States.6 The
large percentage of shipments that are released
after being detained reflects the cautious approach
that FDA takes in protecting human health.
● The FDA data provided to us did not include the
dollar value of detained shipments. 
FDA separates the reasons for seafood detentions into
two main categories, misbranding and adulteration, and
three smaller categories (table 1). Misbranding includes
untruthful labeling or lack of labeling whereas adulter-
ation deals with safety, packaging integrity, or sanitation
problems (Caswell and Wang, 2001). 
In 2001, FDA listed a total of 4,912 detentions for
seafood products, which includes 6,405 violations
(detentions can be for multiple violations). Of the vio-
lations, 83.6 percent were attributed to adulteration,
14.3 percent were for misbranding, and 2 percent for
insanitary manufacturing, processing, or packing. Two
types of adulteration accounted for slightly more than
half of all violations. Salmonella was the most com-
mon violation (34 percent) for adulteration with
seafood coded as “filthy” as the second most common
violation (27 percent) (table 7.1). 
Of the approximately 130 countries that export seafood
products into the United States, 86 had one or more
shipments detained in 2001 and 80 had violations for
adulteration. Although Salmonella was the most com-
mon violation, other potential violations occurred in a
greater number of countries. Salmonella violations
occurred in 42 percent of the countries with detentions,
whereas over 75 percent of countries had products
detained for being “filthy” and 63 percent of countries
had products detained for “no process,” meaning that
the manufacturer had not filed information on its
scheduled process.
Because of this chapter’s emphasis on food safety, the
focus here is on violations for adulteration. The
smaller category titled “insanitary manufacturing, pro-
cessing, or packing” is listed separately in table 7.1,
but is combined with adulteration for the remainder of
this analysis as it also has implications for food safety. 
Table 7.2 breaks down the FDA import detentions for
adulteration by exporting country. The number of
detentions by country is hard to interpret alone
because of the variation in number and magnitude of
shipments from a particular country. Therefore, we
computed detention rates (i.e., the number of FDA
detentions per $1 million imports to the United States)
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5 According to data provided by Mary Snyder of the FDA’s Office
of Seafood, 11,686 import shipments were detained at the port of
entry by FDA out of 1,650,350 line entries during 1999-2001 (or
<1 percent). 
6 Of the 11,686 detained shipments during 1999-2001, 9,120 were
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Table 7.1—FDA violations for detaining fishery/seafood products, 2001
Violation No. of  % of all  Violation description No. of
code violationsviolations countries
Total violations 6,405 100.0 86
Adulteration 5,356 83.6
Salmonella 1,832 28.6 The article appears to contain Salmonella, a poisonous and deleterious  36
substance which may render it injurious to health.
Filthy 1,460 22.8 The article appears to consist in whole or in part of a filthy, putrid, or  62
decomposed substance or be otherwise unfit for food.
No process 683 10.7 It appears that the manufacturer has not filed information on its scheduled  54
process as required.
Insanitary 351 5.5 The article appears to have been prepared, packed or held under  25
insanitary conditions whereby it may have been contaminated with filth,
or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health.
Needs acid/Needs fce 336 5.2 It appears the manufacturer is not registered as a low acid canned food  42
or acidified food manufacturer.
Poisonous 231 3.6 The article appears to contain a poisonous or deleterious substance  38
which may render it injurious to health.
Listeria 170 2.7 The article appears to contain Listeria, a poisonous and deleterious   11
substance which may render it injurious to health.
Histamine 123 1.9 The article appears to contain Histamine, a poisonous and deleterious  11
substance which may render it injurious to health.
Imptrhaccp 41 0.6 The food appears to have been prepared, packed or held under insanitary  5
conditions, or may have become injurious to health, due to the failure
of the importer to provide verification of compliance.
Unsafe col 41 0.6 The article appears to be, or to bear, or contain a color additive which is unsafe. 14
All other violations1 88 1.4 Violations includes those for food that—appears to have been prepared or  46
packed under insanitary conditions, contains excessive sulfites, contains 
or been packed in containers that have poisonous substances, contains 
unsafe food additives, contains unsafe pesticides, has had inadequate processing, 
consists of a filthy, putrid or decomposed substance, contains an off odor, or has 
been held in swollen or leaking containers.
Insanitary manufacturing, processing, or packing
Mfr insan 130 2.0 The article appears to have been manufactured, processed, or packed, 27
under insanitary conditions.
Misbranding 914 14.3
Nutrit lbl 200 3.1 The article appears to be misbranded in that the label fails to bear the required  33
nutrition information.
Lacks firm 140 2.2 The food is in package form and appears to not bear a label containing the 32
name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor.
Usual name 136 2.1 It appears that the label does not bear the common or usual name of the food. 28
List ingre 87 1.4 It appears the food is fabricated from two or more ingredients and the label  29
does not list the common or usual name of each ingredient.
Lacks n/c 84 1.3 The food is in package form and appears to not have a label containing  25
an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure,
or numerical count and no variations or exemptions have been prescribed.
False 70 1.1 The labeling for this article appears to be false or misleading 13
No English 47 0.7 Required label or labeling appears not to be in English. 21
Labeling 46 0.7 The article appears in violation of FPLA because of its placement, form,  21
and/or contentsstatement.
Sulfitelbl 40 0.6 The labeling appears false and misleading because it appears to contain   4
sulfites, but thelabel fails to declare the presence of sulfites, a fact material to 
sulfite-sensitive individuals who must avoid the ingredient.
All other violations1 64 1.0 Violations include those for food that—appears to be offered for sale under  35
the name of another food, appears to contain an unlabeled chemical preservative, 
required labeling is not visible enough, purports to be for special dietary uses and 
its label does not bear required nutritional information, appears to contain additives 
which are not declared on the label, or appears to be represented as a food for which 
a standard of identity has been prescribed and does not appear to conform to that definition.
Note: Two smaller FDA categories not show here. Complete list of violations are available upon request.
1Each individual violation in these groups represent less than 0.5 percent of all violations.
Source: Computed by the authors using FDA Import Detention Reports, January-December, 2001.using census data on the value of imports obtained
from the National Marine Fisheries Service website.7
The top three countries in terms of the number of vio-
lations in 2001 were Vietnam, Thailand, and
Indonesia—all among the top eight exporters of
seafood products to the United States. Vietnam had
580 detentions worth $478 million in exports, resulting
in a rate of 1.21 detentions per $1 million of exports.
This detention rate is almost triple the average for all
countries (0.46). Although Thailand had the second
highest number of detentions (407), it also had the sec-
ond highest value of exports and a detention rate
below average (0.25). Canada, the number one
importer in terms of value, had the lowest detention
rate (0.03). Again, two caveats are that only a small
percentage of products are inspected, and enforce-
ment/inspection efforts are focused on areas with the
highest probability of having a problem. 
An earlier study by Sun (2002) computed the deten-
tion ratios for fishery products by country over 1997-
2000 and found that most ratios remained low.
However, the ratios for some countries, including
Vietnam, fluctuated wildly.
Table 7.3 breaks down the FDA seafood product
detentions for adulteration by class and product. Fish
was the most implicated class, with 45.3 percent of all
detentions. This is not surprising since this category
contains more than 60 types of fish and includes high-
volume products such as tuna and salmon. However,
when looking at individual products, by far, the most
implicated product was shrimp and prawns (marine
plus aquaculture combined), accounting for more than
one-quarter of all detentions. This finding was
expected because shrimp was by far the largest single
import item, with 40 percent of the value of seafood
imports in 2001. 
Table 7.4 looks more closely at the number of violations
in the 2001 FDA detention data to determine the types
of seafood products detained for different reasons.
Shrimp and prawns ranked the highest in terms of the
number of violations for 6 of the top 11 violation codes
for adulteration. In particular, shrimp and prawns
accounted for 58 percent of the Salmonella violations
(fig. 7.4) and 48 percent of the violations for filth.
In summary, out of 130 countries represented in FDA
import detention data, 86 had one or more violations
in 2001 for one or more reasons and 80 of these had
violations for adulteration. Detention rates in terms of
value were low, with an average of 0.46 detentions per
$1 million of imports. Of the 6,405 violations, 83.6
percent were for adulteration, with Salmonella
accounting for 28.6 percent of the adulteration viola-
tions. More than one-quarter of the detentions were for
shrimp and prawns (marine plus aquaculture) which
was expected because shrimp is by far the largest
seafood import item. 
Seafood Safety Incidents
Affecting International Trade
In general, it appears that seafood safety issues have
been less publicized in the media than the food safety
issues linked to some of the other agricultural prod-
ucts covered in this report. Nevertheless, international
disputes over seafood safety have affected trade
opportunities for producers, exporters, and importers.
In 1994, the Spanish government rejected two ship-
ments of squid from the United States. The squid was
found to contain copper in excess of 20 parts per mil-
lion (ppm), which Spain had established as the maxi-
mum allowable amount of copper.8 The 20-ppm level
was advantageous to Spanish squid producers because
Spanish squid naturally has lower levels of copper than
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7 www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/trade/trade_prdct_cntry-com.html, accessed
April 2002. 8 Copper is an essential trace mineral nutrient.
Figure 7.4
U.S. FDA violations for Salmonella, by 
seafood product, 2001











Other—19%squid from other countries. After a few months the dis-
pute was resolved and the U.S. went on to export a
record $16 million of squid to Spain in 1994 (USDA
Foreign Agriculture Service, 1995).
In 1997, the European Commission (EC) banned
shrimp imports from Bangladesh because processing
plants in Bangladesh did not meet EC standards. The
estimated net cost of this August-December 1997 ban
after considering shipments diverted to other countries
was $14.7 million to the Bangladesh frozen shrimp
processing industry (Cato and Lima dos Santos, 1998).
As in many other less developed countries (LDCs),
many plants in Bangladesh have difficulty meeting the
required quality and safety standards because of a lack
of sufficient funds to invest in quality control meas-
ures, more adequately trained staff, and expensive
equipment (Rahman, 2001). The Bangladesh
Department of Fisheries, Fish Inspection, and Quality
Control has verified and certified compliance of
seafood products for only 20 percent of the seafood
processing companies that previously were shipping to
the European Union (EU) (Cato, 1998). This ban
affirms the apprehension of some LDCs that evolving
standards under the WTO will become a major market
access issue (Rahman, 2001).
Since 1997, Kenya and some other countries surround-
ing Lake Victoria have faced a series of food safety-
related restrictions of their fish exports (Henson et al.,
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Table 7.2—FDA import detentions for adulteration of fishery/seafood products versus value of 
imports, 2001
U.S. fishery/ Number of detentions 
Country1 Detentions seafood imports per $1 million imports
Number % of total Mil. dol. % of total Number
Total2 4,431 83.1 9,533.6 93.4 0.46
Vietnam 580 13.1 477.9 5.0 1.21
Thailand 407 9.2 1,607.7 16.9 0.25
Indonesia 366 8.3 382.1 4.0 0.96
Ecuador 321 7.2 392.8 4.1 0.82
India 312 7.0 296.1 3.1 1.05
Taiwan, Republic of China 270 6.1 185.7 1.9 1.45
Philippines 246 5.6 148.1 1.6 1.66
Korea, Republic of (South) 206 4.6 74.1 0.8 2.78
China (Mainland) 150 3.4 659.1 6.9 0.23
Mexico 122 2.8 487.0 5.1 0.25
Japan 114 2.6 120.2 1.3 0.95
Chile 85 1.9 483.4 5.1 0.18
Bangladesh 68 1.5 94.1 1.0 0.72
Brazil 68 1.5 155.4 1.6 0.44
Canada 64 1.4 1,945.4 20.4 0.03
Norway 52 1.2 115.1 1.2 0.45
Nicaragua 40 0.9 81.6 0.9 0.49
Costa Rica 32 0.7 78.4 0.8 0.41
Honduras 30 0.7 123.1 1.3 0.24
Australia 24 0.5 70.1 0.7 0.34
Panama 24 0.5 104.0 1.1 0.23
Venezuela 21 0.5 118.7 1.2 0.18
Iceland 20 0.5 151.7 1.6 0.13
Argentina 19 0.4 105.1 1.1 0.18
Russia 19 0.4 215.4 2.3 0.09
Guyana 10 0.2 58.4 0.6 0.17
New Zealand 9 0.2 112.2 1.2 0.08
Fiji 5 0.1 57.3 0.6 0.09
1 Includes only countries with at least 0.5 percent of total imports. Complete list of countries available upon request.
2 Excludes import detentions from U.S. territories included in tables 7.1, 7.3, and 7.4.
Source: Computed by the authors using FDA Import Detention Reports, January-December, 2001 and National Marine Fisheries Service,
Foreign Trade Information website: http://www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/trade/trade_prdct_cntry.html, accessed April 2002.2000). Salmonella contamination in Nile perch from
Kenya in April 1997 led to border testing of all Nile
perch consignments. Later, a cholera epidemic in East
Africa in December 1997 resulted in a European
Commission ban of imports of fresh fish products
from Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda until
June 1998. The World Health Organization and Food
and Agriculture Organization issued statements that
the ban was not scientifically justifiable and the
restrictions were lifted in June 1998. For Mozambique
alone, the ban resulted in a loss of $60,000 in trade per
month while the ban was in place, which means that
about 30 tons of fish were not traded to the European
Union market (Cato, 1998). Following reports of pesti-
cide poisoning of fish from Lake Victoria, another
round of restrictions began in April 1999 that prohib-
ited all fish exports from Lake Victoria to the EU
(Henson et al., 2000). As a result of these events,
employment in the sector declined and industrial fish
processing companies reduced capacity or closed
(Henson et al., 2000).
In January 2002, the EU suspended shrimp and prawn
imports (and other products of animal origin) from
China because of residues from a banned antibiotic,
chloramphenicol, and because of general deficiencies
in the Chinese residue control system (McGovern,
2002). This antibiotic is used in some animal and
seafood feed to control disease. It has been linked to
fatal leukemia and anemia in humans. The FDA
response was to step up surveillance for chlorampheni-
col residues and residues of other unapproved aquacul-
ture drugs in shrimp and crayfish imports from all
countries and to modify its testing methods so as to be
able to detect the antibiotic at 0.3 part per billion,
equal to that of Canada and the EU. Products with
118 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA
Table 7.3—FDA import detentions for adulteration of fishery/seafood products, by class and 
product, 2001
Class and product Number of  Percent of total  Number of 
detentions detentions countries
Total 4,451 100.0 80
Fish 2,016 45.3 73
Tuna (Albacore, Yellowfin, Skipjack, etc.) 367 8.2 27
Swordfish 224 5.0 37
Sardines (Brisling, Sprats, Pilchards, etc.) 171 3.8 32
Mahi Mahi 122 2.7 11
Mackerel 104 2.3 26
Salmon (Humpback, Silver, King Sockeye, etc.) 95 2.1 17
Milkfish 94 2.1 3
Other1 839 18.8 55
Crustaceans 1,308 29.4 41
Shrimp and prawns 1,043 23.4 35
Crab 126 2.8 14
Lobster 120 2.7 10
Other2 19 0.4 7
Aquaculture harvested fishery/seafood products 413 9.3 20
Shrimp and prawns 365 8.2 13
Other3 48 1.1 11
Shellfish4 224 5.0 31
Other fishery products5 222 5.0 36
Other aquatic species6 226 5.1 18
Mixed fishery/seafood products7 37 0.8 13
Engineered seafood8 5 0.1 2
1 Includes anchovy, barracuda, bass, blue fish, bonito, bream, carp, catfish, cod, corvina, croaker, cusk, dace, eel, escolar, filefish, flounder,
gourmay/gourami, groupers, hake, halibut, herring, jack, kingfish, marlin, mud fish, mullet, perch, pike, pickerel, pollack/pollock, pompano, puffer,
rockfish, suary, scad, shark, sheatfish, smelt, snake head, snapper, sole, spot fish, tilapia, totoava, trout, turbot, wahoo, white fish, whiting, yel-
lowtail, and other products not classified. 2 Includes crayfish, langostino, and other products not classified. 3 Includes catfish, clams, frogs, mus-
sels, oysters, salmon, tilapia, and other products not classified. 4 Includes abalone, arkshells, clams, cockles, conch, conchmeat, mussels, oys-
ters, scallops, and other products not classified. 5 Includes caviar/roe, fish maw, fish paste, fish sauce, gefilte fish, shark fin, and other products
not classified. 6 Includes cuttlefish, frog legs, octopus, sea cucumber, sea urchin, snails, squid, and other products not classified. 7 Includes
chowders, stews, bisques, hors d'oeuvres, salads, stuffed pastas, tuna sandwiches, and other products not classified.8 Includes crab and surimi
used for imitation crab and other products not classified.
Source: Computed by the authors using FDA Import Detention Reports, January-December 2001.detectable levels of chloramphenicol will be detained
and refused entry into the United States (FDA Press
Release, 2002.). Also, the U.S. temporarily suspended
shrimp imports from China. 
Although some of these seafood safety incidents
appear to have resulted in relatively limited and short-
term interruptions of trade and economic impacts,
costs could continue to accrue from continued market
diversions (i.e., lost market share), loss of momentum
in the sector, decreased prices, and reduced capacity
due to temporary or permanent plant closures. The
above examples illustrate that food safety restrictions
can act as barriers to trade as they can for any type of
food. Despite the advantages of some developing
countries in terms of preferential trading arrangements,
food safety incidents can impose costly requirements
on developing countries beyond their ability to afford
compliance (Henson et al., 2000).
Public and Private Actions To
Ensure Safer Seafood
Federal regulation of seafood imports has tended to
focus on end product testing and inspection, except for
where memoranda of understanding (MOU) are in
place (Ahmed, 1991, p. 15).9 More recently, HACCP
systems have been increasingly implemented by pri-
vate industry for seafood, sometimes voluntarily and
sometimes as mandated by governments. HACCP
plans generally follow seven steps: conduct a hazard
analysis; identify critical control points (CCP) for
physical, biological, and chemical hazards; establish
critical limits for preventative measures associated
with each CCP; establish CCP monitoring require-
ments; determine and perform corrective actions;
establish recordkeeping systems; and conduct verifica-
tion procedures. This system has become one of the
more common public actions used to ensure safer
seafood, particularly in developed countries. 
Canada was the first country to establish a mandatory
food inspection program for fish and fishery products
based on HACCP principles. In 1992, Canada adopted
the Quality Management Program (QMP) whereby all
federally registered fish processing establishments in
Canada must implement a system of procedures,
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Table 7.4—FDA violations for adulteration of fishery/seafood products by reason for contravention 
and main products detained, 2001




Salmonella 1,832 Shrimp/prawns, 58%; lobster, 5%; milkfish and tilapia, each 4%; oysters and squid, 
each 3%.
Filthy 1,460 Shrimp/prawns, 48%; tuna, 11%; mahi mahi, 7%; crab 4%,  conch/conchmeat, 3% .
No process 683 Sardines, 20%; tuna, 17%; mackerel, 7%; herring, 5%; salmon and shrimp/prawns, 
each 4%; anchovy, clams, and octopus, each 3%.
Insanitary 351 Shrimp and prawns, 69%; crab, 4%.
Needs acid/Needs fce 336 Tuna, 18%; sardines, 17%; herring, 8%; mackerel, 7%; crab, 6%; anchovy and 
shrimp/prawns, each 5%; snails, 4%.
Poisonous 231 Swordfish, 87%.
Listeria 170 Salmon, 17%; fish roe/caviar, 14%; crab and shrimp/prawns, each 11%; pollack, 10%.
Histamine 123 Mahi mahi, 53%; tuna, 32.
Imptrhaccp 41 Milkfish, 39%; tuna and groupers, each 17%.
Unsafe col 41 Shrimp/prawns, 29%; seafood salad, 17; fish roe, 12%.
Mfrhaccp 32 Shrimp/prawns, 41%; tuna, 34%.
Other 56 Shrimp/prawns, 34%; swordfish, 9%; anchovy and milkfish, each 5%.
Insanitary manufacturing, processing, or packing
Mfr insan 130 Anchovy and clams, each 12%; oysters, 12%; mackerel, 7%; mussels and pollack, 
each 6%.
Note: See table 7.1 for definitions of violation codes.
Source: Computed by the authors using FDA Import Detention Reports, January-December, 2001.
9 FDA has had other programs in place for a long time to address
food safety issues, such as the low acid canned food regulations to
reduce the risk of botulism.inspections, and records. Meanwhile, importers who
wish to be in product compliance with federal regula-
tions may develop a quality management system and
provide details through a Quality Management
Program for Importers (QMPI) submission to the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA, 2002). 
In 1991 and 1994, the European Commission adopted
regulations concerning health conditions for produc-
tion and marketing of fishery products, and again
these were roughly based on HACCP principles
(FAO, 2000). In 1995, the FDA promulgated a
HACCP program for fish and fishery products stipu-
lating that importers of seafood to the United States
must meet the same HACCP standards as U.S seafood
processors (Federal Register, Dec. 18, 1995). Since
then, other developing and developed countries have
made similar initiatives. The level of U.S. seafood
exports has been sustained despite the U.S. HACCP
regulation for fish and fishery products. This means
that increased seafood regulation need not have a sig-
nificant detrimental effect on international seafood
trade at the current levels of production. Although
higher safety standards raise seafood production costs,
the increasing worldwide demand for high-quality
seafood has offset these cost increases (Sun and
Caswell, 2002).10
Inspection protocols and regulatory limits for contami-
nants vary tremendously across countries (Ahmed, 1991,
p. 15), and HACCP systems vary as well. For example,
the EU regulations apply to the whole production chain
whereas the U.S. seafood HACCP regulations apply
only to processors (FAO, 2000). WHO/FAO Codex
Alimentarius incorporated HACCP in its general guide-
lines in 1997, thus creating a starting reference for trade
disputes under the WTO Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (FAO, 2000). 
Meanwhile, private industry may invest in new tech-
nologies and equipment that ensure safer food and
may take certain measures to reduce food safety risk
(which may or may not be part of HACCP systems)
such as rapid cooling, irradiation, proper processing,
and good temperature control at all stages of the pro-
duction and distribution chain. Additionally, some
companies voluntarily test for Vibrio, histamine, or
other contaminants. The leading trade association for
fish and seafood products in the United States is the
National Fisheries Institute, founded in 1945. One
component of their mission is food safety education
for the seafood industry, which includes scientific and
technical information on key issues such as HACCP,
irradiation, mandatory recalls, mercury, and voluntary
seafood inspection services. 
Identity preservation is another means of ensuring
safety, one that is attracting attention in the interna-
tional trade arena. Under an identity preservation sys-
tem, information about the origin of a “lot” of food
follows that lot from harvest all the way to the con-
sumer. An identity preservation system has been in
place since 1925 for molluscan shellfish harvested in
the United States. This system is under the auspices
of the National Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP).
The NSSP is a Federal, State, and industry voluntary
cooperative program that relies on regulatory controls
by State shellfish authorities to ensure safe molluscan
shellfish. Among other requirements, the NSSP
requires that containers of raw shellfish have identity
tags that stay with the shellfish from harvest to sale to
the consumer. The tags must include the identity of
the shellfish harvester/dealer and the date and location
of harvest. Lot identity of the shellfish must be main-
tained throughout the production and marketing chain.
The identity preservation system has been very help-
ful to authorities in the control of foodborne illness.
But it is not a complete solution to the seafood safety
problem. Tags may be lost or switched and the exis-
tence of tags does not control pathogens and other
hazards. Other regulations include certification of
domestic and international growing waters for
bivalves to be consumed in the United States. Many
foodborne illnesses each year are still associated with
consumers eating raw molluscan shellfish in the
United States. 
Regulations for other forms of labeling (e.g., country-
of-origin labeling) may be motivated more by con-
cerns other than food safety. For example, as of
January 2002, an EC regulation requires seafood and
fish products to be labeled with information on the
harvest area, harvest water type, commercial species
name, and whether the product was cultivated or wild.
This regulation will help government officials police
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10 More significant are the differential effects that safety standards
have across countries that supply seafood to the U.S. market. Sun
and Caswell (2002) indicate both positive and negative effects on
volume exported to the U.S. in excess of 30 percent for different
seafood exporting nations. Both developed and developing coun-
tries experienced sizable negative effects. While large positive
effects were mainly experienced by developed nations, smaller
positive effects were experienced by some developing nations (Sun
and Caswell, 2002).the Common Fisheries Policy and to help inform con-
sumers (WorldCatch, 2001).11
Currently, U.S. Customs requires importers to provide
documents that include the country of origin for seafood
products. Some specific seafood products additionally
are labeled as either farm-raised or wild harvest.12 In the
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,
Section 10816 contains two new labeling requirements
pertaining to seafood. The first requirement is that
seafood must have country-of-origin labels.13 The sec-
ond requirement is that the labeling has to distinguish
between farm-raised and wild harvest seafood products.
Implications for 
Policymakers
This chapter has three main conclusions, some of
which have implications for policymakers.
Point 1: Salmonella is a potential target for risk reduc-
tion efforts.
The FDA detention data showed that Salmonella was the
most common contaminant resulting in adulteration of
fish and fishery products. Interestingly, the meat and
poultry chapters of this report also found that Salmonella
was a key food safety concern for those products and the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention out-
break data show that Salmonella was the most common
cause for bacterial foodborne disease outbreaks in pro-
duce during 1993-97.14 Therefore, Salmonella might be
a food safety problem to target for increased risk-reduc-
tion efforts in food production, particularly given that
Salmonella is a leading cause of foodborne illness in the
United States and worldwide. 
Point 2: Most Salmonella contamination detentions
are for shrimp. 
As most Salmonella contamination in fish and fishery
products are with shrimp, risk reduction efforts could
be focused here. And, as over one-quarter of shrimp
production is from aquaculture, improvements in sani-
tation and production practices could perhaps make
substantial differences in the occurrence and extent of
Salmonella contamination. But this won’t solve all the
problems because unlike meat and poultry, where
Salmonella may be a naturally occurring bacteria in
the animals’ digestive tracts, for seafood, Salmonella
contamination is often due to cross-contamination
introduced later during the processing stage.
However, for the foreseeable future, shrimp will con-
tinue to be produced primarily by developing nations
and dominate seafood trade from developing nations to
developed nations (Wessells, 2002). Many less devel-
oped countries may have difficulty meeting the
required quality and safety standards because of a lack
of insufficient funds to invest in quality control meas-
ures, more adequately trained staff, and expensive
equipment (Rahman, 2001). 
Point 3: International seafood markets will continue
to expand and become increasingly segmented.
The FAO report The State of the World Fisheries and
Aquaculture (2000) predicts that international trade of
fish and fishery products will grow in two ways. First,
fish processing in developing countries will increase
due to its attractiveness as an employment-generating
opportunity for low-wage workers, particularly in dis-
placed fishing communities, and due to the increased
demand for value-added fishery products. Second,
developing countries increasingly will become impor-
tant markets for these products. Fish is becoming a
greater source of animal protein around the world—
average annual per capita fish consumption has
increased from 9 kilograms in the early 1960s to 16
kilograms in 1997 (FAO, 200).
The FAO report (2000) also predicts that by 2030,
more than 50 percent of fish supplies will be from
aquaculture and that imports will account for an
increasing share of consumption in wealthy countries.
In the United States, the average import share of fish
and shellfish consumption increased from 56.3 percent
in 1990 to 68.3 percent in 2000. In general, an increas-
ing share of imports means that wealthy countries will
likely want to remove most trade barriers so that these
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11 The Common Fisheries Policy is the system of quotas and tariffs
that the EU uses to manage fisheries and aquaculture issues from
harvest to consumption.
12 The term “wild harvest” fish means naturally born or hatchery-
raised fish or shellfish that are harvested in the wild. The term
“wild fish” excludes net-pen aquaculture, primarily salmon, or
other farm-raised fish.
13 To be labeled as a product of the U.S., farm-raised fish have to
be hatched, raised, and processed in the U.S. For wild fish to be
labeled as a product of the U.S., it must be harvested in U.S.
waters or a U.S. territory and it must also be processed in the U.S.
or a territory of the U.S.
14 The caveats about outbreak data apply here as well: the data do
not capture unreported outbreaks or sporadic cases of foodborne
illness.products will become less expensive (FAO, 2000).
However, wealthy countries also tend to want higher
levels of food safety and tend to be willing to pay
more for food safety. In the future, we may see greater
evidence of market segmentation where wealthy coun-
tries such as the United States, Japan, and EU mem-
bers demand higher valued seafood products with food
safety ensured, while less wealthy countries consume
lower value species (e.g., carp) with fewer safety
assurances (Wessells, 2002). This means that the
degree of food safety could become, to some extent, a
source of product differentiation.
Governance over marine resources is complex because
of intersecting goals arising out of concerns for food
safety, marine resource management, worker safety,
and market access.15 In particular, food safety disputes
often require a delicate balancing between the costs of
mitigating human health risks and benefits of open
trade. Trade for seafood is particularly complex
because of the large number of species traded, coun-
tries involved, and production processes used. 
HACCP as an international trade standard for ensuring
safe seafood will continue to evolve and be adopted by
more governments. And, if countries develop similar
HACCP requirements for seafood, this will facilitate
trade. Currently, the United States does not have
equivalence agreements with other countries for
HACCP for seafood products, partly because they are
difficult to achieve. Therefore, we have limited reach
or control over the actual practices used by seafood
importers into the United States, and there will con-
tinue to be special challenges that arise from seafood
trade between developed and developing countries.
122 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA
15 The most dangerous occupation in the world is fishing at sea
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T
he Belgian dioxin crisis began in January 1999
when animal feed in Belgium was contaminated
with cancer-causing dioxin and polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs). Dioxin-contaminated feed was then
fed to chicken, swine, and other food animals, subse-
quently affecting a large array of agricultural indus-
tries and temporarily interrupting trade with the United
States and more than 30 other countries.2 This chapter
provides some analysis of agricultural exports and pro-
duction effects of the crisis. It complements previous
chapters by providing an example of a food safety 
crisis that resulted from an isolated event involving a
persistent organic pollutant and that affected a wider
range of food sectors than most other food safety
issues. 
Belgium-Luxembourg exports were adversely affected
by the crisis in the short run. Export growth rates for
the decade prior to the crisis were positive for five key
agricultural categories (eggs, dairy products, swine
products, poultry products, and “other” meat prod-
ucts). However, the percentage change in the growth
rate between 1998 and 1999, representing the shortrun
effects of the crisis, dropped and became negative for
eggs, swine products, and dairy products, with the
largest decline for “other meat” products (-32.1 per-
cent). Although the growth rate for poultry products
also fell dramatically, it remained positive at 2.3 per-
cent during 1998-99.
The dioxin contamination originated in animal feeds,
yet other production sectors were far more affected in
percentage terms. This study use Belgium-Luxembourg
monthly production data from the Belgian Ministry of
Economic Affairs, National Institute of Statistics (NIS)
(1999). Poultry meat products, meat and meat products,
and slaughtering of cattle were especially hit hard by
the crisis, Other product categories such as fish and fish
products, actually benefited as buyers switched to prod-
ucts not implicated in the contamination. Feed produc-
tion even increased slightly in July 1999 due to a
temporary slaughter ban that initially kept many animals
on the farms. 
Dioxin and/or PCB contamination in feed has occurred
in several countries since the Belgian dioxin crises,
though to a lesser extent. This crisis was a large-scale,
isolated event and did not represent an ongoing or
evolving food safety problem. One challenge illus-
trated by the 1999 crisis is the fine balance between
gathering sufficient information on such an event (e.g.,
source, cause, human and animal health risks) and the
timely and accurate release of information to the pub-
lic and to trading partners. Overcoming this challenge
will be important for governments and implicated
industries in order to minimize damage to food mar-
kets and maintain consumer confidence in both the
food supply and in governments’ ability to handle food
safety crises.
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Chapter 8
The Belgian Dioxin Crisis and 
Its Effects on Agricultural 
Production and Exports
Jean C. Buzby and Ram Chandran1
1 Authors are economists with the Food and Rural Economics
Division of the Economic Research Service.
2 The terms “swine” and “swine products” are used hereinafter
instead of “hogs” or “pork products” in order to be consistent with
the category names used in the Belgian data.Introduction
The Belgian dioxin crisis exemplifies a food safety
crisis that: (1) arose from a large-scale, isolated con-
tamination event as opposed to an ongoing or evolv-
ing problem, (2) involved a persistent organic
pollutant as opposed to other food safety hazards,
such as pathogens, (3) adversely affected multiple
agricultural sectors and countries importing from
these sectors, and (4) may have been the result of
some form of deliberate contamination. Shortly after
the Belgian government announced the crisis in late
May 1999, the media alleged that the contamination
was the result of the deliberate or accidental use of
motor oil or some other industrial oil in an animal
fat mixture (Lok and Powell, 2000). However, the
Belgian government has not provided an official
confirmation of the source of the contamination or
how it occurred (Lok and Powell, 2000). A more
recent and scientific article attributes the crisis to a
fat mixture made with mineral oil containing
PCBs—“most likely oil from discarded transformers
originating from a waste recycling center” (van
Larebeke et al., 2001). Because the public announce-
ment of the crisis occurred at one point in time, it is
possible to compare Belgian food production and
trade before and after the crisis. However, this chap-
ter is not meant to be a report of a comprehensive
economic analysis.
Background on Dioxin
Dioxin is a general term for hundreds of chemicals
that are highly persistent in the environment. Dioxins
are created as a byproduct of chemical processes.
Some are created from natural causes such as forest
fires and volcanic eruptions; dioxins can be found
throughout the natural world (in soil, water, and air,
for example). Accidental and uncontrolled fires at
landfills also add to dioxin levels. Exhaust emissions
and processes such as pulp and paper bleaching, incin-
eration, and the manufacturing of steel, chemicals, and
paint also release dioxins and contaminate the environ-
ment (EC, July 20, 2001). Absorbed dioxins accumu-
late in body tissue and pose cancer and other human
health risks—in general, the higher up the food chain,
the greater the accumulation (WHO, 1999). Any diox-
ins released into the environment can accumulate over
time in human and animal fatty tissue (EC, July 20,
2001). Contamination with polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) is often accompanied by dioxin contamination
so both are often evaluated together.3 The U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) website provides
extensive information on dioxins.4
Studies suggest that 80 percent (EC, July 20, 2001) to
95 percent (preliminary EPA estimate, 1994) of human
exposure to dioxin is through the food supply, prima-
rily through the dietary intake of animal fats from
meat, poultry, and dairy products. At least in the
United States, human exposure has also occurred his-
torically from industrial accidents and from working in
industries that produce dioxin as a byproduct, or
through drinking contaminated breast milk. Dioxin in
feed is thought to be the main contributing factor to
the dioxin level in food from animals and animal prod-
ucts, though animals can also be exposed through con-
taminated soil, air, and water (EC, July 20, 2001).
There is no international agreement on target levels for
several reasons, including analytical method difficul-
ties, lack of data (e.g., typical levels), and the lack of a
clear distinction as to what level of dioxin is consid-
ered as “safe.” However, the World Health
Organization has elaborated a “tolerable daily dose.”
Consumers have only a limited ability to restrict their
exposure to foodborne dioxins (e.g., consuming low-
fat dairy products and trimming fat from meat) and
therefore national governments have essential roles in
monitoring food safety and acting to protect public
health (WHO, 1999). In general, dioxin contamination
comes from either “background” contamination from
the sources previously described or from specific, iso-
lated incidents, which are rare. In July 1997, U.S.
agencies found elevated levels of dioxin in some
chicken, eggs, farm-raised catfish, and animal feed
(FDA, March 13, 2003). A lengthy investigation
traced the source of this incident to feed produced
with “ball clay” from one Mississippi mine. The clay
was used as an anticaking agent in soybean meal and
has since been prohibited by FDA from use in any
animal feed.
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3 PCBs are fluids that used to be used as transformers and insula-
tors in some industrial settings in the United States. PCBs are
more readily measurable, though dioxins drive health concerns.
For simplicity, the term “dioxin” is sometimes used to cover both
dioxin-like PCBs and dioxins.
4 The Interagency Working Group on Dioxin (IWG) has developed
very detailed information about dioxins on their website and this
covers four topics: (1) general information about dioxins, (2)
overview of the draft EPA dioxin report, (3) food safety questions
and answers, and (4) risk assessment questions and answers.
www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/dioxinqa.htmlGovernments move quickly to stop dioxin contamination
at the source if the source can be identified and removed.
Countries have different ways of dealing with contami-
nation, though both the United States and European
Union have stringent laws for industrial sources that are
driven by what technology can control (Winters, 2002).
The European Commission (EC), the EU’s governing
body, recommends an overall strategy to reduce expo-
sure to dioxins, including actions that reduce dioxin lev-
els in the environment, animal feed, and food, with
emphasis given to the sources of major importance (typi-
cally fish oil and fish meal) (EC, July 20, 2001).
Although, in principle, a similar broad-based strategy is
followed in the United States, the EU has set regulatory
limits for dioxin in food whereas the U.S. doesn’t have
such limits because of concerns about lack of scientific
basis. Some countries seek dioxin testing certification
which is very expensive and only available from private
sources (FAS, 2003).
Efforts to reduce dioxins over the past two decades have
resulted in a downward trend in dioxin exposure for
Europeans (EC, July 20, 2001). Similarly, dioxin levels
in the U.S. environment have declined since the 1970s.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), State
governments, and industry are working together to
reduce the production of manmade dioxins (FDA,
July/Aug. 2000).
The Belgian Dioxin Crisis
The Belgian dioxin crisis began in January 1999,
quickly spread across national borders, and had serious
trade impacts. The crisis occurred when 60-80 tons of
fat used in animal feed in Belgium was contaminated
with almost 1 gram of cancer-causing dioxin and 40-
50 kilograms of PCBs (van Larebeke et al., 2001). The
contamination occurred when a fat smelting company
added dioxin-contaminated oil to a mixture of fats for
later use as a feed ingredient. This contaminated fat
was then purchased by at least 10 feed mills and was
used to make approximately 500 tons of contaminated
animal feed—versus over 28,000 tons/week average
production and use of feed in Belgium (van Larebeke
et al., 2001). The contaminated feed was distributed
mostly to poultry farms but also to rabbit, calf, pig,
and cow breeding and raising farms in Belgium, with
some distributed to Germany, France, and the
Netherlands (van Larebeke et al., 2001). In Belgium
alone, 746 pig farms, 445 poultry farms, 393 bovine
farms, and 237 dairy farms used feed from the 10 pro-
ducers of contaminated feed (van Larebeke et al.,
2001). The following chronology of the crisis is abbre-
viated from a description in Lok and Powell (2000),
which was based primarily on a 1999 Belgian govern-
ment website:
● January 18-19, 1999—Fat mixture was contami-
nated with dioxin at Verkest, a fat and oil process-
ing plant.
● End of January 1999—Contaminated fat was sup-
plied to feed manufacturers and used to make feed,
which was sold to broiler chicken, egg, pork, and
beef producers.
● During February 1999—An animal feed manufac-
turer, the Da Brabender firm, noticed problems
with hens used to produce 1-day old chicks.5
● March 3, 1999—Da Brabender notified their insur-
ance company and this led to an investigation by Dr.
Destickere, a veterinarian [and head of the West
Flanders Inspectorate]. 
● Next 2 weeks in March 1999—Dr. Destickere con-
cluded that the most likely source of the problem
was the fat in animal feed.
● March 18, 1999—Da Brabender sent a sample of
suspect animal feed produced in January 1999 for
analysis. 
● March 19, 1999—Da Brabender notified the
Belgian Ministry of Agriculture.
● A few days later—The Belgian government began
investigating and testing.
● April 21, 1999—Dr. Destickere reported his suspi-
cions about dioxin as the source to the Belgian
Ministry of Agriculture.
● April 26, 1999—Test results found high dioxin
concentrations in feed and chicken fat samples.
● May 26, 1999—Test results found high dioxin lev-
els in breeding eggs for hatching and in mother
hens on farms that purchased from suspect feed
manufacturers. This meant that there were high
levels of dioxin in eggs and chicken on the market
in April.
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5 The media reported that the first signs of contamination detected
by poultry farmers included direct biological health effects such as
hens laying fewer eggs or not thriving, nervous system problems in
chicks, and a declining ratio of hatched eggs.● May 27, 1999—The Belgian Ministry of
Agriculture notified the public and the European
Commission (EC) about the situation.
On May 28, 1999, Belgium banned the domestic sale
of all Belgian-produced chicken, meat, and eggs, with-
drawing these products from retail stores (Ashraf,
1999). Later the Belgian government widened the list
of products potentially contaminated with dioxin
(FAS, June 7, 1999). As a result of the crisis, more
than 200 butcher shops closed temporarily in Belgium
and consumers rushed to buy organic eggs and other
products that were not suspect (FAS, June 7, 1999).
Lok and Powell (2000) detail the actions the Belgian
government took to mitigate and resolve the crisis.
On June 4, 1999, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) issued an import bulletin to
detain certain products at the port of entry. On June 11,
1999, FDA issued an import alert (No. 99-24) to detain
certain products at ports of entry until importers pro-
vided lab test results showing that shipments were free
of detectable levels of PCBs and/or dioxins (FDA, June
11, 1999). Products in this initial import alert included
eggs, products containing eggs, game meats from
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, all animal feeds
and feed ingredients, and pet foods from all European
countries (FDA, June 11, 1999). This list was later
expanded to include milk-containing products such as
soups and cheese (FDA, June 23, 1999). The Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) also issued import
alerts and took subsequent actions. The U.S. import
alerts from this crisis were canceled in early 2000 (per-
sonal communication with FDA on Sept. 21, 2000).
Within 2 to 3 weeks of the May 27 announcement,
more than 30 countries issued different combinations
of temporary consumer advisories, import bans, and
import alerts of potentially contaminated foods and
animals from Belgium, select EU countries, or the EU
as a whole (Lok and Powell, 2000).6 More products
were added to the lists of suspected products as the
crisis unfolded (e.g., chocolates) (Lok and Powell,
2000). Much later, the EU raised objections to the
emergency measures of nine of its trading partners
who maintained restrictions on animal products when
these actions were no longer justified in the view of
EU officials (see chapter 3). 
As dioxin risks are long-term health hazards and hard
to detect and attribute to specific causes, it will take
time to determine if international measures to mitigate
the crisis were successful in terms of protecting human
health: to date, no human illnesses have been linked to
this incident. Van Larebeke et al. (2001) estimate that
the stochastic incremental cancer risk associated with
the Belgian PCB and dioxin crisis varies between 44
and 8,316 cancer deaths in the Belgian population
(roughly 10 million). They caution that huge uncer-
tainties exist with their estimates, such as the patho-
genic potency of the PCBs and dioxin.
Estimated Economic Impacts
of the Belgium Dioxin Crisis
Ideally, an economic analysis of the Belgium dioxin
crisis would require careful evaluation of the: (1)
domestic products that are directly and indirectly
affected by the contamination, (2) agricultural sectors
providing these products to domestic and international
markets, and (3) shortrun and longrun effects of the
crisis. For example, costs from the crisis would
include costs from new regulations for feed ingredi-
ents. However, it would be difficult to estimate these
costs as BSE and foot and mouth disease also likely
contributed to such legislation (FAS, 2003). Because
of data availability and the more descriptive goals of
this chapter, we focus here almost exclusively on the
direct effects of the crisis on Belgian food production
and exports in select markets or sectors. 
Estimated Impact on Exports
To analyze the impact of the Belgian dioxin crisis on
Belgium-Luxembourg exports of agricultural products,
we aggregated data from the United Nations Statistics
Division on agricultural products into five product cat-
egories: dairy, swine, “other meat” (i.e., nonswine and
nonpoultry), and poultry products, and eggs (see
attachment A).
In general, Belgian exports of dairy products far
exceed other categories of Belgian agricultural
exports (table 8.1). Between 1990 and 1995, the
exports of dairy products grew steadily and then
showed a few years of declining exports. Part of the
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6 For example, countries that took action included Australia,
Canada, Cyprus, Germany, Hong Kong, Portugal, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand.drop between 1998 and 1999 is likely due to the
Belgium dioxin crisis because many countries,
including the United States, banned the import of
milk products from Belgium. Exports of swine prod-
ucts and “other meat” products also dropped between
1998 and 1999. Poultry exports grew consistently
over this time period while egg product exports
changed little (fig. 8.1). 
To more closely analyze the short-run economic
effects of the Belgian dioxin crisis, we compared the
longrun growth of exports of eggs and poultry, swine,
other meat, and dairy products over the decade prior to
the 1999 crisis against the shortrun effects, as meas-
ured by the percent change in exports between 1998
and 1999 (table 8.2 and fig. 8.2). These data suggest
that the Belgium dioxin crisis had a shortrun economic
impact on the export market. The estimated growth
rates for the 10 years between 1989 and 1998 were
positive for all five product categories. However,
between 1998 and 1999, the growth rate dropped and
became negative for eggs, swine, and dairy products,
with the largest decline for other meat. The change in
poultry exports between 1998 and 1999 remained posi-
tive but dropped dramatically from its longrun growth
rate of 19.1 percent. 
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Table 8.1—Belgium-Luxembourg world exports of key agricultural products, 1989-99
Product category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
— Metric tons —
Dairy products 1,184  1,156  1,402  1,586 1,586 1,719 1,890 1,711 1,622 1,741 1,676
Swine products 391 382 459 482 540 562 604 630 635 685 588
Meat products1 176 198 234 239 271 259 262 281 333 308 209
Poultry products 68 81 98 123 149 160 188 218 293 328 335
Eggs 89 94 93 98 83 110 108 105 127 118 111
1 Here “meat” refers to meat other than swine and poultry.
Source: Computed from United Nations Statistics Division’s COMTRADE database, 2002.
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Table 8.2—Comparison of the growth of Belgium-
Luxembourg exports of key agricultural products




Meat products 6.5 -32.1
Swine products 6.4 -14.2
Dairy products 4.4 -3.7
Poultry products 19.1 2.3
Source: Computed from United Nations Statistics Division's 
COMTRADE database, 2002.
Figure 8.2
Comparison of the growth of Belgium- 
Luxembourg world exports of key agricultural  
products using percent rate of growth between 
1989-99 and 1998-99
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Percent rate of growth (1989-98)The Belgium Foreign Trade Bulletin (FGTB) reports
that “it is interesting to note that the statistical data for
September, October, November, and December show a
recovery in exports, so that it seems that the effects of
the dioxin crisis had become virtually nonexistent by
then.”7 Any estimation of the exact amount of the
long-run effect on exports will require more detailed
data for a longer time period for these industries and
other directly and indirectly affected industries.
Estimated Impacts on Production
The Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs, National
Institute of Statistics (NIS) conducted a study on the
impact of the dioxin crisis on meat production (1999).
Data in this report were based on an index of production
per working day (1995=100). The NIS report (1999)
compared the change in production, processing, and pre-
serving of key agricultural products in Belgium during
the first 9 months of 1999 with data for the first 9
months in 1998. Although the dioxin contamination
began in January 1999, the major impacts were felt in
June, immediately after the Belgium public, the EU, and
the rest of the world were notified of the crisis in late
May. Overall, when considering the relative importance
of the different subsectors, the dioxin crisis caused an
estimated decrease in total food industry production of
10 percent in June 1999, 2.5 percent in July and August,
and 1.5 percent in September (NIS, 1999). If construc-
tion is excluded, the net impact on the total food industry
was a decline of 1.2 percent, 0.3 percent, 0.3 percent,
and 0.2 percent respectively for the months June through
September (NIS, 1999). 
Here we take a closer look at 6 of the 15 agricultural
sub-sectors in the NIS report, those that were either
directly and adversely affected or profited from the 
crisis:8
1)  Poultry meat products,
2)  Meat and meat products,
3)  Slaughtering of cattle,
4)  Dairies and cheese making, and
5)  Fish and fish products,
6)  Prepared feeds for farm animals.
Monthly production indices (1998-99) for each of
these six product categories are provided in attachment
B. Table 8.3 presents the change in the production
index for each product category for the first 9 months
of 1999 from its corresponding index for the first 9
months of 1998. We developed figure 8.3 so that the
impacts from the crisis and patterns of change for
these six categories could be more easily identified
and compared.
In general, the three meat industry categories (poultry
meat production, meat and meat product production,
and slaughtering of cattle) were the subsectors hit hard-
est in terms of declines in monthly production/process-
ing and preserving. Clearly, the sharpest production
declines occurred in June 1999, right after the public
announcement about the crisis in late May. An analysis
of the long-term effects of the crisis would require more
recent data. However, the worst impacts for all six cate-
gories seemed to be over in July 1999 with the different
subsectors gradually returning to pre-crisis levels over
subsequent months. 
Poultry meat products had the steepest drop in the data
series, 53.5 percent lower in 1999 than in 1998. This is
not surprising because the first bans resulting from the
crisis included the domestic sales of Belgian-produced
chicken meat and egg products and exports of Belgian
chicken products. Although one might expect a larger
drop for feed production, the amount of feed contami-
nated by dioxins was small compared with that pro-
duced and used each week in Belgium, and the feed that
was contaminated was distributed widely, mostly to
poultry producers. 
There were negative percent (index) changes during
the entire first 9 months of 1999 for the production,
processing, and preserving of meat and meat products.
This is consistent with the declining trend in the
demand for these products. During 1995-98, consump-
tion of fresh meat in Belgium declined heavily, as it
did in most of the other EU countries (Verbeke and
Ward, 2001). In particular, the gradual long-term
decline in per capita beef consumption is likely caused
by long-term changes in the eating habits and demo-
graphics of EU consumers (EC, 1997; EC, 1998; see
chapter 4). However, the largest drop in Belgian pro-
duction of meat and meat products was observed dur-
ing June 1999 (-42.4 percent). The decreased cattle
slaughter was likely a function of several factors such
as temporary slaughter bans, which kept many animals
on the farms. 
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7 Source: BFTB - Statistics / Annual Study Belgium’s Foreign Trade
in 1999. URL: www.obcebdbh.be/import_en/info-centerr/trade-
statistics/annual-study/1999/as-sbreakdown_en.html
8 Other categories not covered here include a wide range of products
such as beverages, tobacco, cocoa, bread, condiments, and seasoning. In the production category “dairies and cheese mak-
ing,” declines were more subtle and seemed to quickly
return to monthly decreases. The NIS report considers
this category one of the indirectly affected subsectors.
While several production categories showed marked
declines after the announcement, others, such as fish
and fish products, showed increased production and
profited from the dioxin problem. Monthly changes for
fish and fish products show some natural fluctuation,
perhaps due to seasonal changes or harvest factors.
However, the June 1999 index was 24.4 percent higher
than in June 1998. This likely reflects consumers’belief
that these food products posed lower risks from dioxin
contamination, and consumers may have substituted fish
products for meat and swine products. In particular,
according to the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service
(FAS), Belgian seafood consumption rose 50 percent in
June 1999 due to the crisis, with increased shellfish
sales offsetting a decreased market for other kinds of
seafood (FAS, June 13, 2001).
Another production category that appeared to benefit
from the crisis, at least in the short run, was prepared
feeds for farm animals. The July increase was likely due
to the temporary slaughter ban that kept many animals
on the farms, creating a greater demand for animal
feeds (NIS, 1999). Although the dioxin contamination
originated in animal feeds, other production sectors
were far more affected in percentage terms.
The Belgian swine industry suffered when test results
in June 1999 confirmed dioxin contamination of swine
on some farms (FAS, Aug. 1, 1999). Contaminated
swine farms were depopulated. On other farms, swine
facilities became overcrowded because of reduced
demand, adding unnecessary feed costs, limiting stable
space, and prohibiting fatteners from buying piglets
and starting new fattening cycles. Increased quantities
of pork were put into storage because of reduced mar-
kets. The Belgian pork sector received limited finan-
cial aid from the Belgian government for this crisis
and received no financial aid from the European
Commission (FAS, Aug. 1, 1999). 
Summary of Impacts 
The combination of slaughter bans, large price conces-
sions, and reduced markets after the dioxin crisis posed
an economic burden on consumers, food producers, and
food exporters. On August 16, 2003, the EC approved a
Belgian aid agreement that would reimburse farmers 80
percent of market price of their losses (Lok and Powell,
2000). The Belgian government estimates that the dioxin
crisis cost 465 million ($493 million), with about 100
million ($106 million) attributed to the loss in the swine
sector (where 1999 1.00= US$ 1.06) (FAS, Feb. 1,
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Figure 8.3
Monthly change in Belgium-Luxembourg 
production/processing and preserving of 
agricultural products indices between 
1998 and 1999
% change











Meat and meat products
Fish and fish products
Poultry meat products
Slaughtering of cattle
Dairies and cheese making
Prepared feed for farm animals
Source: Belgium Ministry of Economic Affairs, National Institute 
of Statistics, 1999.
Table 8.3—Monthly change in Belgium-Luxembourg production/processing and preserving of agricultural
products indices between 1998 and 1999
Product category Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep.
Percent
Poultry meat products 4.3 13.4 11.9 1.5 1.8 -53.5 -31.6 -22.1 -9.1
Meat and meat products -6.6 -5.7 -0.9 -7.0 -3.8 -42.4 -19.3 -19.7 -13.5
Slaughtering of cattle -7.0 -8.1 -5.6 -8.2 -5.4 -29.5 -9.8 -18.2 -17.6
Dairies and cheese making -3.4 -3.6 -3.0 -2.7 -2.9 -8.7 -2.0 -3.2 -9.1
Fish and fish products -1.1 9.6 16.8 -5.4 4.6 24.4 13.8 -9.5 15.1
Prepared feeds for farm animals 0.7 0.5 1.8 3.5 8.5 1.7 6.8 2.4 -6.1
Source: Belgium Ministry of Economic Affairs, National Institute of Statistics, 1999.2001, pg. 18, 19).9And as other EU countries were also
affected by export bans, the cost of this incident world-
wide will likely be higher. 
The economic impact of the Belgian crisis was rela-
tively small compared with the Belgium economy’s
GDP (1999) of $266 billion in 1999, but was important
for agriculture, which accounted for 1.4 percent of GDP
or $3.7 billion.10 In 2000, on the heels of the Belgian
dioxin crisis, Belgium confirmed its first case of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). This BSE crisis cost
Belgium an additional 250 million (FAS, Feb. 1, 2001)
(chapter 4 provides more details on BSE).
These costs of the dioxin crisis are, however, offset to
some extent by gains obtained in industries and countries
that provided substitute products. In response to the
Belgian dioxin scare and the temporary removal of some
food products from Belgian supermarkets, Belgian con-
sumers became more concerned about food safety and
many began consuming more produce, organic eggs, and
other organic products. The dioxin crisis also prompted
increased consumption of mutton, lamb, and horsemeat
(FAS, April 17, 2000). The clearest example of a Belgian
food industry that profited from the dioxin crisis is the
appreciably increased production of “fish and fish prod-
ucts” [includes shellfish] in June and July 1999 (NIS,
1999). And, in the German market, there appears to have
been temporarily increased demand for pork and slaugh-
ter hogs (FAS, Aug. 1, 1999). 
Although one might expect that food imports may have
helped reduce or mitigate some of the impacts of the
Belgian dioxin crisis on the domestic economy, United
Nations trade statistics for 1989-2001 show that meat
imports into Belgium-Luxembourg actually fell in 1999
from its 10-year high. The fall in meat imports in 1999
likely reflects, in part, the decreased demand for meat
following the crisis. For example, per capita consump-
tion of beef and veal in Belgium also decreased in 1999,
probably partly due to the dioxin crisis (FAS, Feb. 1,
2001, p. 7).11
Public and Private 
Sector Response
As with the BSE crisis, the dioxin scare illustrates that a
food safety crisis can impose high financial and political
costs on industries and countries. The Public Health
Minister and the Agriculture Minister resigned after if
became clear that the Belgian government had known
about the dioxin crisis for weeks before announcing it
to the public and the EC (Ashraf, 1999). The Dutch
Minister of Agriculture also resigned after similar criti-
cism (Lok and Powell, 2000). Public confidence in both
the food supply and the Belgian government was shaken
and, partly because of this, the ruling party was later
ousted in a national election (Lok and Powell, 2000).
In addition to mitigation actions, the dioxin crisis and
general concerns about dioxins resulted in several
responses by the public sector. First, the Belgian gov-
ernment created a new agency called the Federal
Agency for Safety of the Food Chain in response to
the lack of public communication and internal mecha-
nisms that exasperated the crisis (FAS, Aug. 17, 2000).
This new agency has broad responsibilities that ensure
food safety from farm to table and once fully imple-
mented, it will be placed under the Ministry of Public
Health (FAVV, 2002).12 Second, this new agency insti-
tuted a traceability and monitoring system to extend
the existing SANITEL system for the mandatory iden-
tification of cattle. A meat traceability component
extends the system to other animals and beyond the
slaughterhouse (BELLTRACE) and a monitoring com-
ponent—Contaminant Surveillance System (CON-
SUM)—tests for chemical and microbiological
contamination of feedstuffs and all animal food prod-
ucts such as eggs, oils, fats, dairy, fishery, and derived
products (FAS, Nov. 5, 2001). The goal of this moni-
toring system is early detection of contamination.
Third, the Belgian government will execute certain
decisions taken by the EC concerning dioxins.
For example, the EC asked the EU’s Standing
Committee on Animal Agriculture and Nutrition
(SCAN) and the Scientific Committee on Food (SCF)
for scientific opinions about the contamination of feed
and food by dioxins and closely related PCBs. As a
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9 Of this amount, 165 million was for the Ministry of Agriculture
and 300 million was for the Ministry of Public Health (FAS, Feb.
1, 2001). No further description was provided in the publication.
10 www.state.gov/www/background_notes/belgium_0006_
bgn.html, accesssed May 17, 2002.
11 Pork consumption also fell in 1999 due to the dioxin crisis
(FAS, Feb. 1, 2001, p. 14) and live pig exports increased consider-
ably, particularly to Dutch slaughterhouses (FAS, Feb. 1, 2001,
p. 14). Another factor affecting pork production is EU legislation
against nitrate emissions (FAS, Feb. 1, 2001, p. 13).
12 Previously, food safety in Belgium was controlled by five agen-
cies and is now covered instead by one new agency that falls under
the authority of the Ministry of Public Health. See FAS June 26,
2000 report for details on the agency’s seven assignments.result, two reports were released in November 2000.
The SCF report established a temporary tolerable
weekly intake (TWI) for dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs
of 14 pg/kg body weight (EC, Nov. 22, 2000). These
were updated on May 30, 2001. Meanwhile, the SCAN
report’s main conclusion is that fish oil and fishmeal are
the most heavily contaminated feed materials, followed
by animal fat (EC, Nov. 6, 2000). The report recom-
mended an emphasis on reducing the most contami-
nated materials. Both reports recommended an
integrated approach that would reduce dioxin contami-
nation all along the food chain, a more systematic and
coordinated generation and collection of comparable
and reliable data, and a continuing reduction of emis-
sions to the environment. 
Given these two reports and an earlier White Paper on
Food Safety that identified the need to set standards for
contaminants in feed and food (EC, Jan. 12, 2000), the
EC proposed a strategy to reduce dioxin in animal feed,
the environment, and food in July 2001 (EC, July 20,
2001). In October 2001, the EC adopted this strategy
(EC, Oct. 25, 2001). In essence, this strategy has two
parts. The first part identifies short to medium-term (5
years) and long-term (10 years) actions that combined
are intended to provide a comprehensive understanding
of the dioxin/PCB problem and existing trends to assist
future evaluation and policymaking. The second part
has three components: (1) maximum levels to set regu-
latory limits for dioxin in foods and feeds, (2) action
levels to serve as early warning indicators of undesir-
able dioxin levels so measures can be taken to elimi-
nate the sources and pathways of contamination, and
(3) target levels to bring food and feed, over time,
down below the SCF’s recommended TWI of 14 pg/kg
body weight for dioxins. 
The U.S. government also monitors potential dietary
sources of dioxins. Since 1995, the FDA has tested sev-
eral hundred samples a year, primarily fish and foods
sold at retail outlets (FDA, 2000). Meanwhile, EPA and
the FSIS test for dioxins in U.S. beef, pork, and poul-
try. In 1999, as part of the Total Diet Study, FDA
started dioxin monitoring in 200 of the most commonly
consumed foods in the United States (FDA, 2000). The
U.S. also began monitoring animal feeds that may con-
tribute to the dioxin levels in some foods (FDA, 2000).
FDA’s monitoring program has been successful in iden-
tifying elevated levels of dioxin in some mineral com-
ponents of animal feed and is taking action to stop
distribution of any contaminated product (for example,
see FDA, February 28, 2003).
Dioxin Crisis and Belgian Consumers
During the crisis, Belgian consumers switched to other
food products to avoid dioxin-contaminated products
either voluntarily or as a result of limited access to
foods in supermarkets and stores. Some apparently
crossed into England, France, or Germany in search of
untainted food. Meanwhile, some Belgian towns opened
dump sites so that local residents could leave suspect
foods for destruction (BBC news, June 5, 1999).
The dioxin crisis caused a high awareness and anxiety
about food safety in Belgium that served as back-
ground stress for consumer reaction to another scare,
this time over Coca-Cola (Nemery et al., 1999). Within
a month of the announcement about the dioxin crisis,
schoolchildren and others across Belgium began com-
plaining about nausea, headaches, and other symptoms
that they believed were caused by drinking bottled
Coca-Cola. There were never any significant lab or
physical findings to support these claims and some
people believed that features of this outbreak pointed
to mass hysteria or mass sociogenic illness (Nemery et
al., 1999).13 There was intense media coverage about
the Coca-Cola scare on the tails of intense media cov-
erage about the dioxin incident. 
Conclusion
The Belgian dioxin crisis illustrates that an interna-
tional food safety crisis can have significant, short-
term impacts on the implicated industries and the
exporting country. The dioxin crisis affected a large
array of agricultural industries in Belgium (e.g., feed,
meat, poultry, cattle slaughter, dairy and cheese mak-
ing) and interrupted trade with the United States and
more than 30 other countries (Lok and Powell, 2000).
The crisis also illustrates how consumers react to
crises in the short run, switching to nonsuspect prod-
ucts (e.g., organic eggs). More recent data and more
research are needed to clarify if there are longrun
impacts from the crisis, the extent of such impacts, and
whether the possibility that the contamination could
have been intentional (in some way) had any impact
on consumer food safety perceptions.
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13 Mass sociogenic illness “can be defined as a constellation of
symptoms of an organic illness, but without identifiable cause,
which occurs among two or more persons who share beliefs
related to those symptoms” (Philen et al., 1989).As a result of this crisis, Belgium took multiple
actions to minimize the spread of the contamination,
resolve the problem, and be better prepared for similar
crises (e.g., creation of a single federal agency to cover
food safety from farm to table). However, the month-
long period between when the government was first
notified of the problem and when it was publicly
announced was seen as irresponsible by many stake-
holders and therefore, the Belgian government lost
credibility, trust, and authority and received little credit
for all the positive and proactive measures that were
taken (Lok and Powell, 2000). Despite the govern-
ment’s explanation that the delay was to first confirm
whether the dioxin had entered the human food supply,
by the time of this explanation, criticism and discus-
sion focused on the government instead of on those
responsible for the contamination or on the extant reg-
ulation, surveillance, and enforcement that allowed the
crisis to occur (Lok and Powell, 2000). 
In general, many factors come into play in the identifi-
cation of a food safety crisis, including the existing
surveillance systems and the way that the contamina-
tion manifests itself in animals and humans (e.g.,
declining ratio of hatched eggs, time to develop acute
or chronic illness in humans). On the one hand, the
financial stakes of erroneously announcing a crisis can
be high, so regulators have some reason to be cautious
about prematurely alerting the public and trading part-
ners about a potential crisis until there is sufficient,
accurate information on the source, extent, and risk
posed by the crisis. For example, the California
Strawberry Commission estimated that growers in the
central coast of California lost $16 million in revenue
to during June 1996 when their products were falsely
implicated as the cause of the Cyclospora outbreak
later attributed to Guatemalan raspberries (Mishen,
1996) (see chapter 5). On the other hand, a greater
time lag between the initial contamination and its
identification and control can extend and magnify the
impacts of a food safety crisis on production, trade,
and consumption. And, any public information lag
about a potential food safety crisis can be a point of
criticism used against governments. 
A persistent challenge in major food safety crises will
be the fine balance between gathering sufficient, accu-
rate information on such an event (e.g., source, cause,
human and animal health risks) and the timely release
of information to the public and trading partners.
Overcoming this challenge will be important for gov-
ernments and implicated industries to minimize dam-
age to food markets and maintain consumer
confidence in both the food supply and in govern-
ments’ ability to handle food safety crises.
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Attachment A—Belgian-Luxembourg exports, 1989-1999
Products 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Metric tons
Meat products 
Bovine meat,fh,ch,w.bone 95,803 110,098 123,608 117,085 111,447 94,805 86,958 80,303 83,850 74,097 59,686
Bovine meat,fh,ch,bnless 8,753 16,012 14,065 11,228 13,418 11,718 12,894 12,778 14,988 14,735 18,413
Bovine meat,frozn,w.bone 4,680 1,089 1,566 5,831 3,461 981 988 3,344 4,519 2,291 2,141
Bovine meat,frz,boneless 7,579 10,197 23,548 28,303 35,441 33,395 39,983 42,082 36,044 21,651 13,528
Meat of sheep,frsh,chlld 2,648 2,947 2,602 2,393 1,803 1,570 2,348 1,283 2,064 2,744 4,248
Meat of sheep, frozen 1,966 1,572 1,502 1,576 3,613 6,192 7,254 5,406 6,532 8,155 9,604
Meat of goats 10 4 24 56 2 - - 3 3 1 1
Meat of horses,mules,etc 10,160 10,198 12,377 13,523 22,934 23,831 22,493 29,281 30,315 29,735 8,127
Edible offal,bov.frsh,ch 1,843 2,364 2,028 2,583 6,051 5,797 9,666 10,126 10,929 15,554 3,621
Edible offal,bov.,frozen 4,791 5,461 7,950 9,441 10,175 10,050 9,999 12,281 10,802 7,126 23,699
Ed.off.sheep,horse,fh,ch 137 211 134 43 127 91 114 134 144 255 765
Ed.off.sheep,horse,frozn 307 472 250 440 324 430 360 481 614 789
Meat,ed.off,rabbit,hares 1,675 1,473 965 1,719 1,914 1,371 1,265 1,387 1,740 1,975 1,671
Other meat,edible offal 210 338 333 429 2,712 3,404  1,152 1,440 1,824 2,595 3,944
Bov.meat,dried,smkd,salt 323 341 434 263 208 161 179 74 48 15 18
Oth.mt,off.flr.dr,sk,slt 750 694 616 603 592 1,594 1,763 6,270 6,120 6,469 970
Extract,juice meat,fish 76 26 119 75 29 77 284 75 193 140 143
Sausage of meat,offl.etc 10,315 11,057 15,661 16,490 31,142 34,360 35,611 48,548 90,626 87,611 31,676
Liver,preprd,presrvd,nes 19,590 18,276 21,040 21,486 20,348 21,482 22,560 21,167 24,628 26,422 20,241
Bov.meat,prpd,prsrvd,nes 2,402 2,717 2,986 3,361 3,253 5,945 4,053 3,016 4,561 4,121 4,676
Oth.meat,prpd,prsrvd nes 1,679 1,972 2,340 2,325 2,240 1,698 1,756 1,803 2,206 1,998 2,266
Swine products
Meat of swine,frsh,chlld 163,253 164,759 225,308 255,158 303,100 312,721 380,216 389,984 375,100 422,131 400,652
Meat of swine, frozen 127,924 113,315 122,308 111,642 108,060 120,409 100,011 103,040 100,301 102,969 94,898
Edible offal,swine,fh,ch 3,740 3,555 4,724 6,007 14,476 12,928 13,596 19,036 24,564 27,200 20,494
Edible offal,swine,frzen 17,546 17,336 17,872 20,894 20,695 25,518 23,130 24,449 29,002 31,743 218
Hams,shoulders with bone 2,683 2,118 1,934 1,641 2,944 2,087 1,607 2,022 1,895 2,042 1,893
Bellies (streaky) 5,496 4,969 5,029 4,006 6,493 7,419 5,883 7,092 7,186 7,433 6,635
Oth.pigmeat,dry,salt,smk 20,209 17,974 18,431 15,638 13,597 12,488 12,618 13,484 14,286 12,223 10,580
Pork,prepred,presrvd,nes 49,968 58,022 63,839 66,734 70,205 68,847 67,009 71,081 82,199 79,709 52,911
Poultry products
Poultry,whole,frsh,chlld 4,692 9,086 11,311 13,651 18,734 18,372 17,128 21,617 25,405 27,868 28,598
Poultry,whole, frozen 24,076 23,878 26,379 29,396 29,821 23,792 21,305 19,559 26,313 27,625 19,577
Liver,goose,duck,fh,chll 567 467 429 179 337 222 135 107 340 226 329
Poultry,parts,frsh,chlld 19,407 24,417 32,671 44,233 53,674 55,613 62,189 70,339 101,174 115,008 111,551
Poultry,prts,frzn.ex.liv 15,222 17,564 19,217 25,292 34,713 46,949 69,532 84,304 112,687 130,182 123,283
Poultry livers, frozen 114 309 498 558 812 796 703 - - - 28,843
Poultry,prprd,prsrvd,nes 4,052 5,010 7,815 9,709 10,706 13,919 17,303 22,420 26,905 26,609 22,903
Eggs
Birds’ eggs, in shell 47,730 49,207 47,963 52,991 42,293 71,956 66,493 70,359 82,115 76,431 76,226
Egg,unshelld;yolks,dried 664 893 1,175 1,117 1,728 2,177 1,343 1,848 3,477 3,488 4,295
Egg,unshelld;ylk,not dry 32,690 37,022 36,015 34,552 29,876 24,476 30,142 22,358 27,624 25,872 19,340
Egg albumin 8,348 6,770 8,275 9,147 9,358 11,213 10,444 10,647 13,302 11,950 10,798
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Attachment A—Belgian-Luxembourg exports, 1989-1999--Continued
Products 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Metric tons
Dairy products
Milk,fat cont.1% or less 112,910 108,801 136,778 117,727 109,296 109,303 117,855 89,192 102,680 93,358 68,845
Milk,cream fat cont.1-6% 513,589 478,418 564,070 693,685 683,570 801,064 823,817 779,161 682,509 690,327 693,046
Cream,fat content 6%+ 23,402 18,186 21,645 33,628 21,850 34,248 30,397 45,477 45,926 91,210 93,388
Milk,solid, to 1.5% fat 84,832 63,038 83,660 90,003 102,217 76,406 150,836 88,946 65,808 62,361 90,491
Milk,crm solid 1.5%+ fat 36,126 34,430 69,614 72,173 99,578 119,699 176,401 115,213 92,427 90,237 71,961
Milk,cream unsweetened 20,370 30,875 41,327 62,800 24,765 25,477 28,560 18,271 34,342 78,552 54,366
Milk,cream, sweetened 12,576 16,626 20,423 20,940 20,057 11,936 20,329 16,185 12,239 12,854 15,663
Yogurt 34,675 47,892 62,897 73,052 90,978 85,281 90,533 106,609 122,552 142,647 165,474
Buttermilk 9,731 12,414 11,365 14,184 18,370 30,762 37,597 44,828 40,642 36,063 32,538
Ice cream 58,694 63,856 69,690 60,955 62,692 69,319 68,151 68,636 75,842 90,454 92,927
Whey 102,768 103,497 106,480 122,462 94,220 66,948 76,097 78,660 94,564 88,949 56,171
Milk products nes 452 1,355 734 11,914 24,546 53,470 29,264 40,833 31,349 30,670 15,159
Butter,other fat of milk 116,658 107,278 132,469 119,244 133,541 127,367 125,094 105,345 111,332 116,825 107,338
Cheese, powdered, grated 207 430 522 907 971 1,085 1,566 919 1,082 1,948 3,523
Processed cheese, whole 29,622 39,383 45,490 51,793 54,016 48,937 49,036 49,892 51,730 51,709 51,601
Blue-veined cheese 418 425 453 492 540 461 416 305 325 357 443
Fresh cheese,unfermented 794 1,290 1,232 1,616 2,088 6,302 6,516 5,449 7,345 10,975 10,226
Other cheese, curd 25,703 28,223 33,204 38,400 42,657 50,732 57,301 57,445 49,187 51,461 53,034
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Attachment B—Belgium-Luxembourg monthly production indices of key agricultural products, 1998-99
Product category Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep.
Production, processing, and preserving of meat and meat products
Year 1998 128.7 121.9 127.3 132.6 135.3 130.2 122.4 119.5 120.3
Year 1999 120.2 115.0 126.1 123.3 130.2 75.0 98.8 95.9 104.0
% change from 1998 to 1999  -6.60 -5.66 -0.94 -7.01 -3.77 -42.40 -19.28 -19.75 -13.55
Production and preserving of poultry meat
Year 1998 142.2 128.8 140.1 151.8 162.6 159.1 154.9 137.3 138.9
Year 1999 148.3 146.1 156.8 154.1 165.5 74.0 105.9 107.0 126.2
% change from 1998 to 1999 4.29 13.43 11.92 1.52 1.78 -53.49 -31.63 -22.07 -9.14
Slaughtering of cattle
Year 1998 109.7 100.9 108.5 106.8 103.5 100.4 90.1 94.2 101.4
Year 1999 102.0 92.7 102.4 98.0 97.9 70.8 81.3 77.1 83.6
% change from 1998 to 1999  -7.02 -8.13 -5.62 -8.24 -5.41 -29.48 -9.77 -18.15 -17.55
Processing and preserving of fish and fish products
Year 1998 107.3 106.6 112.1 133.7 127 119.8 119.6 123.5 112.3
Year 1999 106.1 116.8 130.9 126.5 132.9 149.0 136.1 111.8 129.3
% change from 1998 to 1999  -1.12 9.57 16.77 -5.39 4.65 24.37 13.80 -9.47 15.14
Operation of dairies and cheese making
Year 1998 109.7 101.8 109.8 107.1 107.6 104.5 85.7 89.6 99.3
Year 1999 106.0 98.1 106.5 104.2 104.5 95.4 84.0 86.7 90.3
% change from 1998 to 1999 -3.37 -3.63 -3.01 -2.71 -2.88 -8.71 -1.98 -3.24 -9.06
Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals
Year 1998 120.5 111.8 119.3 121.4 114.3 111.8 111.4 109.8 110.3
Year 1999 121.4 112.4 121.4 125.7 124.0 113.7 119.0 112.4 103.6
% change from 1998 to 1999  0.75 0.54 1.76 3.54 8.49 1.70 6.82 2.37 -6.07
Indices per working day (1995=100)
Source: Select production categories from the report by the Belgium Ministry of Economic Affairs, National Institute of Statistics titled 
“The Impact of the Dioxin Crisis on Belgian Production,” 1999.